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Notes on Business Cycle Theory from a Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium Perspective
Daniel Solomon1
1 Abstract
In these notes I go over some basic aspects of the analysis of business cycles and
aggregate uctuations from a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
perspective. I build a cannonical DSGE model with a small number of repre-
sentative agents and a large set of distortionnary wedges standing for various
frictions as an organising framework. I use this model to discuss fundamental
properties of business cycle dynamics. I start with some of the basic assump-
tions common to most applied DSGE models, and the modeling of household
and rm behaviour. Then I discuss general equilibrium and the response of the
economy to various shocks with exible prices and wages, as well as ways of ap-
plying DSGE models with actual data. Finally I add nominal price rigidities to
get the standard New Keynesian model, and discuss some open economy issues,
scal policy and unconventional monetary policy.
1bernardsolomon79@gmail.com
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2 Introduction
"Nothing is less real than realism ... It is only be selection, by elimination, by
emphasis that we get at the real meaning of things."
Georgia OKee¤e
These notes survey business cycle theory in a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) framework. The DSGE approach presents a formal rep-
resentation of an economy with households and rms doing the best they can
to attain certain objectives subject to di¤erent constraints and interacting in
competitive markets. I revise certain key points, highlight others that are often
implicit or omitted in the standard analysis and propose a framework that tries
to synthesize a vast literature and the experience of many analysts who have
worked with DSGE models.
The main objective is to use the discipline and logic of the DSGE approach as
a general framework that tries to cut through the complexity of the real world
and bring out some of the core factors driving the economy, eventually also
allowing a rough quantitative assesment of these factors and their e¤ects. To do
this, I will construct a simplied articial economy. This articial economy, or
model, allows us to more precisely analyse some of the key mechanisms behind
the functioning of the real economy, because despite its falseness it is much
easier to control and manipulate either on the computer or mentally than the
real economy.
I develop a a cannonical DSGE model that encompasses many existing mod-
els as special cases. In comparison to some of the large scale macroeconomic
models in use, the model I develop has a small number of variables and equa-
tions. Yet in comparison to other expositions of the DSGE approach my model
is more complex, with a relatively large number of features and shock processes.
The added complexity is required to provide a synthesis of some of the key is-
sues arising in applied macroeconomic analysis, issues that can be ignored in a
purely academic analysis.
I should clarify from the outset that the main goal is not to present a com-
pletely realistic model of the economy, even ignoring the di¢ culty of dening
criteria for realism. The complexity of modern society with a large number of
agents interacting almost simultaneously makes it extremely unlikely that any
mental or mathematical model of the economy would ever be complete or very
realistic anyways. At best, we can aim for for a model or a set of models that
will allow us to keep track of the main variables in the economy, explore the
logical consequences of certain assumptions, approximately mimic and study
some of the main features of the economy and through its relative simplicity
improve our grasp of reality.
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I try to focus on general results that hold across a large range of plausible
models and model calibrations without examining any specic calibrated or es-
timated models conclusions. Because the DSGE approach is quantitative, in
more specic applications we can assess its level of "realism" along important
dimensions and improve its t to the real world through standard econometric
techniques. Most of the analysis should hopefully be self contained. But in-
evitably, since this is more a set of personal notes than a formal textbook, much
of this document is better seen as a complement and an extension to more funda-
mental textbook readings on dynamic general equilibrium theory (for example
Ljunqvist and Sargent (2004) [137]ch. 1-4, 8 and 10-13, Gali (2007) [90] (ch.
2-5) and Romer (2001) [157] ch 4,7,8 and 11).
I investigate business cycles in the general denition of the term as "economy-
wide uctuations in production or economic activity over several months or
years"... "that occur around a long-term growth trend, and typically involve
shifts over time between periods of relatively rapid economic growth (an ex-
pansion or boom), and periods of relative stagnation or decline (a contraction
or recession)." (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Business_cycles). But some of
the mechanisms that I highlight are also important for explaining long run in-
come di¤erences across countries, or more prolonged economic depressions and
medium-run uctuations such as the 1930s in most of the world, or the lost
decades in Latin America in the 1980s or in Japan in the 1990s. This ability
to use a common framework to study both short run and long run issues is one
of the key strengths of the DSGE approach.
I generalise the typical textbook DSGE model by introducing a relatively
large number of stochastic wedges (otherwise known as shocks) to the decision
margins of agents in the economy. A wedge is any factor that causes a devi-
ation of economic agentsbehaviour from the benchmark decision rules of the
neoclassical growth model without any taxes or distortions. It can be seen as a
generalisation of a distortionnary (non lump-sum) tax. To use a common anal-
ogy, the undistorted neoclassical growth model represents an economy in which
all basic "plumbing" systems necessary for a well functioning society work well.
The wedges represent various factors that interfere with the "plumbing" of the
economy, making it run less e¢ ciently and smoothly.
Chari et al. (2007) [50] demonstrate that many if not all models with realis-
tic frictions such as credit constraints, imperfect competition or price rigidities
can be represented using a benchmark RBC economy with wedges that cause de-
viations of agentsdecisions from the equilibrium conditions of the undistorted
benchmark economy. Buera and Moll (2012) [35], Zha et al (2009), Curdia
and Woodford (2009) , Challe and Ragot (2010) [48] show how incomplete -
nancial markets and credit frictions can be represented in representative agent
economies as generating wedges that distort saving, investment and consump-
tion decisions. Labour market distortions can be thought of as taxes on either
labour supply or labour demand (Shimer 2009)[161]. Declines in output due to
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Keynesian price rigidity generate deviations from perfect competition that look
like increases in various taxes on production inputs (Sustek (2008), Goodriend
(2004)[96]). Ine¢ cient distribution of production inputs across rms can be
treated as lower total factor productivity (TFP).
The DSGE with stochastic wedges framework allows us to analyse both busi-
ness cycles and long run income di¤erences between countries in a unied way
(for examples of the use of this framework to study long run income di¤erences
see Parente and Prescott (1999) [153], Restuccia and Rogerson (2007) [156],
Buera and Shin (2012) [36], Jones (2011) [115]). It also also provides an in-
tuitive description of the mechanisms behind di¤erent business cycle events as
changes in the "taxes" on various activities. As a result, we can analyse busi-
ness cycles with similar tools and concepts as those used in public nance. The
cost of the distortionnary wedges approach is that we can no longer treat the
representative households objective function as the relevant measure for welfare
analysis. When wedges are exogenous and the baseline model has exible prices
and wages, we can compute the competitive equilibrium of the economy using
a social planner maximisation problem, but we should nevertheless remember
that this does not imply a Pareto optimal allocation from the perspective of
households in the economy. Since we focus on positive analysis, the limited
normative validity of the model is not a big concern. 2
I start by developing the real business cycle (RBC) model, in which only
real (ination adjusted) variables are determined and only relative prices matter.
After studying the RBCmodel in depth, I add nominal pricing rigidities that link
the DSGE framework with the traditional sticky price Keynesian framework.
Sticky price models can be seen as a formalisation of the popular notion of
business cycle uctuations being caused by disequilibrium between supply and
demand due to ine¢ cient prices. Flexible price RBC models instead try to
explain business cycles as equilibrium responses to factors that shift output
despite relatively e¢ cient price setting. Both frameworks can t the data well
along many dimensions but with radically di¤erent prescriptions for economic
policy.Many business cycle analysts emphasize the primary role of sticky prices
in explaining most of the short term dynamics of the economy. They would
argue that the RBC model is at best just a prelude to the actual business cycle
analysis using a Keynesian sticky price model, or at worst a distraction. But
there are several reasons for spending a lot of time and e¤ort on the RBC model.
2Chari et al (2008) argue that the basis of formal welfare analysis using agentsobjective
functions in the most recent generation of monetary DSGE models is tenouous at best. They
also suggest that many of the shocks in those models should be interpreted as wedges as in
BCA. The key distinction from this perspective between BCA and the current generation
of monetary policy DSGE models is that the former allow for more pervasive static and
dynamic correlations between the shocks, while the latter usually assume the shock processes
are independent of each other. But once we accept the shocks are not structural, there is no
reason to assume they are not correlated with each other. While BCA has been performed
so far using RBC models, it could also be implemented using an economy with nominal price
rigidities as the prototype/baseline model augmented with wedges.
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First, the model is exible in allowing for various market imperfections.
The original RBC model (e.g King and Rebelo [126]) assumed all business cycle
uctuations were e¢ cient, in the Pareto optimality sense: the government could
not improve economic outcomes without hurting at least some agents. Modern
RBC theories allow for all sorts of market ine¢ ciencies that can be potentially
reduced through government policies. The common denominator of RBC models
is the absence of monetary frictions or nominal price and wage rigidity (e.g cash
in advance constraints, staggered nominal price settig), not the lack of any
sources of frictions and ine¢ ciences (e.g incomplete nancial markets, market
power and real wage rigidity).
Second, even with nominal price rigidity the response of the economy to
shocks comes closer to the dynamics of the RBC model over time. Therefore
from one perspective, this baseline will serve as a backbone of the Keynesian
sticky price macroeconomics that I discuss next.Disagreement about the per-
sistence and size of the deviations from the exible price equilibrium is at the
heart of the debate between conventional sticky price Keynesian economists and
economists of the real business cycle school. The former believe deviations from
the exible price equilibrium can last for years, while the latter believe any
deviations are likely to be small and last no more than a few quarters if at all.
Finally the RBC model with stochastic wedges can serve as a more gen-
eral framework that encompasses both exible price and Keynesian sticky price
models, in the spirit of Chari et als (2007) [50] business cycle accounting. The
sticky price model can be mapped into an equivalent RBC model with the ap-
propriate process for the stochastic wedges. Our generalised RBC model allows
us to decompose and classify various mechanisms a¤ecting the economy without
taking the exible price assumption too literally. We can then think about those
mechanisms in greater detail using a suite of auxiliary, more fully microfounded
models.
From this perspective, the RBC model with stochastic wedges can be seen as
a a core model that helps organise our thinking and complement other auxililary
models that dig deeper into the mechanisms behind the economic environment.
For example these include models with heterogeneous households (e.g Carroll
(2001) [46], Krusell and Smith (1998) [131], Iacoviello and Pavan (2013) [111]),
models with heterogenous rms (e.g Arellano et al (2012) [12], Bloom et al
(2012) [34],Khan and Thomas (2013) [123]), models with imperfect information
(e.g Benhabib et al (2013) [26] , Angeletos and Lao (2012) [11]), models with -
nancing constraints and banking (e.g Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) [93], Iacoviello
(2005) [109], Christiano et al (2012) [56])), models with matching frictions (e.g
Bai et al (2012) [17], Farmer (2011) [80]). In applied settings, we can use a
suite of these models to analyse various components of the environment, while
keeping track of the interactions between di¤erent components using the core
DSGE model.
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3 Sorting out some core assumptions
The essence of the DSGE approach is the requirement for the economist to
carefully specify all demand and supply functions, or their imperfect competition
equivalents, and all budget and other accounting constraints of the economy
that are necessary to conduct the analysis. To accomplish this, we need to say
something about the main agents, or actors, in our model.
The model economy consists of many almost identical households that can
be summarized by one or 2 representative households that own all the rms, and
many identical rms that can be summarized by a representative rm. House-
holds and rms interact through competitive markets for goods, labour, capital
and nancial assets. Their decisions are a¤ected by several stochastic wedges or
taxes. These represent various nancial marketsimperfections, search frictions
and imperfect information. I use more wedges than Chari et als (2007) [50]
business cycle accounting (BCA) framewok to allow a more detailed identica-
tion of various frictions distorting the economy, for example through data on
wages and asset prices.
BCA usually assumes that the wedges are exogenous and follow a general
reduced form stochastic process such as a VARMA(p,q) after the appropriate
stationarity inducing transformations (such as linear detrending or rst di¤er-
encing). They can be correlated among themselves both dynamically (for exam-
ple through a VAR(p) component of their joint stochastic process) and statically
(e.g through correlated shock innovations). The wedges can also be linked to
the models endogenous variables to take into account interactions between the
full state vector of the economy and the wedges. For example, the feedback
between nancial frictions and the level of economic activity (frequently called
the nancial accelerator) is captured up to a linear approximation by a VAR(p)
that includes both the wedges and the endogenous states. 3
3.1 Rational choice
3.1.1 Denition and motivating assumptions
The supply and demand functions in the DSGE approach are usually derived
from the rational choice assumption: agents do the best they can to attain
certain goals summarized by a value function, subject to the perceived and
actual constraints they face. Formally they pick a vector of decision variables x
to solve
max
x2C(x;z)
V (x; z);
for some value function V (:) and constrained set C(:); where z is a vector of
exogeneous variables. This principle for deriving decision rules can be made
3Note that in this case the competitive equilibrium is no longer equivalent to a social
planner optimisation problem.
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almost tautological by allowing for enough exibility in agents perceptions.
There are theorems guaranteeing that any behaviour can be represented as the
solution to a dynamic optimisation problem for some pattern of beliefs and
preferences (Rust,2006 [158]). This makes the rational choice assumption in
its most general form more of a framework for structuring our thinking rather
than a falsiable hypothesis: a method for deriving the dynamics of di¤erent
variables by always trying to "rationalise" decisions, asking (mathematically)
"What were they thinking ?".
The rational choice approach tries to capture on average at least the com-
plexity of human and organisational decision making. It provides a convenient
recipe for discovering potentially key e¤ects of the agents economic environ-
ment on their decisions without actually having access to what is in their mind
when making those decisions, when surveys are likely to be highly unreliable
and of limited external validity.
It provides an abstract, idealised, description of the response of economic
agents to key factors such as uncertainty, diminishing marginal utility of con-
sumption (more generally diminishing marginal sensitivity to di¤erent stim-
uli),search costs in labour or product markets, quantity adjustment costs. Clas-
sic examples include the bu¤er stock/permanent income consumption-saving
model (Carroll (2001) [46], Attanasio et al (2010)[14]), the search frictions model
of labour markets (e.g Ljunqvist and Sargent (2004) ch. 26 [137], Hall (2014)
[105]) and the neoclassical capital investment model with xed adjustment costs
(Khan and Thomas (2008) [122], Bloom et al (2012) [34]). In formulating these
abstract descriptions it forces the analyst to think more carefully about the mo-
tivations of people and organisations in the economy and the constraints they
face in trying to achieve certain goals.
In practice, DSGE models usually simplify the analysis by equating agents
perceptions of the process governing the evolution of their value functions and
constraints with the analysts perceptions of the actual process along most di-
mensions. Obviously, this strict perfect optimisation version of the rational
choice approach is highly unrealistic. Relative to the benchmark that it estab-
lishes, actual decisions must be subject to signicant optimisation errors.
The strict form of the rational choice approach should really be seen as
an idealised abstraction of agents that take reasonably good decisions. It is a
useful vehicles for quantication and improving our intuition as long as agents
in the economy on average approximately solve the optimisation problems they
face correctly: as long as there are some fundamental reasons explaining and
justifying most of agentsdecisions, at least as a rough approximation. In this
case, the focus of formal analysis should rst be on the fundamental motivations
and constraints that shape behaviour. Adjustments for misperceptions and
decision making biases can be added afterwards using reduced form statistical
models to make the analysis more realistic.
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Things are more complicated because any model of the economic environ-
ment (whether built formally by an economist or informally by economic agents)
is likely to be missing a lot of factors, and therefore can lead to highly subop-
timal behaviour. But the rational choice assumption only requires that agents
actions are approximately optimal in the context of the simplied approximate
reality of the economic model. Agents actions may be far from the optimal
decisions because our understanding of the economy is highly incomplete and
full of errors. But this type of decision error due to the complexity of the
real world is also one made by the expert economist or nancial advisor. It is
fundamentally di¤erent from the decision errors due to psychological decision
biases or ine¢ cient heuristics that are the subject of cognitive psychology and
behavioural economics.
The claim of the strict rational choice assumption is that the economists
or decision making experts and the agents inside the model are on average
(across many economists or many agents) roughly on an equal footing in terms
of their ignorance of the truly optimal decisions. Under the strict rational choice
assumption, the expert analyst can improve decisions of the agents in the model
only by a modest amount. The gains from expertise cannot be too large. And if
our simplied model of the economy does end up capturing the main features of
the economy well, the rational choice approach assumes agents will on average
make approximately optimal choices.
A weaker interpretation of rational choice theory is that it describes average
behaviour of agents in the economy under the assumption that decision errors
across agents are random and hard to predict systematically. In this case, ir
represents a focal point, around which agentsdecisions are likely to be distrib-
uted. Formally, this is captured by the Random Utility Model (RUM) (Mas
Collel et al (1995) [143], chapter 1, Webb (2013), [175]). the RUM adds sto-
chastic preference shifters or perception errors into the exogeneous variables z:
Once we recognise how misspecied economic models can be, the rational choice
assumption takes on a more modest role. It reduces to saying that the part of
economic behaviour that can be captured most reliably by the endogenous,
structural, part of a model is the rational part. Trying to endogenise irrational
behaviour is subject to all sorts of modeling noise and biases, so irrationality
is best captured by reduced form exogenous processes such as expectations or
preference shocks capturing various decision errors.
A purely IID error implies that the analyst gives up on an attempt to sys-
tematically predict agentsoptimisation errors. More systematic deviations from
strict rational choice, that do not wash out in aggregate, can be captured by
assuming agents optimise subject to stochastic wedges that distort decisions.
For example these stochastic wedges can make capital investment look more
attractive than it actually is given rational expectations on future prots, or
they can increase the desired level of household consumption relative to the op-
timal consumption under rational expectations about future income. From an
14
econometric perspective, it can be di¢ cult to disentangle the component of any
stochastic wedge that is due to optimisation error, from the component that is
due to other factors that are not observed by the outside analyst- factors that
would make the agentsdecisions look optimal.
Recent research in Neuroscience nds evidence of a physical, neuron inter-
action based, counterpart to the value function used to rank decisions at the
core of rational choice theory. At the same time it suggests that choice must
be viewed as fundamentally stochastic, and is likely to be systematically biased
for example due to constraints on decision making time (Fehr and Rangel ,
2011)[83]. Webb (2013) [175] shows how the RUM approach can be derived as
a reduced form of the standard neural decision making model. He shows how
neurological studies of decisions can improve the specication of the error terms
in RUM, for example suggesting patterns of correlation between di¤erent types
of errors or implying heteroskedastic errors.
Research by neuroscientists may one day lead to a much more accurate model
of decision making based on a realistic understanding of the brain. But for now,
we still do not have a general neuroscience based model of decision making
in complicated economic situations such as the consumption/saving choice or
labour supply decision. As a result, the standard rational choice approach is
likely to be a mainstay of decsion making models for many years to come.
3.1.2 Alternatives to rational choice
The main alternative to a rational choice model tries to posit directly relations
between variables and functional forms without referring to any optimisation
subject to constraints. This is often called reduced form modeling. In general,
the reduced form model does not require the analyst to think as hard about
the environment and objectives of economic agents. This makes it easier to
develop new model specications, and increases the speed of analysis. At the
same time, this approach is more likely to neglect important e¤ects that are not
a priori obvious to an analyst that hasnt faced the same decisions under the
same incentives as the agents being studied. For example, in typical reduced
form approaches it is hard to know to what degree psychological features such
as risk aversion, or various features of agentsconstraints such di¤erent types of
credit constraints or the persistence of income shocks a¤ect agent behaviour.
In more sophisticated versions, analysts appeal to so called rules of thumb
or heuristics. The main idea is that the complexity of the economic environment
and the costs of thinking drive agents to adopt simple, routine, rules of behav-
iour that are adequate in satisfying agentsobjective despite being suboptimal.
These rules are often chosen rather arbitrarily, without su¢ cient justication.
At least at this stage, the rules of thumb and heuristics postulated in economic
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models without the rational choice assumption tend to underestimate the so-
phistication of human learning and approximate optimisation abilities (Levine
2012, ch.3). For small shocks, these rules of thumb may be quasi-optimal. For
the large shocks and changes that are most interesting to economists and the
public it is more likely that agents pay more attention to their environment and
try harder to optimise their decisions. In these cases, the simple rules of thumb
may no longer apply and the optimal rules derived in DSGE models may be a
better approximation to reality.
Furthermore, the optimal decision rules in DSGE models are almost always
derived as a state space model of the form
xt = h(st; vt);
st = g(st 1;et);
in which the decisions depend on a small number of state variables st. Condi-
tional on following the rule, agents only have to optimise once- when picking
the rule. Afterwards, they just need to keep on following the rule in order to
attain their objectives. But then, what prevents us from describing the optimal
decision rule itself as a simple rule of thumb? The problem is that the non
optimisation based approaches have not adequately dened the meaning of sim-
plicity in decision rules, nor have they clearly dened the threshold for agents
to be satised with a suboptimal decision rule.
There has been some work on developing models in which agents optimise
subject to information processing constraints (e.g Gabaix (2014) [87], Sims
(2010)). Gabaix (2014) develops a model of optimisation subject to constraints
on the complexity of the agents mental representation of reality. These con-
straints lead the agent to optimise subject to a simplied perception of its envi-
ronment, taking into account only a small number of factors and underreacting
to others. Formally, the agent rst chooses a vector of attention levels m; where
mj = 1 implies full attention to a variable zj (the rational choice benchmark),
while mj = 0 means that the agent ignores changes in zj ; The agent chooses m
by solving
max
m
~V (x(z;m); z)  c(m);
where c(m) is the cost of attention m; and ~V is an approximation of the
optimal value function V . Gabaix assumes that ~V is a Taylor approximation
around a default value of the exogeneous variables z, such the sample average
or last period value of z: This captures the idea that the agent already knows
how to optimise quite well in a simplied default environment, such as one with
constant interest rates or an environment that is the same as last period. After
choosing m; the agent choose x to solve
max
x2C(x;z)
V (x; z;m):
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This framework delivers many of the biases documented by behavioural eco-
nomics. For example the default value creates a status quo bias, in which
decisions are tilted in part towards past actions. It can also lead agents to
underestimate di¤erences in the prior probability of events ( the base rate fal-
lacy/representativeness heuristic), if agents do not devote full attention to those
di¤erences and rely instead on a default of equal prior probabilities. Or it can
cause agents to underestimate the amount of mean reversion in shocks to their
environment, leading to excessive extrapolation from the past.
An alternative, more complicated framework is the rational inattention model
(Sims (2010)). In this model agents optimise within a standard bayesian infer-
ence model but subject to imperfect signals about reality and constraints on
their ability to improve the precision of these signals. The signal processing
constraints force agents to allocate their limited attention to more important
sources of uncertainty, while barely responding to other less important shocks.
So far, these models have only been applied in a few simplied settings and
are often computationally harder to work with. In the future, one can envi-
sion a model combining the insistence of the DSGE approach on forward look-
ing behaviour and explicit incorporation of the e¤ects of budget constraints on
preferences behaviour with some sort of optimisation under bounded rational-
ity constraints. In the meantime, the rational choice model is its current form
may be the only operational, widely used framework for explicitly modeling
purposeful actions by intelligent agents.
At the same time, the rational choice framework often ends up signicantly
exaggerating the intelligence and access to information of agents in the economy.
So there may be a role for complementing these models with other models that
assume simpler rules of thumb behaviour, afterwards using some form of model
combination. Or one could use hybrid models mixing rational choice based
decision rules with rules of thumb, capturing an intermediate reality in which
both the implications of optimal choice and rules of thumb are captured to some
degree. The frequently used 2 household type DSGE model with unconstrained
saving households and rule of thumb households that always consume all their
income can be seen as an example of that (e.g Gali and Lopez Salido (2007) [91],
GIMF (2013)[7] ). A common model of nancially constrained entrepreneurs
assumes that except for a small xed consumption or dividend payment rate,
they invest as much as possible up to their borrowing constraint (Bernanke et al
(1999)[28], Christiano et al (2012) [56]). Other examples include DSGE models
in which a subset of agents have adaptive expectations (e.g Shleifer et al, 2013).
3.1.3 Hybrid models as a way of combining rational choice and
bounded rationality
Hybrid models that mix DSGE dynamics with reduced form models such as
VARs can also be seen as a way of mixing rational choice theory with simpler
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bounded rationality rules. A simple bounded rationality rule is to set a vector
of variables xt to some habitual level xh up to some random decision shifter
that could reect various environmental stimuli that cause the agent to deviate
from her habitual decision. One could easily imagine that these extra stimuli
are persistent, leading for example to a VAR(1) This leads to a model for the
simple rule of thumb xrott , mixing with the DSGE dynamics x
dsge
t
xt = !x
dsge
t + (1  !)xrott ;
xrott = x
h + et;
et = et 1 + vt;
0 < ! < 1;
)
xrott = x
h + (xrott 1   xh) + vt;
xt = x
0 + axdsget + b(x
rot
t 1   xh) + ut;
for appropriate denitions of x0; a:b; ut: The hybrid model can also be refor-
mulated as a version of the popular partial adjustment model
xt = x
rot
t + !(x
dsge
t   xrott ):
In this interpretation actual behaviour is governed by the rule of a thumb with
some adjustment each period towards the rational decision. We shall have more
to say about hybrid DSGE-VAR models of this kind latter.
3.2 Representative agents and the importance of income
and wealth distributions
Our core model will have 1 or 2 representative household types, and a single
representative type of rm. In its most extreme form the single representa-
tive household and rm model assumes that the distribution of resources across
agents is irrelevant when studying aggregate uctuations, except through its
impact on the wedges. Any reduction in spending by a borrower due to higher
borrowing costs is o¤set by an equivalent increase in spending by lenders. In-
come losses by lenders due to an increase in bankruptcies are o¤set by equivalent
gains to borrowers. Because of the irrelevance of the wealth and income dis-
tributions for aggregate variables, we can study a symmetric distribution of
resources with identical innitely lived agents subject to wedges without loss
of generality. The model also assumes that the demographic structure of the
population has only a small e¤ect on business cycles, so we can consider agents
with an arbitrarily long (innite) decision horizon.
In an extended model with a small number of representative agents (e.g
borrowers and savers), the approach assumes that the wealth and income dis-
tributions only matters for macroeconomic aggregates through a small number
18
of agent types. This assumption does not mean that more realistic wealth and
income distributions do not a¤ect social welfare. But the working hypothesis
is that the representative agent model can capture with reasonable accuracy
the changes in macroeconomic aggregates, which can then be used as inputs
into welfare analysis taking into account more realistic heterogeneity between
households. 4
The representative agent model with time varying wedges makes it easier to
consider the joint impact of many di¤erent frictions by simplifying computations
and economic intuition. It also makes global nonlinear solution methods easier
to apply. These methods are particularly valuable in studying large shocks such
as nancial crises. In contrast, with current computing power nonlinear solu-
tion methods may not be feasible for su¢ ciently detailed heterogeneous agent
models. Economies with a larger number of agent types or a more structural
model of any given friction are harder to solve and analyse while taking into
account the joint impact of several frictions.
For some issues explicit modeling of the e¤ect of the distribution of resources
on growth and uctuations is obviously desirable. For example, one cannot di-
rectly study the impact of the ow of debt among di¤erent households and rms
without introducing wealth heterogeneity. Demographic transition issues such
as the pension funding crisis also require models with overlapping generations of
nite life households. Though within the innite horizon representative house-
hold, the essence of the demographic shock from an aging population can be
studied as a shift towards a higher weight on leisure in the utility function.
I view the detailed examination of specic frictions in more focused,more
microfounded, heterogeneous agent models (frequently looking at only 1 or 2
frictions at a time) as complementary with the business cycle accounting ap-
proach, or the currently popular medium scale DSGE policy models with a
large number of shocks and relatively loose microfoundations. One can use the
more microfounded models to discipline the process for wedges in the economy
studied here.
4See Maliar and Maliar [139] for conditions under which this hypothesis is completely
justied for households. In particular, we need complete nancial markets. Krusell and Smith
(2006) [132] discuss conditions for approximate aggregation into a few representative agents
to hold even with incomplete nancial markets. For rms, we can get an aggregate production
function with aggregate total factor productivity as a function of the cross-section distribution
of productivities, at least in the Cobb-Douglas case (see for example Moll(2009), Hsieh and
Klenow (2009)). The business cycle uctuations in the cross-section distribution of rms can
be partially captured by the total factor productivity wedge. Perhaps the key point from
these papers and others on aggregation such as Mulligan (2011) [148] is that one should not
take the representative agent too literally as an actual agent in the economy in the same
way that the average household with a non integer number of kids does not actually exist.
Therefore, it does not make a lot of sense to ask if there is any agent in the economy who
actually behaves like the representative agent. The representative agent represents average
behaviour over many di¤erent agents. Under some conditions, studying the behaviour of such
an average over many agents is su¢ cient to (approximately) capture the aggregate dynamics
of the economy.
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I will also examine an extension of the baseline model with 2 types of rep-
resentative households, in which one type is always credit constrained. This
extension nests two tractable models that have become almost standard in s-
cal policy analysis (e.g the GIMF model (2013) [7] Iacoviello (2005) [109]): the
PIH/ROT (Rule of Thumb) model in which a subset of households simply con-
sume their income each period, and the borrower/saver model in which a subset
households always borrow the maximum allowed by their borrowing constraints.
It is a convenient way of capturing most of the insights from more realistic het-
erogeneous agent models with credit constraints and precautionary household
saving such (e.g Carroll (2000) [45] ).
3.3 Rational expectations
3.3.1 Denition and motivating assumptions
Our analysis "o¢ cially" assumes rational expectations (RE). though we will
sometimes interpret the shocks hitting the economy as caused by agent misper-
ceptions about the future. In its weakest form RE simply means that agents
in the economy form expecations optimally given the available information and
their information processing constraints. Using this denition, RE is simply an
extension of the rational choice framework to the formation of expectations.
In its stronger form RE mean that the model builder and all agents in the
model share the same conditional expectations function induced by the model.
This is equivalent to saying that from the perspective of the model agents
forecasts are unbiased, i.e. there are no systematic forecast errors. It is also
equivalent to saying that the model builder has no information advantage over
the agents in the model. This strong form of the RE hypothesis is also fre-
quently called "Model Consistent Expectations". Clearly these are unrealistic
assumptions, given the cost of acquiring and processing information in the real
world. It is highly unlikely that any agent in the economy will ever know the
true data generating process of the economy. As a result, systematic forecasting
biases in at least some directions are unavoidable.
The presence of strong heterogeneity in information and views on economic
issues and the resulting debates obviously contradict the strict RE hypothesis
that all agents share the same common knowledge of the economy. However, we
can be exible and extend our interpretation of RE to allow for di¤erences in
opinions and perceptions of the economy. The RE assumption is compatible with
an economy in which every single agents decisions deviate from the best decision
under rational expectations, but in aggregate these errors in decision making
approximately cancel out. This requires su¢ ciently small decision making units
relative to the size of the economy, and low correlation between expectational
errors to allow application of the law of large numbers. In applied work, we
can easily extend this perspective to the case in which the average of individual
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errors is an IID residual (this can be treated as measurement error in a state
space estimation framework).
Except for linear decision rules, this outcome is not what necessarily emerges
from an environment in which agentsbeliefs themselves randomly deviate from
rational expectations, but it may still be a reasonable approximation (see Mc-
Callum (1980) for a similar argument). It is almost certainly a better approxima-
tion to random expectations errors around RE than most adaptive expectations
schemes. The perspective of RE as describing the average forecast error over
many agents also reconciles RE equilibrium analysis with the traditional role
of the economist as advisor to either the government or the private sector. If
RE literally held for each agent, there would be little role for economic experts
to come in and improve decision making through their advice. But if RE only
holds on average, expert advice can help individual agent by reducing the bias
in their own personal forecasts and decisions.
At a more fundamental level, RE enforce a certain humility of the modeler:
they embody the belief that a priori the average forecasts over many di¤erent
agents in the economy at any one time are usually as good as those of an indi-
vidual economist building a model. This hypothesis receives some support from
the typical nding of the litterature on economic forecasting that consensus or
average survey forecasts usually dominate any individual economic forecast in
accuracy. When building a model, the economist knows the true data generat-
ing process by default. In this case, acknowledging that the dominance of the
average forecast across agents requires that on average agents have RE.
RE emerge as a focal point of the analysis when even though we know
there must be some common bias in agents beliefs (since they cannot know
the correct model), we cannot a priori be certain in which direction it will go.
In this case, the RE assumption examines the outcome under the mean of a
symmetric prior distribution of the direction of the bias. Ideally, one would
augment this analysis by a sensitivity analysis exploring the e¤ects of di¤erent
biases in important dimensions. One could even build probability regions taking
into account uncertainty on the direction of expectation biases. But due to
computational and time constraints, analysts almost always jump this step. So
far, the litteratures on decision making biases has suggested that agents can
both overreact and underreact to information. However, it has not provided
a clear framework explaining when we should observe under or over reaction.
Assuming both types of biases are a priori equally common and of equal size
leads to RE distorted by random expectations errors as a natural benchmark.
3.3.2 RE, adaptive expectations, learning and misperceptions
The usual alternative to RE (e.g the Fair model (Fair (2004), or the Moodys
Analytics macromodel (2011)) is to assume that agents form expectations on
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the basis of the lags of some time series that happen to be easily observable by
the economist. The adaptive expectations approach appears to better reect
the limited information and information processing capacities of some economic
agents, but it is also sure to miss many factors that enter the expectations of
economic agents. These are probably best modelled in terms of a relation be-
tween observable aggregates such as GDP and unobserved states as in the DSGE
approach. The typical implementation of adaptive expectations also does not
directly incorporate the di¤erences in opinions and perceptions of the economy
that we have highlighted as the main deviation from a strict intepretation of RE.
It just imposes a model of the average bias of economic agentsexpectations,
often without giving it su¢ cient economic or psychological motivation.
The growing research on learning in DSGE models (e.g Eusepi and Preston
(2011) [78]) is about how economic agents use the past to learn about the
evolution of the factors driving the economy (the states). Models with learning
are harder to solve than RE models. But computational constraints are likely to
drop signicantly over the next decade, and learning models have already shown
promise in generating more persistent and hump shaped dynamics in response
to shocks.
Even if we think the models with learning dynamics are more realistic, the
RE benchmark still serves as a valuable point of comparison. Examining RE
equilibria allows for a clear distinction between the conjenctured e¤ects of an
economic policy, regime change or shock that are due to the fundamental struc-
ture of the economy and the e¤ects that are due to misperceptions about the
economy. Essentially, RE allows us to isolate the economic equivalent of the
placebo e¤ect. If an economic theory does not satisfy the requirement for exis-
tence of an RE equilibrium, then it cannot be that 1) people on average believe
the theory and 2) the theory is actually true. Otherwise the theory would imply
an RE equilibrium. In that case, the theory can only be true if many people
are not aware of it or do not actually believe it, that is it cannot be a common
"conventional" opinion. Placebo e¤ects are usually less powerful or less reliable
than more fundamental e¤ects that are compatible with RE.
Finally, by clearly separating the role of expectations in in decision making,
RE automatically capture the 2 direction feedback between agent expectations
and expected outcomes. Agentsdecisions are inuenced by their expectations
about the future. But at the same time if many agents change their decisions
in a similar direction based on shifts in expectations, this will a¤ect the future.
Adaptive expectations capture the feedback from agent expectations to expected
outcomes, but they assume any feedback in the other direction happens with
a potentially important lag or does not happen at all. The RE assumption
emphasizes that agents current actions and new shocks hitting the economy
should a¤ect agentsexpectations of the future, further a¤ecting their actions
today.
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In the business cycle accounting framework, some shocks can be interpreted
as persistent deviations of agentsdecisions from RE. For example excessive pes-
simism can be mapped into a higher investment wedge, or a higher household
discount factor. I will highlight these links between deviations from RE and
shocks at several points in the text. There is one key di¤erence between these
approaches to "irrational" expectations and the traditional adaptive expecta-
tionas approach. Adaptive expectations imply predictable and easy to exploit
(for policy makers) mistakes by economic agents. While shock based deviations
from of RE allow us to explore agent misperceptions, the way they are modelled
as random processes, with the ensuing di¢ culties in identifying and quantify-
ing them, emphasizes the di¢ culty in systematically predicting and exploiting
"irrationality" for policy purposes or for private gain.
A challenge to strong reliance on easily predictable irrational beliefs is that
if 1) these expectation errors are the main cause of business cycles, 2) its easy
to measure irrational beliefs shocks in the private sector, and 3) most people
in private sector agree with this theory of business cycles, then the government
should be able to eliminate recessions simply by informing private sector agents
theyre too pessimistic. But in reality its hard for the government or a smart
economist to credibly tell people to be less pessimistic in their decisions, and
by how much they should adjust their decisions to align them with RE. This
suggests some limits on non RE shifts in expectations as an explanation for the
business cycle. At the very least, correctly measuring the amount of deviations
from RE is not an easy task.
3.4 Competitive markets
The baseline model without price rigidity assumes perfect competition. How-
ever, one of the key points of business cycle accounting is that many models
of imperfect competition can be represented as economies with perfect compe-
tition with appropriate adjustment in the wedges that distort agents supply
and demand decisions relative to an environment with actual perfect competi-
tion (Chari et al (2007) [50] ). Agents with market power behave as if they take
prices as given subject to an extra tax or lower production e¢ ciency that induce
lower supply and higher prices in equilibrium. From that perspective, assuming
perfect competition is without loss of generality as long we adjust the wedges
correctly. We will still have standard supply and demand factors playing a key
role in shaping market outcomes despite the imperfect competition.
Perfect competition is the limit of many market structures as transaction,
search and information costs decline and as the number of participants increases
(e.g Gale (1986) [88], Burdett and Judd (1983) [37], Moen (1997) [147]), Kircher
(2009) and Mas Collel et al (1995) [143], ch 10. The general idea is that agents
taking prices as given becomes a good approximation as it becomes easier for
agents in the market to meet competing o¤ers for products of a given quality or
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characteristics within a short enough amount of time. In the case of constant
marginal costs and homogeneous products, perfectly competitive outcome can
be established with just 2 competing rms (see the Bertrand model in Mas
Collel et al (1995)[143], ch. 12).
With increasing marginal costs or capacity constraints, perfect competition is
attained for homogeneous goods in the limit where search frictions decrease and
the number of rms increases, as long as buyers are allowed to simultaneously
compare multiple price o¤ers or recall previous price o¤ers and as long as rms
are allowed to ration buyers. Even without simultaneous search, the ability of
buyers to recall previous price o¤ers allows them to search rst for cheaper goods
without worrying that they will end up without any purchase. As a result, as
the number of competitors increases it becomes easier for buyers to nd goods
at the market clearing price. A rm o¤ering goods at a price signicantly above
the market clearing price would not be able to nd buyers as the number of
competitors increases. The ability to ration buyers allows rms to o¤er slightly
lower prices than the competition without worrying that they will have to make
too many sales at excessively high marginal costs. A very low price would lead
to a potentially large number of customers that would have to be served at a
marginal revenue below the marginal cost of production. As a result rms will
not o¤er prices signicantly below the market clearing price.
Research on more realistic levels of search frictions has developed the most
for labour markets(see Ljunqvist and Sargent (2004) [137],ch 26 for an intro-
duction). But we can apply most of the results from labour markets search
models to product markets if we think of rms as selling jobs worth a value
X at a price equal to X minus the wage. Firms o¤ering higher wages (or a
combination of higher wages and amenities) sell at a lower price, but with a
lower probability for the job seeker to get the job. The value functions and
functional forms will of course di¤er in product markets.5 I depart from the
perfectly competitive framework in discussing the New Keynesian sticky price
extension of the baseline model. The baseline framework for studying economies
with sticky prices is monopolistic competition: a market structure where each
rm has some market power coming from product di¤erentiation or imperfect
substitution among goods, and conditional on an index of market power (e.g
the level of substitutability among competing goods) prot margins are inde-
pendent of the number of competitors. In the exible price model, monopolistic
competition can be easily mapped into a perfectly competitive market with a
distortionary wedge.
5Old Keynesian macroeconomic models would frequently assume partially exogenous
processes for prices in the short run, with agents deciding on desired supply and demand
taking prices as given, and actual sales equal to the minimum of desired supply and demand.
From a modern perspective, the problem is that price taking is not rational given the dise-
quilibrium between desired supply and demand: agents have incentives to bargain or make
alternative price o¤ers to try to avoid the rationing in the old Keynesian model (see the Barro
critique, Barro (1977) [20]). In contrast, modern theories of search frictions derive the number
of unmatched buyer or seller vacancies and prices as endogenous outcomes of the economy.
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3.5 Shocks
DSGE models generate business cycles through shocks to the stochastic wedges.
Shocks can represent a mixture of unexpected shifts in fundamentals and shifts
in expectations that could reect rational sunspot/sentiment shocks or random
deviations from RE. The DSGE frameworkI makes no attempt to generate endo-
geneous deterministic uctuations, as done by some authors for example in the
Post Keynesian litterature. Instead, it suggests di¤erent sources of randome-
ness that cannot be fully explained or predicted in a deterministic model. These
shocks are combined with several mechanisms that amplify them, make their
e¤ects more persistent and generate hump shaped/ boom-bust (or recession-
recovery) dynamics that are typically observed in the data. The focus on ran-
dom shocks as the cause of economic uctuations is in line with the di¢ culty of
nding any deterministic cycle in the economy.
Policy makers and the business press often classify shocks to the wedges as
demand and supply shocks. Roughly speaking, demand shocks are those shocks
that shift desired spending on components of GDP such as consumption hold-
ing all general equilibrium and model based endogenous channels xed. Supply
shocks are shocks that shift the desired output of rms and desired production
factor supplies (such as labour supply) once again holding all general equilib-
rium and other endogenous model channels xed. For example an increase in
the external nance premium on household borrowing would count as a de-
mand shock, while a change in business hiring regulation will count as a supply
shock. In some cases the classication is more ambiguous, and a shock is both
a supply and demand shock. An example of this ambiguity is a change in the
consumption tax, or in the level of product market competition. The demand
and supply classication is often discounted by DSGE researchers (e.g Plosser
(1989)), because most shocks have simultaneous e¤ects on supply and demand
factors. However, it is deeply ingrained in policy makers and in non-economists
minds. Therefore, it is useful to be able to translate analysis of DSGE models
into those terms, while acknowledging that may interesting scenarios map into
a combination of supply and demand shocks.
An alternative shock classication is into intertemporal and intratemporal
shocks. Intertemporal shocks such as an external nance premium or an invest-
ment wedge shock directly a¤ect agentsintertemporal optimisation conditions.
In contrast intratemporal shocksmain direct e¤ect is on budget constraints
and intratemporal optimisation conditions. Once again, the classication is not
mutually exclusive: in the earlier example the consumption tax shock is both
intertemporal and intratemporal.
Another feature that will be important in analysing shocks is the pattern
of their dynamics. Front loaded shock processes have a bigger magnitude in
initial periods: jzt+j+1j < jzt+j j for j > 0: They hit hardest on impact and
die out gradually over time if they are stationnary. Back loaded shocks have a
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bigger magnitude with some delay during initial periods: jzt+j+1j > jzt+j j for
0 < j < J: They build up gradually over a few periods before hitting a peak and
then eventually dying out if they are stationnary. These two patterns of shocks
can lead to signicant di¤erences in the response of the economy. Front loaded
shocks have been most common until recently, usually in the form of an AR(1)
process. More recently, growth rate shocks and news shocks which are back
loaded have become the focus of attention due to their ability to capture much
of the common intuition about expectations driven business cycles, and the
gradual di¤usion of productivity improvements or new business practices. Back
loaded shocks can also capture anticipated tax or government spending shocks.
Of course transitory back loaded shocks must eventually have an anticipated
front loaded pattern as the shock dies out. The response of the economy to
the front loaded nal phase of the shock will have some similarities to the
initial response to unanticipated front loaded shocks, except one has to take
into account the shift in capital and other endogenous state variables due to the
initial back loaded part of the shock.
In the basic real business cycle model with upward sloping production factor
supplies and downward sloping production factor demands, it is di¢ cult for
demand shocks to generate business cycles. Therefore, an important departure
from the standard real business cycle model in our framework is the addition of
a distribution/marketing sector that reects search frictions in product markets
as in Rios Rull et al (2012) [17]. Fluctuations in the e¢ ciency of this sector
in response to e.g credit market shocks can capture the common notion that a
recession is a time when it is harder to nd customers for ones products. It
also allows us to formalise the popular notion of demand driven business cycles
e¤ects even with exible prices and wages. Finally it introduces well dened
notions of production capacity and capacity utilisation.
3.6 Approximations
We will use several common approximations to simplify the analysis at various
stages. A frequent approximation for production and utility functions is the
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function
u(fxig) ' a

ibix
 1

i
 
 1
:
For this function the elasticity of substitution (the percentage change in the
ratio of two inputs xjxk required to achieve a given level of u in response to a
1% change in the ratio of marginal e¤ects of xj and xk on u) is approximately
constant:
 '
 (
xj
xk
)=(
xj
xk
)


uxj
uxk

=

uxj
uxk

 :
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6A higher  means that di¤erent production inputs or utility providing goods
xi are easier to substitute in response to relative price changes.For example, as
 ! 1 u becomes a linear function and all inputs are perfect substitutes in
producing u. In some cases we will take a loglinear approximation for utility
functions and production functions,
u(fxig) ' aixii :
This Cobb-Douglas specication often emerges as the only functional form
compatible with certain restrictions such as a constant elasticity of substitution
between di¤erent production factors or utility function variables, and the exis-
tence of a long run balanced growth path (BGP) for the economy. Formally, the
Cobb Douglas function is the limit of the CES function as   ! 1: Of course
the 2 restrictions we have just mentionned are themselves convenient approxi-
mations, roughly supported by data on long run trends. In any case, loglinear
approximation often provides a tractable middle ground between the frequently
(over)used linear approximation and allowing for stronger nonlinear e¤ects. Us-
ing a 1st order Taylor approximation, it implies the intuitive restriction that a
1% change in xi changes u by approximately %:
Another common approximation will be the assumption of perfect foresight
or its extension in the form of certainty equivalence. Certainty equivalence
means that we distribute the expectations operator through the frequently non
linear function, that is
Ef(x) ' f(E(x)):
This approximation violates Jensens inequality, stating that for strictly con-
cave functions
f(E(x)) > Ef(x):
, with the reverse inequality holding for the strictly convex function g(:) =
 f(:). Typical functions in economic models can be decomposed into a nite
number of strictly concave, strictly convex or linear regions. Certainty equiva-
lence is only exact if f(:) is linear. Nevertheless for small levels of uncertainty,
the certainty equivalence approximation can be reasonably accurate and pro-
vide useful intuition. For cases with high levels of uncertainty, we can frequently
get a useful decomposition of the total e¤ects of a shock or a change in para-
meters into the certainty equivalence e¤ect and a correction for the nonlinear
uncertainty e¤ects.
For example, a typical no arbitrage condition for an asset with return Rj;t+1
states that
1 = EtMt+1Rj;t+1;
6The IES is exactly constant at the limit
 =

@(xj=xk
@(uxj=uxk)
 uxj
uxk

(
xj
xk
)
 :
27
where Mt+1 is a stochastic discount factor. Using the covariance equation, we
can rewrite this as
EtMt+1EtRj;t+1 = EtMt+1Rj;t+1   cov(Mt+1; Rj;t+1)()
EtRj;t+1 =
1  cov(Mt+1; Rj;t+1)
EtMt+1
:
Note that for a risk free asset the return
Rt+1 =
1
EtMt+1
;
so that the risk premium can be written as
EtRj;t+1  Rt+1 =  cov(Mt+1; Rj;t+1)Rt+1:
The risk premium is positive whenever the rate of return on asset j covaries
negatively with the stochastic discount factor, i.e the rate of return on j is
lower just when the investor values a high return the most. This sort of relation
is at the heart of much of asset pricing research (see Cochrane, 2011 [59]), as well
as nonlinear models with nancial frictions (e.g Mendoza (2010) [145]). In some
cases, the e¤ects that are shut down by default with certainty equivalence are
actually 1st order. I will point out several situations where taking into account
Jensens inequality reveals important new economic mechanisms for generating
and propagating busines cycles.
We will often imagine that rms and households face continuous choices,
with the optimal choice given by the the calculus rst order condition that the
derivative of the objective function with respect to the decision variable be set
to zero. Agents in our model keep on hiring, investing and accepting jobs as
long as the marginal benet exceeds the marginal cost and stop hiring, investing
or accepting jobs when the marginal benet is below the marginal cost. By the
intermediate value theorem, if the net benet function is continuous then there
exists a point at which the marginal benet equals the marginal cost. This is
the optimisation rst order condition. In reality, most choices are discrete so
that there isnt a choice exactly setting marginal cost equal to marginal benet.
Nevertheless, the rst order conditions can be a useful approximation as along
as individual agents face a su¢ ciently large number of discrete choices or as
long as there is a su¢ ciently large number of agents in the economy.
With these preliminary remarks out of the way, it is time to introduce the
two main types of agents in the model, households and rms.7
7The word "agents" is the conventional way of labelling the most basic decision making
units inside an economic model. From a marketing perspective, perhaps the term "economic
actors" would have been more appropriate, while conveying the same meaning. In some sense
a microfounded/structural macroeconomic model is at its core a mathematical story or play.
The mathematics makes the evolution of the story more concise and more logically coherent
(this is almost tautological since mathematics itself can be seen as a branch of logic). At the
same time, there is no doubt that it makes economic models less appealing to those with a
more literary inclination.
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4 Households
I start with the classic DSGE model assumption of a single representative house-
hold type, before moving on to my preferred two household types (borrowers
and savers) model There is a large number of measure 1 of identical households
with an innite planning horizon. Households try to maximise a discounted
sum of each periods payo¤ function, usually called the utility function, subject
to a sequence of budget constraints for each period.Their utility function for
each period u(c; lt) is dened over consumption ct and leisure lt:We follow the
standard expected utility assumption to deal with aggregate uncertainty so that
given any set of uncertain outcomes fuig with probabilities i households rank
decisions based on
v = iiui = Eu:
We can see this as a simplication in which 1) the contribution to v of i or
ui are independent of those of uk or k for k 6= i, 2) the contribution of ui
to v is zero if i = 0 (event i never occurs) and ui if i = 1 (event i occurs
with certainty). Yet another way of thinking about this is that each outcome
contributes to the value function a utility of ui adjusted by some weight !i that
is linear in the probability of the outcome i: Furthermore the ratio of weights
is proportional to the ratio of probabilities, !i!k =
i
k
:
These simplications are fully justied under certain reasonable but some-
times empirically violated assumptions (see Mas Collel et al (1995), ch. 6 [143]).
The expected utility theorem says that agentsobserved choices y are equiva-
lent to maximising the expected utility v above for some utility function u(y)
as long as
1) choices satisfy the standard rationality assumptions of completeness and
transitivity:the decisions maker can always rank any two choices, either by ex-
pressing a strict preference or saying that he/she is indi¤erent between the op-
tions. Also, if xA is preferred to xB ; and xB is preferred to xC ; then xA is
preferred to xC as long as preferences do not change.
2) the independence axiom is satised: if households prefer outcome xA to
an outcome xB, then given any third outcome xC they must prefer the outcome
in which xA happens with some probability  and xC occurs with probability
1    to the one where xB happens with probabilty  and xC with probability
1  ;
3) the continuity axiom is satised: if xA is preferred to xB which is pre-
ferred to xC ; there exists some probability  > 0 such that the outcome in which
xA happens with probability  and xC with probability 1  is preferred to xB :
The independence axiom is essentially a requirement that the ranking be-
tween xA and xB remains the same when we mix in the possibility of a 3rd
outcome xC : Continuity excludes lexicographic preferences in which certain op-
tions are always dominated because there is a small probability of an undesired
outcome xC . The independence axiom is the most controversial in terms of
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empirical violations, and has led to development of several models relaxing it
(perhaps the main alternative being prospect theory (Barberis,2012)).8
Households care about consumption and work e¤ort over many periods into
the future, but usually they are impatient. They care more about payo¤s closer
to the present and discount payo¤s further into the future more heavily. For-
mally, they apply a discount factor t to each periods utility: We make the
common simplifying assumption that the payo¤ in each period depends on pay-
o¤s in other periods only through budget constraints: there is no direct link
between the payo¤s in each period. This implies the total value of of intratem-
poral payo¤s is linearly additive (see Mas Collel et al (ch. 20) [143] for further
discussion of this assumption). They value any plan for choices of consumption,
leisure and saving using the objective function
E0
1
t=0tu(ct; lt)
, where without loss of generality we consider the decision at t = 0; and we
assume rational expectations (E0(:) is taken under the same probability measure
as that used by the analyst building the model): The benchmark model assumes
a time separable utility, so that past consumption does not a¤ect current utility
through preferences. There is no habit formation, a feature which is commonly
used to explain sluggish adjustment of consumption to some shocks. However,
note that we can always rewrite a utility function without habits as
u(ct; lt) = u(
ct
st
; lt)
with st = s as a constant habit stock that does not a¤ect a¤ect optimal deci-
sions. In this sense, for any time separable utility function the household values
consumption relative to a highly persistent, slowly evoving, habit stock. The
key feature of preferences with habit formation is that the habit stock changes
endogenously in response to business cycle conditions. To the degree that we
think habits are more slowly evolving and do not respond much to business
cycles, we may prefer the simpler utility function with a constant habit stock.
Incidentally, micro level studies have failed to nd signicant support for habit
formation, in the sense of a habit stock that responds to higher frequency shocks.
4.1 The households choice problem
8Formally our arguments only establish that the value function must be of the form
v = a+ b(iiui);
but we can set a = 0 and b = 1 without loss of generality (other choices of a or b are
equivalent to redening ui with a = 0; b = 1:).
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The representative household picks consumption ct, risk-free bond holdings bt+1
and labour supply nst sequences to solve
max
fct;nst ;bt+1g
E0
1
t=0tu(ct; lt)
subject to a sequence of constraints
ct(1 +  c;t) + bt+1  btRtefph;t + wt(1  nst)ns;t + dt + Tt, (t);
and a no Ponzi game (NPG) condition,
lim
T!1
Et
uc;t+T bt+1+T
Tj=1efph;t+j+1Rt+1+j
 0:
ns;t = 1  lt;
uc > 0; ucc < 0; ul > 0; ull < 0; uc;l  0:
, where dt are dividends from rms, wt is the wage rate, Rt is the risk free
gross interest and bt are risk free assets. efph;t+1 is the household external
nance premium that taxes borrowing and subsidizes lending. We will show
latter that it can emerge as a reduced form for a richer model in which a subset
of households are borrowing constrained. Like Rt+1; efph;t+1 is predetermined
with respect to t+ 1: The taxes here can be interpreted as a mixture of actual
government taxes, legislative or regulatory barriers and nancial frictions. For
example changes in the cost of consumer nancing can be partially mapped
into the consumption tax  c;t and in the borrowing external nance premium
efph;t: Changes in the level of competition in consumer product markets or in
the cost of consumer search and shopping can be mapped into  c;t; with higher
costs raising  c;t: The labour supply wedge ns;t can represent income taxes and
welfare payments that discourage work e¤ort. It can also represent time varying
search frictions that make harder for households to nd the jobs to which they
are a best match in a recession (e.g Beaudry and Portier (2013)). Tt are lump-
sum rebates for all the taxes and wedges in the economy. Lump sum taxes are
a simple device to isolate the e¤ect of wedges at the margin and avoid the e¤ect
through aggregate resourcesloss, which many people would argue is important
for long run growth but is secondary for the purpose of studying business cycles.
9
The discount factor of the representative agent is more than a measure
agentsactual psychological impatience. For example, even in a long run bal-
anced growth path without uncertainty, precautionary saving can generate what
looks like higher patience from the perspective of a representative household (e.g
Aiyagari (1994) [1] ). Therefore, in the balanced growth path where t = ~
t
; ~
can be very close to 1 or even above 1 despite the fact that a purely psycho-
logical impatience discount factor must satisfy ~ < 1 (people generally prefer
9Assuming the wedges are rebated to the representative household in this way is also
equivalent to modeling the wedges as binding quantity constraints on the variables to which
the wedges apply. For example the wedge on bond holdings could come from a borrowing
constraint.
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getting something today rather than tomorrow): This exibility can be impor-
tant in allowing the model to match low average real interest rates and high
equity premia in the long run. 10
The optimisation problem above is known as the sequential representation of
the households problem, since it represents the household as choosing sequences
of state-contingent decisions to maximise a weighted sum of lifetime payo¤s. A
more intuitive representation of this problem is to make choices each period to
maximise the sum of current payo¤s and the current value of future payo¤s,
assuming the continuation of optimal decisions in the future. This equivalence
of choosing innite sequences of decisions and of making the best choices now
condional on making the best choices in the future is known as the Bellman
optimality principle (Stokey et al (1989) ch. 3-4 [167], Rust (2006) [158]). The
principle of optimality allows us to reformulate the optimisation problem as
V h(bt;;  t; St) = max
ct;nst ;bt+1
u(ct; lt) + Et
t+1
t
V h(bt+1;  t+1; St+1)
subject to
ct(1 +  c;t) + bt+1  btRtefph;t + wt(1  nst)ns;t + dt + Tt, (t):
Here  t is a vector of wedges, and St is a vector of other aggregate state
variables that are required for the household to form its optimal plans. This
"recursive" representation of the optimisation problem is often more intuitive
and useful in numerical solution methods. It shows that households do not
explicitly need to form plans while contemplating a large number of periods
into the future. It is su¢ cient that they have (on average at least) a correct
assessment of the value of their future payo¤s, as summarised in the value
function V h(:): Optimisation errors or misperceptions can be included in the
discount factor
t+1
t
and the wedges  t. More generally, we can use the recursive
representation of of the optimisation problem as a starting point for various
bounded rationality models in which agents replace the value of future outcomes
V h(bt+1;  t+1; St+1) by various approximations (see Gabaix (2013) for a state
of the art model in this direction).
The rst order conditions of the household optimisation problem for each
state and period are:
ct : t(1 +  c;t) = uc;t
nst : ul;t = twt(1  ns;t)
bt+1 : t = Et
t+1
t
efph;t+1Rt+1t+1:
10 ~ > 1 is compatible with a nite objective function for the representative households as
long as ~G1 y < 1, where Gy is the long run growth rate of consumption and  =  uxxux is
the curvature of the utility function u(f(c; l)) with respect to x = f(c; l): ~G1 y < 1 requires
Gy > 1 and  > 1; both of which are empirically plausible.
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In addition, optimality requires that the NPG condition hold with equality
(this is usually called the transversality condition), otherwise the household
would overaccumulate wealth.
4.2 Consumption and saving decisions
The rst order condition for bonds, known as an Euler equation is at the centre
of the modern theory of consumption and saving behaviour. At the optimal
choice, households equalise the marginal utility of consuming this period to the
appropriately discounted expected marginal utility of consumption next period.
In the special case of a separable utility function with constant intertemporal
elasticity of substitution
u(c; l) =
c1 
1   + v(l);
and assuming constant discount factors and interest rates, and certainty
equivalences,we get
E
ct+1
ct
=

~Refph
1=
:
The equation above captures the main insight of the simplest form of the
modern theory of consumption: households try to keep consumption relatively
constant across periods. This is often referred to as consumption smoothing
(Romer (2001) [157], ch. 7). More generally, households try to smooth the
marginal utility of consumption across periods, but for plausible utility function
this still leads to a signicant desire to stick to a smooth consumption path.
From a microeconomic perspective, the bond Euler equation is a demand
curve stating that the demand for consumption today relative to consumption
tomorrow is negatively related to the relative price of consuming more today
than tomorrow, Rt+1efph;t+1: Perhaps more intuitively for non economists, the
Euler equation says agents shift consumption from the present to the future
when the total interest payment on a given loan becomes more expensive relative
to a bundle of consumption goods. The many debates about the t of aggregate
Euler equations essentially revolve around what other control variables belong
in this demand function besides the interest rate, and about the aggregation of
the many individual household level demand curves into an aggregate relative
consumption demand function.
This aggregate relation between interest rates and consumption is a rea-
sonable approximation to an environment with more realistic xed portfolio
transaction or optimisation costs in adjusting to interest rates and asset prices
at the individual level, as long as there is su¢ cient dispersion in idiosyncratic
shocks or dispersion in adjustment costs (so absent such adjustment costs not
everyone would respond the same way). In this case, the aggregate consump-
tion response to interest rates can be quite exible despite micro level rigidities.
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Similar arguments can be made for the relation between aggregate investment
and interest rates (See Caplin and Leahy (2002) [42], Khan and Thomas (2008)
[122]and Golosov and Lucas (2007)[94] for examples of this aggregate exibility
despite micro level xed adjustment costs). In some cases non convex adjust-
ment e¤ects will have signicant e¤ects, that may only be partially be captured
by the structure of our reduced form wedges. This is especially the case for
highly illiquid assets, such as housing (see for example Iacoviello and Pavan
(2013) [111]). But an approximation assuming very sluggish adjustment in the
aggregate is likely to be even more misspecied.
The consumption Euler equation, like all dynamic rst order conditions in
our model, can also be interpreted as an asset pricing equation. Here, we get
the price of a 1 period, ination adjusted, risk free bond promising 1 unit of
consumption (the numeraire in our model), as a function of its payo¤ and the
stochastic discount factor:
pbond;t =
1
Rt+1
= Et
t+1
t
t+1
t
efph;t+1:
This links macroeconomics to the vast litterature on general equilibrium
nancial asset pricing (see Cochrane (2011) [59] for a survey).
4.2.1 Discount factor shocks
Discount factor shocks are important in modern business cycle theory, for ex-
ample in Keynesian models (e.g Smets and Wouters (2002) [163], Christiano
et al (2010)) and in asset pricing models (Cochrane (2011) [59]). More gen-
erally discount factor shocks are important in analysing changes in aggregate
consumption and saving across the business cycle. The stochastic component of
the discount rate can be shown under certain circumstances to be generated by
the precautionary saving motive. Higher uninsured idiosyncratic income risk,
or lower cash on hand (the sum of income and liquid nancial assets) in the
presence of uninsured idiosyncratic income risk imply a lower ability to smooth
consumption in case of negative income shocks. This leads to higher consump-
tion uncertainty and higher precautionary saving (Carroll (2001) [46]). From
the perspective of the representative agent, higher precautionary saving looks
like a higher discount factor. Carroll (2001) [46] argues that the implications of
higher income uncertainty for consumption uncertainty growth are essentially
the same as those of certain types of credit constraints. This can be easily seen
in our framework by noting that consumption growth in the Euler equation is
a function of the product
t+1
t
efph;t+1:
Without further information than consumption growth, we cannot separate ex-
ternal nance premia from precautionnary saving.
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The link between precautionnary saving and discount factor shocks can be
seen more easily in the case of a separable utility function
u(c; l) =
c1 
1   + v(l);  > 0:
Consider an economy with many households indexed by i: Assume any credit
constraint does not bind and efph;t+1 = 1. With uncertainty we have the Euler
equation
1
~Rt+1
= Et

ci;t+1
ci;t
 
:
Using the convexity of f(x) = x ; for x = ci;t+1ci;t ; Jensens inequality implies
Et
ci;t+1
ci;t
 
< Et

ci;t+1
ci;t
 
=
1
~Rt+1
:
() Et ci;t+1
cit
>

~Rt+1
1=
=
cPFi;t+1
cPFi;t
()
Et
ci;t+1
ci;t
= vbi;t+1

~Rt+1
1=
; vbt+1 > 1;
where xPF is the value of x under perfect foresight. Roughly speaking mov-
ing from a low uncertainty environment to one with high uncertainty decreases
current consumption and increases saving. The average vbi;t+1 above is an over-
estimate of the e¤ect of higher uncertainty on aggregate consumption growth
(as opposed to average consumption growth), since households for which the
e¤ect of uncertainty is stronger will typically be poorer and have less weight in
aggregate consumption. Nevertheless, in general higher uncertainty is expected
to reduce consumption and raise saving (see Challe and Ragot (2010) [48] for a
more formal proof in a simplied model of uninsured idiosyncratic income risk).
In representative agent models like ours, a convenient proxy for changes
in countercyclical income risk may be the unemployment rate. Much of the
countercyclical income risk comes from a higher risk of job loss in a recession,
and unemployment is much more likely to be observed than other measures of
income risk such as the variance of earnings across di¤erent households. There-
fore, one shortcut to incorporate the e¤ect of countercyclical risk in simpler
representative agent models is to add the unemployment rate as part of the
discount factor in the Euler equation. We will formalise this shortcut using a
simplied model of precautionnary saving from Carrol and Toche (2009) [47].
In their model each employed household faces a probability put+1 of job loss next
period. Assume for simplicity perfect foresight on all other variables including
the job loss probability.The Euler equation for an employed household is
cet+1
cet
= (~Rt+1)
1=
 
1 + pu;t+1
"
cut+1
cet+1
 
  1
#!1=
:
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Also assume for simplicity that there is an unemployment system that pro-
vides a constant replacement rate of what the newly unemployed worker would
spend if he kept on working, so that
cut
cet
= ~cu < 1:
We can see immediately from this equation that an increase in the expected job
loss probability increases the expected growth rate of consumption conditional
on staying employed and boosts saving by the employed. A 1st order Taylor
approximation of the new unemployment risk factor around ~cu = 1 leads to
cet+1
cet
' (~Rt+1)1= (1 + pu;t+1(1  ~cu))1= :
This highights how unemployment risk behaves like an increase in the return
to saving. The extra return is approximately the product of the unemploy-
ment risk, the percentage consumption loss in unemployment and risk aversion.
Caroll and Toches model does not lend itself conveniently to aggregation via
a representative household, therefore in general equilibrium it still requires the
use of more computationally intensive solution methods for heterogenous agent
models (e.g the Krusell and Smith (1998) [131] algorithm). However we can cap-
ture most of the aggregate implications of the original model if we assume that
ex post households get complete consumption insurance against unemployment
so that
cet = c
u
t = ct:
Ex-ante, we assume that employed househods do not take into account this
insurance, deviating from rational expectations. Instead they think they will
get ~cu of their former income if they become unemployed. As a result the rep-
resentative households consumption path is determined by the Euler equation
ct+1
ct
= (~Rt+1)
1=
 
1 + pu;t+1

~c u   1
1=
= (~t;t+1Rt+1)
1=;
, where we have redened the stochastic discount factor to take into account
unemployment risk. In models without an explicit distinction between unem-
ployment and non-employment, and assuming small uctuations in the number
of hours per job, unemployment is is roughly proxied by 1  nt:
The discount factor shock can also be mapped into overoptimism or pes-
simism about the future. Excessive pessimism makes the representative house-
hold more patient and less eager to consume now relative to the future. The
increase in "patience" shows up as an increase in
~t;t+j = t+j=t
for some j > 0 in the rst order condition for bonds. Conversely, higher op-
timism maps into a a lower ~t;t+j : More formally, an excessively pessimistic
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households Euler equation dictates lower consumption today given the expec-
tation of lower future consumption and a constant discount factor. But under
the true rational expectations operator and a constant discount factor current
consumption would be too low:
Et~t;t+1Rt+1efph;t+1
1=
' ct+1
ct
>

~EtRt+1efph;t+1
1=
;
where we have made a certainty equivalence approximation. This interpretation
of the discount factor shock can be useful for decomposing the impact of another
shock (for example a change in government spending or taxes) into the rational
expectations component that is justied when households on average understand
the e¤ect of the shock, and into a an expectations shock component caused by
householdsmisperceptions of the e¤ect of the shock.
Cochrane (2011) [59] discusses a similar equivalence between deviations from
RE and the stochastic discount factor used to price nancial assets. He empha-
sizes the di¢ culty of separating shifts in the discount factor due to time varying
uncertainty or risk aversion from shifts in the discount factor due to time varying
deviations from RE based on typical macroeconomic and nancial time series
data. Shefrin (2007) [160] surveys in detail the behavioural interpretation of
discount factor shocks, under the assumption that deviations from RE are the
only source of the discrepancy from the single representative agent rational as-
set pricing model. He calls the shift in the discount factor of the representative
household due to deviations from RE "market sentiment". A positive (negative)
market sentiment indicates excessive optimism (pessimism) when aggregating
expectations over many households. RE hold in the aggregate (zero market
sentiment) if expectations errors cancel on average in the cross section, and if
these errors are uncorrelated with household wealth.
4.2.2 The consumption function
We can use the Euler equations and household budget constraints to obtain
an aggregate consumption function. By incorporating other variables such as
debt to income ratios or measures of idiosyncratic household risk and the wealth
inequality into efph; t and t; we get a consumption function that combines the
insights of the classic Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH, Romer ch. 7 [157]
)and the insights of the vast literature on credit constraints and precautionary
saving. The PIH emphases wealth as an important determinant of consumption
spending, both in the form of various assets and in the form of future incomes .
The key insight distinguishing the PIH from other reduced form consumption
equations is the recognition of the fact that much of that wealth is in the form of
future earnings. By making consumption a function of expected future income,
the PIH tries to partially endogenise the residual or consumption "shock" in
traditional old Keynesian consumption functions, often interpreted as a shock
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to consumer condence. Higher expectations of future income make consumers
more optimistic, increasing their consumption. In reverse, lower future income
expectations make consumers more pessimistic and reduce consumption.
The original PIH model has been heavily criticised for exaggerating the
importance of wealth for consumption and underestimating the importance of
credit conditions and current income (see Romer (2001) ch. 7 [157] for a basic
exposition, and Attanasio and Weber (2010) [14] for a modern survey of the
PIH and the main empirical and theoretical issues surrounding it). In its
representative agent version, it has been criticised for exaggerating the amount
of insurance available to households against idiosyncratic risks. The modern
theory of the consumption function (e.g Carroll (1997) [44],Carroll (2001) [46],
Kaplan and Violante (2014)[120]) usually predicts a higher average sensitivity
of consumption (the marginal propensity to consume) to current income and
changes in credit constraints than to wealth.
While future income is less important for large segments of the population
that are credit constrained or close to their borrowing limit, it is more important
for the consumption decisions of middle income and rich households, most of
whom are further from their borrowing limits, and who constitute the bulk
of consumption spending. Surveys such as the SCF, and modern models of
consumption that take into account uninsured income risk, life cycle e¤ects
and the partial illiquidity of wealth nd that around 30-42% of households are
credit constrained or close to being credit constrained (Kaplan and Violante
(2012)[120]). But other households in the economy do have signicant net liquid
wealth relative to their maximum borrowing limit, and these tend to be the
richer households whose contribution to aggregate consumption is signicantly
above their proportion of the population.
In the US in recent years, the top 20% of income earners have accountd
for 60% of aggregate consumption. Most of the households with low net liquid
wealth have a lot of partially illiquid net wealth such as stock portfolios or
housing that can be adjusted in response to bigger shocks. 11 For example a
big enough negative shock may induce the liquidation of some pension assets or
moving to a smaller apartment or house.
Furthermore, while uninsured idiosyncratic household risks are clearly im-
portant, recent empirical evidence suggests signicant levels of insurance and
much larger foresight by households regarding income changes than estimated
by simple econometric methods (e.g Kaplan and Violante (2010)[119], Guve-
nen and Smith (2014) [103]. Guvenen and Smith (2014) [103] estimate that
45% of idiosyncratic shock innovations are ensured by a combination of formal
and informal mechanisms. These results explain why empirically the marginal
11Net wealth is assets minus liabilities: that is, Kaplan and Violante (2012) subtract credit
card debt from liquid assets and mortgage debt from illiquid assets to get their wealth mea-
sures.
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propensity to consume (MPC) out of transitory income shocks such as tax re-
bates is around 0:25 rather than the higher numbers suggested by older Key-
nesian consumption functions (Kaplan and Violante (2014)[120]). Note that
these MPCs are for nondurable consumption. Higher MPCs can be found if
we include durable goods as part of consumption, but standard microeconomic
theory argues durables are more like a form of saving than consumption, since
durables are essentially a type of capital. Therefore, it is quite natural that
there is a higher MPC for durable goods.
Finally, comparison of extended versions of the PIH model to micro data
on the level of net worth of older households suggests that around 75-85% of
households in the US succeed in saving enough for retirement relative to the op-
timal saving benchmark. In contrast simpler models, such as the old Keynesian
consumption function fail to explain household wealth accumulation (Scholz et
al ,2009 [89]). Retirement is perhaps the biggest predictable income shock that
any household is likely to su¤er. The ability of most households to successfully
smooth their marginal utility of consumption in this case suggests that the PIH
provides a reasonable approximation to the consumption and saving behaviour
of most households. Unfortunately, the more sophisticated models with unin-
sured income risk, forward looking behaviour and partial insurance are harder
to solve and aggregate for the purposes of DSGE analysis. We try to approx-
imate the richer insights from those models by starting with the original PIH
model and adjusting it to take into account credit constraints and incomplete
nancial markets.
The consumption function: a closed-form solution Solving for the con-
sumption function of our representative household usually requires numerical
methods. We will examine a special case that delivers some insights that are
likely to hold in more general solutions. We focus on a perfect foresight equi-
librium with separable log utility
u = ln c+ v(l):
We also simplify the budget constraint by dropping all wedges except efph;t
and putting all income sources together into one variable yt: Dene Rtefph;t =
Rh;t: Iterating forward on the budget constraint and using the transversality
condition,
1k=0
ct+k
kj=1Rh;t+k
= btRh;t +
1
k=0
yt+k
kj=1Rh;t+j
;
where for any xt+j ; 0j=1xt+j = 1: This is the standard intertemporal budget
constraint that is at the heart of the PIH. Note that the intertemporal budget
constraint holds for any sequence of shocks, for any level of uncertainty and
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regardless of the borrowing constraints, as long as the no Ponzi game condition
holds. Now write
ct+k
ct
= kj=1
ct+j
ct+j 1
:
Using this equation together with the Euler equation
ct+j
ct+j 1
= ~t+jRh;t+j ;
where ~t+j =
t+j
t+j 1
; we can solve out for ct from the intertemporal budget
constraint,
ct =
1
1k=0
k
j=1
~t+j
 
btRh;t +
1
k=0
yt+k
kj=1Rh;t+j
!
;
where 0 = 1 for k = 0:
This consumption function is the result of combining the intertemporal bud-
get constraint with the desire to smooth consumption as captured by the Euler
equation. 1
1k=0
k
j=1
~t+j
can be interpreted as the marginal propensity to con-
sume (MPC) out of wealth
btRh;t +
1
k=0
yt+k
kj=1Rh;t+j
:
In the special case of ~t+j = ~ the MPC is 1   : the It is typical of the PIH
in that consumption depends on the present value of all future income and on
current nancial wealth.
The key prediction of the PIH is that more persistent changes in income yt
with a signicant impact over many periods will have bigger e¤ects on current
consumption ct than purely transitory shocks. A permanent shock will have
the largest impact, with consumption almost responding by the full amount of
the change in income. This prediction is at the origin of the name of the PIH.
The idea is that consumption is most strongly related to permanent income, the
component of income composed of permanent shocks. Another less emphasized
but intuitive prediction is that changes in income in a later period yt+k have
a smaller e¤ect on ct than a change in current income yt due to the higher
discount rate attached to future income streams.
The main modications of our consumption function relative to the standard
PIH is that we allow for nancial distortions in Rh;t+j and for uninsured idiosyn-
cratic risk e¤ects or deviations from RE through time varying discount factors
~t+j : The time varying discount factors capture shifts in the desire to smooth
consumption. In the extended PIH model, an increase in income uncertainty
or a strengthening of the precautionary saving motive due to lower income or
wealth would show up as a higher sequence of
n
~t+j
o
lowering consumption
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ct: An increase in nancing frictions for borrowers would have a similar e¤ect
through higher fRh;t+jg :
Since the precautionary saving motive is usually decreasing in cash on hand
xt = yt + btRh;t;
the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of cash on hand is higher than
that out of the present value of future incomes
1k=1
yt+k
kj=1Rh;t+j
More generally, with
@~t+j+1
@xt+j
< 0
the consumption function above implies a higher MPC out of income in the
next few periods than out of income further in the future (see Carroll (1997)
[44],Carroll (2001) [46] for more intuition on this point using the standard model
of precautionary savings with uninsured idiosyncratic income risk): An increase
in income uncertainty or a reduction in household wealth, by raising
n
~t+j
o
also reduces the sensitivity of consumption to interest rates fRh;t+jg : Since
income uncertainty and household wealth typically deline in a recession, house-
hold consumption should be less sensitive to interest rates in general, and to
monetary policy more particularly, in an economic downturn.
While our derivation has used log utility, our perfect foresight consumption
function can be easily generalised to the case of other utility functions that
imply an Euler equation of the form
ct+j
ct+j 1
= gc(xt+j ; ~t+j ; Rh;t+j)Rh;t+j :
x is a vector of variables excluding consumption. The same steps as for the log
utility case lead to the consumption function
ct =
1
1k=0
k
j=1gc(xt+j ;
~t+j ; Rh;t+j)
 
btRh;t +
1
k=0
yt+k
kj=1Rh;t+j
!
:
For example, this Euler equation holds for the frequently used Cobb-Douglas
function
u(c; l) =
(cl1 )1 
1  
In this case, xt+j+1 includes the relative leisure time
li;t+j+1
lt+j
: More generally
we could allow for demographic variables to reect the age composition of the
population, For the common case of
 > 1 we have
@gc(:)
@Rh
< 0
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so that higher future interest rates increase the marginal propensity to consume
out of wealth. The intuition is that in this case the income e¤ect of higher in-
terest rates dominates the substitution e¤ect and households want to consume
more of their wealth when interest rates increase. At the same time, higher
interest rates directly reduce wealth for borrowers via btRh;t and for all house-
holds via the discounted value of future income 1k=0
yt+k
kj=1Rh;t+j
: As a result,
current consumption ct is usually still decreasing in interest rates when  > 1:
Finally, note that in equilibrium all the variables on the right hand side of this
equation will usually follow a Markov process, so the the consumption function is
also a Markov process in the models state variables. This makes predicting and
simulating the behaviour of consumption relatively straightforward once we have
solved the household optimisation problem, and it simplies comparison the
consumption function from our optimisation based model to simpler statistical
models such as VARs or ARMAX equations that are also Markov processes.
4.2.3 The external nance premium and borrowing constrained house-
holds
Here we show how the external nance premium for the representative house-
hold efph;t+1 can emerge in an environment with heterogeneity, where a subset
of households are borrowing constrained. The model of household credit con-
straints in Iacoviello (2005) [109] and the savers-spenders model of Mankiw
(2000) [140] are standard examples. Imagine that a xed proportion bo of
households always borrow at a rate Rbo;t > Rt: The remaining sa = 1  bo of
households are savers who always lend at Rsa;t = Rt: Assume they both have a
utility function of the form
c1 i
1   + v(li); i = bo; sa:
Dene the percentage deviation from the steady state of a variable xt to be
x^t =
xt   x
x
:
Then a rst order approximation in percentage deviations from the steady-state
for each householdsEuler equation is
c^i;t = Etc^i;t+1   1

R^i;t+1 + v
b
i;t+1;
where vbi;t+1 is a household specic discount factor shock. Aggregate con-
sumption can be written in percentage deviations from the steady state as
c^t =
bocbo
c
c^bo;t +
sacsa
c
c^sa;t:
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Using this with the Euler equations implies
c^t = Etc^t+1  1


bicbo
c
R^bo;t+1 +
sacsa
c
R^t+1

+(
bocbo
c
vbbo;t+1+
sacsa
c
vbsa;t+1):
Now, bocboc R^bo;t+1 +
sacsa
c R^t+1 can be seen as a rst order approximation
for some Rt+1efph;t+1: We can derive a similar result for the nonlinear Euler
equation under perfect foresight, though there the weight of the di¤erent Ri;t+1
in the aggregate Rt+1efph;t+1 will no longer be constant, and heterogeneity in
the discount factor shocks will also a¤ect the denition of efph;t+1. To see this,
start with the individual nonlinear Euler equations for i = sa; bo
ci;t+1 =

~i;tRi;t+1
1=
ci;t:
Using
ct = iici;t;
and dening
~t = ii
~i;t
we can rewrite the Euler equation as
ct+1 = i(~i;t+1Ri;t+1)
1=ici;t
= ct~
1=
t+1i
 
~i;t+1
~t+1
Ri;t+1
!1=
ici;t
ct
= ct
0@~t+1
24i ~i;t+1~t+1 Ri;t+1
!1=
ici;t
ct
351A1=
 ct

~t+1Rt+1efph;t+1
1=
with the appropriate denitions.
Note that the household external nance premium can reect more general
distortions in household credit markets than just credit spreads between risk free
assets and household loans. In particular it also captures quantity constraints
on borrowing that show up in rst order conditions as Lagrange multipliers. A
tighter credit constraint due to lower income or collateral increases Lagrange
multiplier and raises the expected growth rate of consumption. Therefore, the
tighter credit constraint can be mapped into a higher efph;t+1:
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The 2 households model with rule of thumb consumers The most
tractable model capturing credit constraints is one where a subset of house-
holds simply consume all their labour income each period. These "Rule of
Thumb" (ROT) households can be seen as highly impatient but without any
collateral for borrowing. Therefore they cannot borrow, and are constrained to
simply consuming their income. Krusell and Smith (2006) [132] suggest that
this 2 household model can provide a good approximation to the aggregate con-
sumption behaviour of richer heterogeneous household models with uninsured
idiosycratic income risk and di¤erences in discount factor across households. We
will examine a slight generalisation of this model, where a subset of households
are constrained by an exogenous borrowing limit bt+1: Ultimately, once we add
durable goods, this 2 household setup will be part of our preferred cannonical
DSGE model.
Borrowers are more impatient than savers: that is their discount factor on
the BGP is ~bo < ~sa:
12As a result, borrowers borrow up to the maximum
credit limit on the BGP. We assume uctuations are close enough to the BGP,
and ROT households are impatient enough such that the credit constraint re-
mains binding outside the BGP. Alternatively, we can imagine that big positive
shocks that would normally cause households to save some of their income gains
also induce signicant reductions in uninsured idiosyncratic risk or signicanly
higher optimism about future income prospects. As a result, borrowers end
up borrowing as much as possible despite the higher income. The borrowing
limit is stochastic, allowing us to capture in reduced form a tightening of credit
constraints. We also assume that borrowing households do not own shares in
rms. This captures the fact that poorer or more highly indebted households
typically own little stock market wealth or private equity.
The representative borrower household solves
max
fcbo;t;nbo;t;bbo;t+1g
E0
1
t=0bo;tu(cbo;t; lbo;t)
subject to a sequence of constraints
cbo;t(1 +  c;t) + bbo;t+1  bbo;tRtefpbo:h;t + wt(1  nst)nbo;t + Tt, (t);
 bbo;t+1  bt+1; (t+1); bt+1j  0:
nbo;t = 1  lbo;t;
uc > 0; ucc < 0; ul > 0; ull < 0; uc;l  0:
The optimality condition for bonds changes to
bbo;t+1 : bo;t = Et
bo;t+1
bo;t
efpbo;h;t+1Rt+1bo;t+1 +
bo;t+1
bo;t
t+1:
12Higher impatience can be seen as a proxy for higher expected income growth of younger
consumers, which given their relatively low current income and the consumption smoothing
motive encourages them to borrow more.
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The other optimality conditions remain the same.
The rst thing to note is that as promised, through appropriate redeni-
tions a binding borrowing constraint with t+1 > 0 maps into a higher external
nance premium Rbo;t+1Rt+1 ; so we can analyse a tightening of the borrowing con-
straint as an increase in the household external nance premium: Second, in this
model with an always binding borrowing constraint the consumption function
of borrowers is trivial:
cbo;t(1 +  c;t) = wt(1  nst)nbo;t + Tt   bt(Rtefpbo;h;t   1) + (bt+1   bt):
The household consumes its wage income net of taxes and debt repayments.
This leads to a traditional Keynesian multiplier e¤ect on aggregate consump-
tion: shocks that reduce output lead to lower wage income, which reduces the
consumption of income constrained households. Under some conditions (e.g
sticky prices, or spillovers from lower aggregate demand to TFP), this leads to
a further decline in output. Debt repayments have been decomposed into in-
terest payments bt(Rtefpbo;h;t   1) and principal repayments  (bt+1   bt): The
typical model with rule of thumb households assumes bt+1 = 0 for all t; that is
households cannot borrow and simply consume their after tax income. Finally,
in this model market clearing conditions change to
iicit = ct;
iini;t = nst;
iibi;t = 0:
Aggregate consumption ct is now a function of future income levels, interest
rates and current income with the coe¢ cient on current income depending on
the proportion of income earned by rule of thumb households.
Estimates of the proportion of credit constrained households bo range be-
tween 0:15 and 0:5; with numbers in the lower range being more common in
medium size policy models (e.g the IMFs GIMF model (2013) [7], Bank of
England COMPASS model (2013) [39],Gali et al et al (2007) [91]). Hurst (2006)
conducts tests of excess sensitivity to predictable income shocks at the level of
individual US households (using the PSID). He nds a group of around 20-30%
of households that have a very high MPC, together with signicant drops in
consumption income in retirement that are hard to justify using various control
variables. He links this group of households explicitly to questions in the PSID
about lack of nancial planning, arguing that 20-30% of households can be seen
as ROT households that do not try to smooth their consumption. Note that
the actual consumption share of these households can be signicantly lower,
because usually their average consumption Ecbo;t < Ecsa;t: Finally, note that
the aggrecate consumption function can also be reinterpreted as a model of op-
timisation error by the representative household, with bo reecting a tendency
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of households to systematically over respond to changes in their current income.
For example this optimisation error could arise if current income is more salient
in peoples minds when judging how much to save.
4.3 Labour supply
The labour supply rst order condition equates the marginal cost of labour e¤ort
in terms of leisure to the marginal benet. Here the marginal benet is the
wage adjusted for the shadow cost (Lagrange multiplier) of the constraint - i.e.
the value of the extra marginal labour e¤ort in relaxing the budget constraint.
Combining rst order conditions, we can rewrite the labour supply condition as
ul;t = uc;t
(1  ns;t)
1 +  c;t
wt:
If we interpret our model literally, the representative household makes a
continuous choice of working hours. In other words, labour supply is divisible.
In reality there are signicant indivisibilities in labour supply choices at the
household level, e.g one can work at a part-time or full time job with limited
adjustments in terms of overtime or hours reductions. But aggregate labour
supply is continuous. The divisible labour supply model can always be trivially
reinterpreted as the decisions of a large family that measures family welfare
according to u(c; 1 ns) on what proportion of its members ns to send to work.
The family sends more members to work until the marginal disutility of sending
an extra member to work is equal to the wage evaluated at the familys marginal
utility of wealth.
The large family assumption is clearly extreme. However, even if hours of
work are indivisible the assumption of divisible labour supply of the representa-
tive household can be fully justied in the presence of highly competitive labour
markets and complete nancial markets (Mulligan (2001)[148]). The divisible
labour representative agents decisions are equivalent under these conditions to
the aggregate of the decisions of many agents with partially divisible labour
supply. So a reduction in the labour supply of the representative household in
response to lower wages can be mapped into a lower rate of job acceptance by
the unemployed facing lower wage o¤ers, as well as higher separations due to
rms being more reluctant to pay salaries above the reservation wage for some
workers.
Following Mulligan (2001) [148], we can interpret the labour supply rst
order condition in a model with complete nancial markets as representing the
tradeo¤between the cost of working ul and the benet of working uc;t
(1 ns;t)
1+c;t
wt
of the marginal worker who is (approximately) indi¤erent between working and
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being out of the labour force. Each worker j has to choose between working a
xed amount of hours for a benet of uc;t
(1 ns;t)
1+c;t
wj;t"j;t and not working with
a benet of ul;t: Agents for which the opportunity cost of working is lower so
that
ul;t < uc;t
(1  ns;t)
1 +  c;t
wj;t"j;t
end up working. Agents for which working is costly relative to the benets such
that
ul;t > uc;t
(1  ns;t)
1 +  c;t
wt"j;t
are unemployed or out of the labour force. For the marginal worker, "j;t = 1
and the labour supply condition holds with equality.
I use a utility function u(c; l) that is compatible with a a balanced growth
path to capture the lack of a a strong trend in hours of work over the second
half of the 20th century (there have been some regime changes for example in
Europe reducing hours of work, but they do not seem to follow a deterministic
trend). This requires
u(c; l) =
(ch(l))1 
1   :
Within the class of constant elasticity of substitution functions, the long run in-
variance of hours worked to trend output growth requires Cobb-Douglas utility
function of the form u(c; l) = (c
l1 )1 
1  : I allow for nonseparable utility due to
the strong evidence that consumption and leisure are substitutes. Some models
of the extensive labour supply margin also predict non-separable utility func-
tions for the representative household (Basu and Kimball (2002) [21],Euseppi
and Preston (2009)[77]).
Complementarity of work and consumption can explain some of the comove-
ment between current income and consumption, as well as part of the di¤erence
in consumption levels between workers and the unemployed. To see this con-
sider the consumption Euler equation with a non separable Cobb-Douglas utility
function under perfect foresight:
ct+1
ct
1 (1 )
= ~t+1Rt+1efph;t+1

lt+1
lt
(1 )(1 )
:
For  = 1 we are back in the case of a separable utility function, and con-
sumption growth is only a function of discount factor shocks and interest rates
and external nancing constraints. If  > 1; consumption and work e¤ort are
complements. In this case an increase in working e¤ort at t + 1 relative to t
(lower lt+1lt ) leads to an increase in the expected growth rate of consumption
ct+1
ct
: Note that the expected work e¤ort term lt+1lt acts as a shift in the discount
factor, with higher work e¤or now relative to the future making the household
more "impatient". For moderate non separability the conclusions with separable
47
utility can still provide a reasonable approximation. But the complementarity
between work and consumption improves the empirical t of the consumption
function by explaining some of the observed excess sensitivity of consumption
to current income relative to the separable utility function benchmark. Nonsep-
arable preferences also weaken the impact of income e¤ects on labour supply by
strengthening the link between work hours and consumption. A meta analysis
of many studies by Chetty (2006) [52] suggests that the degree of risk aversion
and non-separability that is compatible with the empirical evidence on labour
supply and changes in consumption in response to unemployment or disability
cannot be too high. In particular the relative risk aversion coe¢ cient should
not exceed 2, with values closer to 1 being more plausible.
In the general case with uninsured idiosyncratic risk, individual labour sup-
ply with indivisibilities does not aggregate exactly to that of a representative
agent (Chang et al (2011)[49]). Nevertheless the representative household model
can provide a useful approximation in cases when full modeling of indivisibility
with heterogenous agents is computationally too costly (see Chang et al (2011)
[49] for some shortcuts that can be used to improve the match of the representa-
tive agent model to results from a more realistic heterogeneous agents model).
Early models of indivisible labour were used to justify a very high macro
elasticity of labour supply, helping to explain large employment uctuations as
movements along the labour supply curve (see Kydland (1995). [62]). Mulligan
(2001) [148] , Erosa et al (2014)[75] and Mustre del Rio (2012) show that when
incorporating a realistic level of heterogeneity in workersreservation wages the
aggregate Frisch (constant marginal utility of consumption) labour supply elas-
ticity with indivisible labour is closer to that of reasonably calibrated divisible
labour models at around 0:7 to 1:75. The lower number takes into account
only the extensive margin, while the higher number also takes into account the
response of hours per job (the intensive margin). 13 It is common to dismiss
changes in the intensive margin as insignicant. Yet in the US hours per job ad-
justment typically accounts for one third of the volatility of total hours. In the
recent nancial crisis of 2008, hours per job changes accounted for most of the
13With a cobb-douglas utility function, the representatives household labour supply elastic-
ity is approximately l
ns
close to the BGP. This makes it hard to reconcile typical estimates of
the proportion of hours worked in the population (e.g 1/4 of the hours in a year or less spent
working, and an employment rate around 60%-70%) with such a low aggregate labour supply
elasticity if we interpret leisure l to include all non working hours. However, a reconciliation
is possible if we interpret the utility function of the representative household to be over the
amount of non work hours relative to a minimal xed amount of non work time, dedicated
to sleeping and other core home production activities. From that perspective we can think of
the utility function as
u(c; 1 + lmin   ns   lmin)
= u(c; 1  ns);
where lmin is a xed minimum amount of time that has to be spent outside of work, and
l = 1  ns as before.
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total hours adjustment in some European countries such as Germany (Ohanian
and Ra¤o 2009).
The divisible labour representative household model also becomes a better
approximation once we take into account that many of the marginal workers
whose employment uctuates the most across the business cycle usually have
a choice between looking for part time of full time employment, and to the
degree that the typical household contains at least 2 working age members.
Mulligan and Rubinstein (2004) analyse household labour supply aggregating
over all household members, and nd that in contrast to individual worker
employment where the extensive employment status dominates, the intensive
hours margin dominates labour supply from the household perspective. They
argue that labour supply of couples is much smoother than that of individual
workers. In part this is because it is much less likely for both members of a couple
to be unemployed than for a single member. Finally, in studying tax policies one
has to take into account di¤erences in labour supply elasticity between di¤erent
income or wealth and education groups. From the representative household
perspective, we need to use the labour supply elasticity of the group that is
actually most a¤ected by a tax policy in studying its macroeconomic impact,
adjusted by its weight in the active population.
The labour supply equation is at the heart of the di¢ culties of the basic
neoclassical business cycle model in generating comovement between consump-
tion and investment in response to demand shocks or to intertemporal shocks.
Consider a separable utility function. An increase in consumption reduces the
marginal utility of consumption and therefore the marginal utility of leisure for
a given wage and taxes. By the concavity of utility in leisure, leisure must in-
crease and labour supply must decline. The fall in labour supply makes it harder
for an increase in consumption to be accompanied by an increase in output and
investment. Bilbiie (2006) [30] shows this logic also holds when consumption
and leisure are substitutes as long the utility function is concave. There are
several mechanisms that have been shown to partially solve this comovement
problem.
An indivisible labour model with nonseparable utility in consumption and
leisure and both extensive and intensive margin can generate positive comove-
ment between aggregate consumption and labour supply(Euseppi and Preston
(2009) [77]). The idea is that even though at the individual worker level higher
consumption is associated with lower labour supply, because consumption and
leisure are substitutes an increase in wealth can cause consumption and ag-
gregate labour supply to both fall because of a composition e¤ect: suppose a
shock causes an increase in individual household consumption and a reduction in
labour supply. At the individual household we still have negative consumption-
labour supply comovement. However, because part of the reduction in labour
supply comes through lower labour force participation and the employed con-
sume more, aggregate consumption declines.
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Consider news of a future increase in productivity. This typically generates
a positive wealth e¤ect, reducing labour supply. The reduction in labour supply
generates a recession in response to a positive news shock. Euseppi and Preston
show that if we add investment adjustment costs to the model, the substitu-
tion e¤ect of higher future productivity dominates and the positive news lead
to higher labour supply and output. In this case at the individual level con-
sumption falls and labour supply goes up. Aggregate consumption nevertheless
increases because of a higher labour force participation rate. However, the real-
ism of a reduction in employed householdsconsumption in response to positive
news is doubtful, so this probably cannot replace other mechanisms generating
expectations driven business cycles through shifts in labour demand. 14
Habit formation as in Christiano et al (2007) [55] is another factor that can
contribute to comovement for demand or news shocks. With habit formation,
while higher current consumption lowers the marginal utility of wealth and re-
duces labour supply, higher future consumption increases the marginal utility
of wealth and raises labour supply. Habit formation or other consumption ad-
justment costs can be captured in our setup as part of the consumption wedge
 c;t: In this case  c;t is an increasing function of the deviation of consumption
from the stock of habits Sct = f(ct 1; ::; ct k): Incorporating durable goods can
similarly alleviate the comovement problem under some circumstances. We will
discuss several mechanisms that can enhance comovement of consumption and
investment over the business cycle, including e¤ects of demand or news shocks
on TFP, labour adjustment costs and the presence of consumer durables invest-
ment.
Finally, we examine more formally the e¤ect of worker heterogeneity of
the borrower/saver form. In general, di¤erences between workers will gener-
ate movements in the e¤ective labour tax rates faced by the representative
household. Consider the simplest case of
u(c; l) =
(cbl1 b)1 
1   :
The rst order condition for type i household is
1  bi
li;t
=
biwt
ci;t
1  ns;i;t
1 +  c;i;t
:
Manipulating this equation and aggregating over all households,
lt = iili;t =
ct
wt
i
1  bi
bi
1 +  c;i;t
1  ns;i;t
icit
ct
;
ct = iici;t:
14Note that their mechanism works through a non-concave utility function of the represen-
tative household, so it is compatible with the analysis in Bilbiie (2006).
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Clearly if all wedges a¤ecting labour supply  ci ; ns;i and leisure preference
parameters are identical across households, we get perfect aggregation of indi-
vidual labour supplies into aggregate labour supply. In the more realistic case
in which di¤erent groups of households have di¤erent preferences for leisure and
face di¤erent labour supply or consumption wedges we will not get perfect aggre-
gation. Signicant shifts in the composition of aggregate consumption across
di¤erent groups or in the wedges facing di¤erent groups will a¤ect aggregate
labour supply. We will have more to say on these e¤ects when discussing shocks
to the labour wedge.
5 Firms
5.1 The rms decision problem
There is a measure 1 continuum of rms. The representative rm picks sequences
of nt;mt to maximise
dt = g(Atmt; em;t)ztf(Atnt)  wt(1 + nd;t)(nt +mt);
gm > 0; gmm < 0; gem > 0; fn > 0; fnn < 0;
g(am; :)f(an)  ag(m; :)f(n) for a > 0: At = GyAt 1; Gy  1:
At is the labour augmenting component of total factor productivity, whose
growth rate Gy   1 determines the long run growth, absent any shocks, of
output. Following the analysis of the benchmark New-Keynesian model we
have abstracted from capital. More generally we have assumed fnn < 0, a
xed capital stock and no feedback from the price of capital into any credit
constraints. The xed capital stock allows us to ignore investment.
zt is a total factor productivity (TFP) shock, also known as the e¢ ciency
wedge using the terminology of business cycle accounting. In addition to actual
changes in the technology, it can also reect more generally any factor that
changes the e¢ ciency of the economy for a given level of aggregate capital and
labour input. An increase in the proportion of nancially distressed rms can
reduce the utilisation rate of capital and labour if a rms normal functioning
is hindered by liquidation procedures or by harsher debt covenant restrictions.
Procyclical competition in product markets can generate procyclical TFP uc-
tuations from the perspective of the aggregate production function (Jaimovich
and Floetotto (2008) [112]).
Misallocation of production inputs across rms due to di¤erences in costs of
nancing or in the degree of imperfect competition faced by di¤erent producers
also reduces the output of the economy for any given level of aggregate labour
or capital inputs. For example if higher nancial frictions disproportionately
a¤ect smaller rms, the dispersion in marginal products of inputs across rms
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increases. With diminishing marginal productivity this higher dispersion re-
duces aggregate TFP (see Khan and Thomas (2013) [123], and (Buera and Moll
(2012) [35]for examples).
Higher costs of intermediate production inputs also reduce TFP from the
perspective of a value added production function in terms of labour and capital
(see Chari et al 2007 [50], Jones (2011,2011b) [115], [114] and the section on
the input output structure in business cycle models). In all these cases, there
is a decline in zt:Chari et al call zt the e¢ ciency wedge and nd that it can
explain most of the output decline during the US Great Depression in the 1930s.
The section on real business cycle models with variable capital discusses these
endogenous TFP channels in more detail. 15
g(:) represents distribution, matching marketing and commercialisation ef-
forts due to e.g. search frictions as in Rios-Rull et al. (2012) [17]. We can think
of g(:) the utilisation rate of production capacity ztf(Atnt): Here we take it as a
function of the amount of labour dedicated to marketing and distribution, and
vector of other factors em;t . em;t can reect changes in regulation of shopping,
time varying entry and exit rates of new stores, changes in consumer shopping
e¤orts or frictions in consumer nancing that a¤ect the e¢ ciency of the distri-
bution and marketing sector. In some models (e.g Rios Rull et al (2012) [17])
shopping e¤ort is endogeous. The impact of a shock to em;t on business cycles
is qualitatively similar to a TFP shock. We will examine several extensions that
try to endogenise em;t.
The general idea captured in models with a non trivial g(:) function is that
the distribution, delivery and matching of goods and services to buyers are
key components of their value as measured by GDP. In fact distribution costs
can represent more than 40% of the retail price of a product (Burstein et al.
(2001)). A reduction in the e¢ ciency of the distribution and marketing process
as measured by g(; ) reduces the e¢ ciency of the economy just like a reduction in
the productivity of its factories or a worse allocation of production inputs across
rms. Therefore, from the perspective of a value added production function in
capital and labour, any decline in the e¢ ciency of the matching and distribution
process g(:) will act like a negative TFP shock.
g(:) shocks also capture more general shifts in the e¢ ciency of the matching
process between buyers and sellers. For example changes in consumer tastes
across sectors or negative sector specic technology shocks usually require ad-
justments in the composition of output across sectors. But in an economy with
frictions, it may take some time for the matching process in new sectors or in
sectors with higher TFP to adjust to the inow of new buyers and sellers into
15Note that these mechanisms for endogenising TFP allow us to reduce the scope of the typ-
ical critique of these shocks that we do not seem to observe technological regress in recessions
(see King and Rebelo (2000) for a typical statement of this critique).
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these sectors, especially if the new entrants are slow to adapt their marketing
and search strategies to the new market. While this adjustment occurs, match-
ing in the economy is less e¢ cient ( see for example Black (1986) [32]). This
e¤ect may be especially relevant in economies that have gone through strong
business or real estate investment booms, when the boom turns to a bust. In
that case, di¢ culties in shifting the structure of the economy from an excessive
reliance on investment can amplify a recession. Note that this e¤ect is assymet-
ric: the same intersectoral adjustment costs would dampen the response of the
economy to positive shocks requiring reallocation across sectors.
Using the terminology of Rios Rull et al (2012) [17], these are all demand
shocks that act like productivity shocks because they change the aggregate TFP
of the economy. In an economy with randomeness in the matching process (e.g
Angeletos and Lao (2012) [11]) a nancial shock can destroy existing longer term
trade relations, increasing the idiosyncratic matching risk facing rms. The
increased uncertainty in matching raises the costs of nding buyers for ones
products and reduces the e¢ ciency of the matching process. This mechanism
would also map into a negative shock to g(:):
As for the other rm level wedges, once again we interpret taxes more broadly
here to include various private sector distortions as well as government taxa-
tion. For example, we will show that nd;t can include nancing frictions in the
funding of the rmswage payments, countercyclical markups in an environ-
ment with imperfect competition or labour market search frictions that raise
the cost of hiring. Note that the TFP wedge is equivalent to a revenue tax that
is not rebated to the households in Tt: We could also have included a revenue
tax rebated to the household in Tt; but this would be equivalent to assuming a
symmetric tax on all production inputs. Therefore, we can ignore the revenue
tax without loss of generality.
The rst order conditions (FOCs) of the rm are
nt : gtztfn;t = wt(1 + nd;t);
mt : gm;tztft = wt(1 + nd;t):
These FOCs have the classic interpretation that the rm hires more labour
as long as the extra benet exceeds the extra cost w(1+ nd): The comparative
statics are quite standard. A higher wage or higher labour tax means that at
the margin the rm requires a higher return to hiring someone or to raising
the number of hours. With diminishing marginal productivity this causes the
rm to reduce employment. An increase in productivity makes the rm increase
employment for activities that were not protable before. Formally, since the
higher productivity raises the marginal product of labour, and at the optimum
the rm hires until the marginal product equals the marginal cost of employ-
ment, the rm keeps the marginal product equal to the marginal cost by hiring
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more. Note that in this formulation where the only cost of distribution is in
terms of wages, the ratio mtnt is independent of wt(1 + nd;t):
16
5.2 The neoclassical labour market model, unions, long
term contracts and wage rigidity
The description of labour supply and labour demand above constitutes the neo-
classical labour market model, a benchmark for much of the analysis both in
labour economics and in macroeconomics. The key condition characterising
labour markets in our model is
ul;t
uc;t
1 +  c;t
(1  ns;t) =
gtztfn;t
(1 + nd;t)
:
The left hand side of this equation can be seen as the reservation wage of the
representative worker. At any wage above the reservation wage, the representa-
tive household has an incentive to further increase labour supply and vice versa
if the wage is below the reservation wage. The right hand side of the equation is
marginal value of an extra unit of labour to the representative rm. At any wage
above this marginal value the rm has an incentive to reduce employment and
vice versa for any wage below the marginal value. We have already discussed
how these aggregate conditions reect aggregation of labour supply over het-
erogenous workers who can only adjust their hours in discrete amounts (partial
labour indivisibility). In those circumstances, the left hand side of the labour
market equilibrium condition represents the marginal workers reservation wage
(the worker who is just indi¤erent between working and not working). Labour
market equilibrium equalises the representative worker reservation wage and the
representative rms marginal return to hiring. This represents an outcome in
which all mutually benecial trades between employers and workers have been
realised.
The neoclassical labour market equilibrium condition seems at rst hard to
relate to labour markets with signicant union power and centralised bargaining
such as those in some European countries. But in fact, if unions and employers
bargain e¢ ciently the equilibrium equation above provides a good approxima-
tion. If the union demands wages above the reservation wage for the marginal
workers (those whose jobs are at risk or who havent been hired yet), labour
supply would exceed labour demand. Therefore, there would be union members
who would increase their welfare by working at the given wage and would ac-
cept a lower wage to work, but who would be rationed out of the labour market.
Furthermore, rms would be willing to hire these workers at the lower wage.
In reverse if employer representatives demand wages below the marginal return
to hiring, some employers would benet from proposing lower wages in order
to hire more workers at a prot and workers would be willing to work at those
16 If we had separate wedges on the wage bill of the two types of workers, mt
nt
could be
a¤ected.
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higher wages. E¢ cient bargaining between rms and workers would not allow
these mutually benecial transactions to go unfullled.
More formally, as the number of workers and rms represented in labour
market negotiations increases, then under plausible conditions the set of bar-
gaining outcomes compatible with no deviations by various coalitions of rms
and workers shrinks towards the competitive equilibrium condition above (for a
proof, see the analysis of convergence of the core of an economy towards com-
petitive equilibrium in Mas Collel et al (1995)[143], ch 18)). Of course, to
achieve this outcome requires signicant exibility in terms of the ability to
have di¤erent wages for di¤erent worker experience levels (possibly proxied by
tenure) and skills.
Real world imperfect information about e¤ort and worker abilities can limit
contract exibility. We can capture ine¢ ciency in the labour market bargaining
process, e.g due to excessive wage rigidity in union demands, in reduced form as
part of the labour supply wedge ns: 17 Similarly, it is easy to extend this analysis
to allow for some market power by unions (imperfect substitutability between
unionised and non unionised workers) leading to monopoly rents through the
labour supply wedge ns (with higher ns representing higher monopoly power)
. But conditional on this market power, e¢ cient bargaining between unions and
employers should still lead to something close to the neoclassical labour market
condition above.
The neoclassical labour market model embodied in the representative house-
hold and rm maximisation problems above also seems to clash with the over-
whelming empirical evidence that wages in ongoing employment relations are
quite stable in response to most shocks (Babecky et al (2009a) [15], Basu et al
(2010) [19]). However, it is compatible with a more realistic model in which
rms enter long term contracts that provide their workers partial insurance
against shocks while the wage of the marginal workers (new hires or the rst
workers that would be red at a constant wage) is set competitively (see Barro
(1977) [20] and Pissarides (2009)[154] for related arguments about the relevance
of wage rigidity in determining aggregate labour hours).
This poses a measurement problem in matching wt in our model directly
to average wage series or to wages reported in microeconomic panel data sets
that do not distinguish between ongoing jobs and new jobs. wt in the model is
more directly comparable to the wages of newly hired workers, though even this
measure does not fully capture the actual cost of the marginal worker to the
rm in a world with long term labour contracts. At any rate wages of new hires
are usually found to be quite responsive to aggregate conditions (Carneiro et al
(2009) [43],Bellou and Kaymak (2011) [25] ,Pissarides (2009)[154]), even in some
European countries known for their rigid labour legislation such as Portugal.
17See the section on nominal wage rigidity for a formalisation of this insight.
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Babecky et al (2009b)[16] examine more generally compensation practices in
a survey of European rms. They nd that rigidity in wage setting is compen-
sated at least to some degree by adjustments to other margins such as overtime
pay, bonuses, delayed promotions or hiring new workers with lower wages. Pis-
sarides (2009)[154] summarizes evidence from studies that distinguish wages on
new jobs from those of job stayers. He argues that labour market models with
exible wage adjustment match the empirical cyclicality of the wages of new
hires in the US and Europe quite well. Kudlyak (2010) [133] tries to measure
the actual cost of the marginal worker using more sophisticated methods in the
US. Unlike simply looking at the wages of new hires, Kudlyak takes into account
the fact that in long term contracts wage reductions could take the form of lower
future wages relative to the market wage, rather than a cut in the entry wage of
a new worker. She nds the cost of labour is up to 3 times as procyclical as the
average wage. While her method has not yet been applied in other countries,
the cumulative evidence just cited suggests that the most relevant measure of
wages for labour demand can be quite exible.
Here we provide a basic illustration of the relation between the neoclassical
labour market model, long term labour contracts and wage rigidity, as long the
marginal workerswages are exible. Suppose the representative rm uses 2
kinds of workers, permanent workers npt and marginal workers n
m
t . The rm
commits to keep a xed amount of permanent worker hours np + mp at a xed
wage rate wp: Meanwhile marginal workers can be be adjusted exible at at a
competitive wage wt:We assume that both types of workers enter the production
function as perfect substitutes. Dene
nt = n
p
t + n
m
t ;mt = m
p
t +m
m
t :
Also we start with the case in which shocks are small enough that the rm would
never want to have less worker hours than the number of permanent hours. The
rms cash ow is now
dt = g(Atmt; em;t)ztf(Atnt) wt(1+nd;t)(nmt +mmt ) wp(1+nd;t)(np+ mp):
The rst order conditions are exactly the same as in the original model as
long as the rmslabour demand satises nt > np and mt > mp (which we have
assumed to hold):
Now go back to the representative households optimisation problem. We
have to think a bit more carefully about the household choice between perma-
nent and marginal labour e¤ort. One possibility is to allow the household to
choose both types of hours subject to a constraint that
npt  np + mp:
assume that wp > wt, which is in line with typical case in which more permanent
sta¤ with longer tenure have higher wages. In this case the constraint above
always binds, and the representative household is constrained in its choice of
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permanent workers. In this case only the choice of marginal workers is uncon-
strained. A simpler but more ad hoc assumption is to force the constraint above
to hold with equality for some exogenous unspecied reason. The work hours of
permanent and marginal workers are perfect substitutes in the utility function.
Dening
ns;mt = n
m
t +m
m
t ;
we get the same rst order conditions as for the problem without permanent
workers as long as
nst > n
p + mp:
But this second inequality will hold in any competitive equilibrium in which the
earlier inequality conditions on labour demand also hold.
Under these conditions, combining the household budget constraint and the
rmsprots and equating supply and demand for marginal labour hours, we
get the same system of equations characterising equilibrium in the model with
long term contracting as in the model with only static exible labour contracts.
Therefore we get the same solution for quantities. The relevant wage for hiring or
ring decision is that of the marginal workers wt: Average wages in the economy
will typically be more rigid. Looking a a histogram of wage changes in such an
economy, we will see a spike at 0 (here we have assumed real wage rigidity for
permanent workers, but a similar argument could be made for nominal rigidity).
One question that arises is what happens when rms labour demand declines
strongly enough that they want to cut back on their permanent employees. In
general, the outcome will no longer be the same as with static contracts. The
one exception is if a su¢ cient number of permanent workers can be converted
into marginal workers, in which case the constraints nt > n
p
t andmt > m
p
t never
bind (where we now allow npt ; m
p
t to occasionally adjust in response to economic
conditions). Essentially, this amounts to assuming bargaining between workers
and employers is su¢ ciently exible so as to avoid any ine¢ cient separations,
as in Barro (1977) [20].18
6 Competitive Equilibrium
We use the market clearing conditions, budget constraints and optimisation
conditions (e.g rst order conditions for di¤erentiable problems or Value func-
tions for non di¤erentiable optimisation problems) to form a system of equations
dening the solution of the model. This system of equations is called the com-
petitive equilibrium. We partition the variables in the system into state variables
and non-state variables. The state variable vector is su¢ cient to describe the
dynamics of the system, in the sense that once we know the path of the states
it is easy to predict the path of non state variables from that of the states.
18The equivalence with our basic model will also fail if the two types of workers are imperfect
substitutes in production on the utility function, but in that case we should still get equivalence
with a neoclassical labour market model featuring the same substitutability patterns.
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There are several ways of dening the state vector. At the very least the
states at time t must include all predetermined variables: i.e. variables whose
forecast error at t is exogenous (Klein (2000) [128]). Typically this includes,
exogenous stochastic shock processes zt, capital stocks and the lags of non state
variables (kt; yt 1). Using just the predetermined variables as states gives us the
Minimum State Vector (MSV) solution. We also have the fundamental source of
uncertainty in the system, a vector of IID variables (often known as innovations
or error terms) et:
Formally, dening the state vector st and the non state vector yt we seek a
solution to the system of equations
Etf(st; st+1; yt; yt+1; et+1) = 0:
19 We are usually looking for a rst order Markov solution
st+1 = g(st; et+1);
yt = h(st):
The equations above are called a state space system. Compared to typical
systems of equations in econometrics or statistics, the key innovation in the
state space equations is the recognition that the underlying factors that drive
the system can be unobserved. In contrast, a subset of the non state variables yt
is usually observed. In applied work, it is common to allow for an extra residual
or measurement error "t in the equation for the non state variables, leading to
yt = h(st) + "t:
The main econometric challenge is to estimate the probability distribution of
the partially unobserved states st conditional on the the observed variables. In
typical macroeconomic forecasting applications, we are interested in the forecast
distribution p(st+1jyt), the ltered state distribution p(stjyt) and the smoothed
state distribution p(stjy0;:::;yT ):This can be done in the linear case using the
Kalman lter. In the general nonlinear case, there is a wide variety of options
going from adaptations of the Kalman lter to take into account higher order
terms in the state equations (e.g the unscented Kalman lter) to full blown sim-
ulation based methods such as the particle lter (Fernandez Villaverde (2010))
[84].
Once we have obtained the state space representation, we can use a com-
bination of explicit formulas and simulation (applying the law large numbers)
to forecast,do scenario analysis ,nd probability bands or event probabilities for
di¤erent variables,evaluate the ability of the model to match various features of
the data or link historical events to their more fundamental unobserved causes
(the states) through variance decompositions. Fernandez Villaverde (2010)[84]
19 Inequality constraints can be transformed into equations by introducing Lagrange multi-
pliers and forming the corresponding complementary slackness conditions.
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and the references he cites are an excellent introduction to solution methods and
Bayesian inference for DSGE models. For generalisations that handle a large
number of heterogenous agents (which are also applicable to the more standard
models with a small number of agents as a special case) see the survey by Algan
et al (2009) [5].
Note that the expression of the equilibrium system Etf(:) and the solution
g(:) and h(:) using only t and t+ 1 is without loss of generality: we can always
handle further lead and lags by expanding the state vector. For example, if we
need yt 1 in our state vector, we can dene the new variable s 1;t = yt 1: For
yt 2; we would dene s 2;t+1 = s 1; t and so on for higher order lags.
Finally, note that in the case of exogeneous shock processes zt the solution
for the endogenous decision variables of agents in yt can be done independently
from the actual shock processes used in model simulation. This gives us some
exibility in modeling deviations from rational expectations due to mispercep-
tions on the exogenous shocks. For example, we can solve for decision rules
yt = h(kt; zt) + "1;t;
assuming that agents perceive zt as following
zt = f
1(zt 1) + "1;t;
, while the true process that we use in simulating the model is
zt = f
2(zt 1) + "2;t:
This allows us to capture situations where agents may overestimate the per-
sistence of shocks leading them to overreact (see for example Laibson et al 2011),
or their decision rules may misperceive the risk that they face leading them to
errors in the amount of precautionnary behaviour.
In most cases we can nd a unique state-space form solution. The most
straightforward way to do this is by Taylor approximations of the functions h(:)
and g(:). The 1st order approximation
AEt(xt+1   x) = B(xt   x) + Cet+1;
xt = (yt; st)
involves taking a (log)linear approximation of the equations in Etf(:) around x
(usually the long run balanced growth path of the economy) and using matrix
decompositions of A and B such as the QZ or the SVD decompositions to solve
the linearised system of equations (e.g Klein (2000) [128]) for a set of equations
st+1   s = g1(st   s) + et+1
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yt   y = h1(st   s):
This linear approximation to the state space system is similar to another popular
class of time series models, the dynamic factor model (DFM) (Stock andWatson
(2010)[166]). The state variables are essentially like the factors in DFMs, except
that they have a clearer economic interpretation than factors extracted through
purely statistical methods. The parameter restrictions from DSGE models can
be used to improve (conditional) forecasts from factor models (see for example
Baurle (2008), Consolo et al (2009)) and to provide economic interpretations
to the factors. In the other direction, the factors extracted in reduced form
statistical factor models may be useful in improving the identication of wedge
processes in business cycle accounting DSGE models.
A unique rational expectations solution for the linearised state space system
above requires the number of Eigenvalues of (A;B) with an absolute value be-
low 1 to equal the number of predetermined variables. Under this condition,
the QZ decomposition partitions the initial system into 2 separate blocks: the
1st one allows solving for the predetermined variables, the 2nd one solves the
non predetermined variables as a function of the predetermined variables that
have been solved in the 1st block (Klein (2000)[128]). Higher order Taylor ap-
proximations of order k involve totally di¤erentiating Etf(:) = 0 k times and
evaluating it at BGP values of the variables. This procedure leads to several
systems of linear equations that can be solved recursively to get the kth order
coe¢ cients (see for example Judd (1998), ch. 14 [117] and Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2004) [100]).
Modern software packages for solving and simulating macroeconomic mod-
els (e.g dynare) have made these calculations almost routine. With current
computing resources, analysts usually restrict the approximation order k  3;
with 1st and 2nd order approximations being more common. 2nd and 3rd order
Taylor approximations capture some nonlinearity, though the quality of approx-
imation can deteriorate away from the long run deterministic growth path of
the economy.
More severe nonlinearity or assymetry in dynamics requires the use of more
accurate but slower global approximation methods (Judd (1998), ch. 11 [117]).
Alternatively they can be captured to some degree by adjusting the approxima-
tion point x: For example, higher de facto nancing frictions for a large nega-
tive shock can be captured by using an approximation around x with heavier
nancial distortions for the IRF. We can also increase the accuracy of perturba-
tion methods by using exact equations such as identities to solve out for some
variables whenever it is possible. That is if we have m equations of the form
f(y1t; y2;t; st) = 0; then we can use the perturbation solutions of st and y2;t to
solve out precisely for y1;t (see Maliar and Maliar 2011 for further development
of this hybrid perturbation approach):
In some cases a unique solution in the form above does not exist . In this
case we need to add new shocks to the system to account for this indeterminacy.
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In addition, the functional form linking these "sunspot" or nonfundamental
shocks vt to the other variables is itself indeterminate. To implement this,
we redeclare some of our jump variables to be predetermined and add new
exogenous forecast errors to them (see Farmer and Khramov (2013)[81] for a
formal analysis and examples of how to implement this in standard software
packages such as Dynare). There are several economic criteria for resolving this
indeterminacy (e.g Benhabib and Wen (2004) [27]). These lead to a solution of
the form
st+1 = g(st; et+1; vt+1);
yt = h(st; vt):
In the baseline model introduced in this section life is actually much simpler.
The equilibrium conditions are
bt+1 = 0;
nst = nt +mt;
yt = ct:
We solve the model in several steps:
1. Solve the rms rst order conditions for m for m(n;w; :::):
2. Use 1. and the rst order conditions for n to solve for n(w; :::);m(w; :::):
The result of 2. can usually be written as w(n):
3. Combining the above with the rst order condition for ns with the market
equilibrium conditions we get a static equation for nt which is independent of
efpht or efph;t+1.
7 Business cycle dynamics in the exible prices
and wages economy with a xed capital stock
7.1 Intertemporal shocks
A fundamentals based solution requires a unique solution in each of these steps.
In that case, intertemporal wedges such as efph;t; or t do not a¤ect output
if they are uncorrelated with intratemporal wedges. like  c;t or nd;t. They
only a¤ect interest rates. A more indirect proof of this result is also instructive:
if the intertemporal and intratemporal wedges are uncorrelated, a shift in the
intertemporal wedge that reduces desired consumption and increases desired
saving does not a¤ect labour demand for a given wage. For consumption ct and
output yt = ct to fall in response to this negative demand shock requires labour
supply to fall for any given wage. This causes wages to rise, decreasing labour
demand. But with the standard income e¤ects on labour supply, a decline in
consumption encourages an increase in labour supply at any given wage and
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therefore higher output. Since yt = ct this means consumption has increased,
leading to a contradiction. Instead, consumption does not change and the higher
desired savings lead to an decline in interest rates to clear credit markets.
Consider the implications for nancial shocks, e.g a rise in efph;t+1. The
above result says that to have an e¤ect on output, a nancial shock must
have some immediate e¤ect on the e¢ ciency of utilisation rate of productive
resources zt or em;t, or on intratemporal household wedges  c;t; ns;t. Note that
these results do not rely on perfectly competitive markets, since nd;t and zt
can be in part related to imperfect competition. With imperfect competition,
these intertemporal household level shocks cannot generate business cycles as
long rmspricing markups are exogenous. Without sunspot equilibria, only
fundamental intratemporal shocks such as zt can move output in this economy.
20
7.2 Total factor productivity (TFP) shocks
Suppose there is a positive TFP shock in the current period that is orthogonal
to the other wedges. The increase in TFP causes higher output both directly as
productivity increases but also indirectly by raising labour demand, since the
marginal product of labour is higher. To attract more workers, wages have to
increase. The wage increase has two e¤ects. First there is a substitution e¤ect:
a higher return to working encourages higher labour supply. Second, there is an
income e¤ect. Since leisure is a normal good, higher income encourages leisure
and discourages labour supply. With preference that are compatible with a
long run balanced growth path these two e¤ects o¤set each other perfectly in
the economy with xed capital stock. As a result, output and consumption only
increase due to the direct e¤ect of higher productivity. Unless, the TFP shock
also leads to a shift in the labour wedge, equilibrium labour supply does not
change. This is easiest to see with a Cobb Douglas production function
yt = ztn

t
and a constant elasticity of substitution utility function
u(c; l) =
 
cl1 

1  
1 
:
, where for simplicity we set gt = 1: The households labour supply optimality
condition is
1  

1
lt
=
wt(1  ns;t)
ct(1 +  c;t)
:
20With multiple solutions, output can shift due to sunspot uctuations that look. One has
to be careful though with sunspot models not to generate other counterfactual predictions such
as negative responses of aggregate labour demand to cuts in payroll taxes. The controversial
responses of these models to shocks occur because they frequently require an aggregate labour
demand curve that is upward sloping and steeper than aggregate labour supply (see e.g. the
aggregate externality RBC model in Benhabib and Wen (2004) [27] and Aiyagaris (1995) [2]
critique of these modelsimplications for other shocks and tax policies ).
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Labour demand satises

yt
nt
= wt(1 + nd;t)
=) yt = wt(1 + nd;t)nt

, which using yt = ct implies
1  

1
1  nt = 
wt(1  ns;t)
wt(1 + nd;t)(1 +  c;t)nt
; i.e.
1  

nt
1  nt = 
(1  ns;t)
(1 + nd;t)(1 +  c;t)
:
, so that nt is independent of wt and therefore of zt shocks after conditioning on
 c;t and ns;t. Note that equilibrium labour supply is decreasing in ns;t and in
nd;t; so a TFP shock could reduce labour supply if for example it increases the
labour supply wedge ns;t: Allowing gt to depend on mt, we can easily derive
the same result for example with
yt = ztm

t n

t :
Meanwhile, the interest rate follows the pattern of the change in productivity
closely. Assume rst that productivity is higher in the current period than in
the next period, that is the TFP shock is front loaded. Then consumption
smoothing households would like to reallocate resources across periods through
saving. Since this is not possible in aggregate with bt+1 = 0, interest rates
fall to clear credit markets. Now assume that productivity is higher next period
than now. Then households would like to borrow funds to start consuming more
today. Since this is again impossible in aggregate, interest rates increase to clear
credit markets (Goodfriend (2004) [96]). The countercyclicality of interest rates
for front loaded TFP shocks is reduced in the presence of credit constrained
households. For credit constrained households the improvement in the economy
leads to a lower external nance premium. In this case, a reduction in efph;t+1
tends to push up interest rates, going in the opposite direction to the e¤ect of
consumption smoothing by non credit constrained households.
7.3 Labour wedge shocks
Now consider an increase in the labour demand wedge nd;t: The increase could
be caused by higher nancing costs for wages (e.g Jermann and Quadrini (2010),
Arellano et al. (2012) ), higher recruitment costs per worker (Pissarides (2008)
[154]), higher markups (See Bils et al (2012) for a state of the art empirical
analysis of countercyclical markups and their interpretation, and the section
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on mapping price rigidity into markups in this document), higher uncertainty
about the returns to hiring ,or higher search frictions in labour markets due to
the need to reallocate workers between sectors. The rise in nd;t decreases labour
demand and wages. Lower wages reduce labour supply through a substitution
e¤ect, but at the same time they increase labour supply through a negative
income e¤ect. However, in contrast to the TFP shock, the income e¤ect of the
lower wage is reduced by the increase in lump sum transfers Tt: As a result,
the substitution e¤ect dominates and equilibrium labour supply declines. Since
TFP is xed by assumption, output in the economy also declines. Note that the
results would be the same if instead of writing out the labour demand wedge
as a tax on rms, we specied it as a binding quantity constraint on labour
demand. For example consider the constraint
wtnd;t  at; (nd;t):
Now the labour demand optimality condition is

yt
nt
= wt(1 + nd;t):
Writing nd;t = nd;t; we get the exact same conclusions as before. The alter-
native intepretation claries why exactly the substitution e¤ect dominates the
income e¤ect on labour supply: the key factor is that the higher cost of hiring
workers increases the share of non labour income in GDP. This could occur from
a mixture of higher prots share in GDP, or if unemployment benets spending
increases proportionately to the higher labour demand wedge.
A higher labour supply wedge n;st would have a similar e¤ect for quantities.
21 nd;t and ns;t are frequently combined together to dene an overall index
of labour market distortions. Using householdsrst order condition for labour
supply with rmsrst order condition for labour demand we get
gtztfn;t
(ul;t=t)
=
1 + nd;t
1  ns;t :
1+nd;t
1 ns;t is often known as the labour wedge. It captures the deviation of em-
ployment from the benchmark e¢ cient outcome of the undistorted neoclassical
growth model, with a higher wedge indicating bigger deviations. In general
the labour wedge is countercyclical, indicating signicantly higher procyclical
volatility in hours of work compared to a benchmark labour market model with-
out distortions. Chari et al (2007) [50] document an important role for the
labour wedge in business cycles. Mulligan (2010) shows that a real business
cycle model with an increase in the labour wedge can account for much of the
US great recession of 2008-2010, when large output declines were accompanied
by acyclical or rising average labour productivity. Because of the procyclicality
of wages (especially after adjustment for composition bias and long term labour
21The labour supply wedge is isomorphic to a preference shock to the disutility of work.
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contracts), we start by examining factors that could explain a procyclical labour
demand wedge.
7.3.1 Some models of the labour demand wedge
This section presents some models of the labour wedge due to precautionnary
cutbacks in labour demand caused by the combination of signicant levels of
idiosyncratic business risk, incomplete nancial markets and labour adjustment
costs. These are all crucial elements in understanding rmslabour demand and
capital investment according to the most recent, state of the art, microecono-
metric research on rm production decisions (e.g Caballero and Engel (1999),
Bloom (2009) [33], Cooper and Willis (2006)).
Arellano et al (2012)[12] build a model where a procyclical labour wedge
emerges from the interaction between hiring decision and the costs of default
on the rms debt:
1) Firms must make their employment decisions before fully knowing their
productivity or the demand for their products during the period. That is, in
contrast to the usual assumption that labour demand can be easily adjusted as
a function of the rms current productivity, here labour demand is less exi-
ble.More generally there are some labour adjustment costs making labour demand
depend on expected future conditions as in Bloom et al (2012) [34].
2) Because of the mismatch between the receipt of revenues and spending on
wages and other production inputs, rms require short term loans (either from
nancial institutions, nancial markets or from other rms in the form of trade
credit).
3) Financial markets are incomplete: rm loan repayments cannot be made
fully state contingent and default has real costs, unlike in the complete markets
model. A higher wage bill increases the probability of the rm not having su¢ -
cient funds to fully repay its debt, forcing it to default on its loans. Default with
incomplete markets leads to the liquidation of the rm: the rm disappears and
its previous owners can only restart production by paying a reentry cost. More
generally, there are signicant costs of default.
4) An increase in the probability of default for a given labour input (e.g due to
higher idiosyncratic risk) leads to a precautionnary reduction in labour demand
as the rm tries to reduce the probability and costs of default.
Arellano et al (2012)[12] show that in a reasonably calibrated model this
mechanism can match the declines in output and employment in the US during
the great recession of 2008-2010 quite well while replicating the initial increase
in labour productivity. Arellano et al (2012) [12] assume the rmsowners are
fully diversied with respect to idiosyncratic risk. The precautionnary reduction
in labour demand due to higher uncertainty is likely to be even stronger if rms
are owned by undiversied entrepreneurs or large undiverisifed shareholders
as in Angeletos and Calvet (2005) [9], or Angeletos (2007) [8]. With labour
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adjustment costs or partial irreversibility labour demand choices become like an
investment. In that case the increased riskiness of labour encourages risk-averse
entrepreneurs to reduce hiring and shift towards safer investments such as risk
free bonds.
These labour demand e¤ects are unlikely to be signicant for most large
US corporation that have positive net nancial asset balances. But the dis-
tribution of corporate net nancial assets is highly unequal. While in recent
years the average corporate sector net nancial assets balance is positive, the
median balance is negative, with 57% of corporations having negative balances.
Furthermore the non corporate rm sector has a negative net nancial asset
balance (see BEA tables, as well as Armenter and Hnatkovska (2012)). Com-
puting the current ratio of US corporations as the ratio of liquid assets to short
term debt, we see that even in aggregate short term debt is signicantly larger
than liquid assets with a current ratio around 35% over the last 30 years. It
jumped to over 50% in the early part of the great recession (2008-2010), but that
was in large part because rms cut down their expenditures and accumulated
cash in reaction to the nancial crisis. 22 These facts suggest that the relation
between nancial distress fears and hiring may be quite relevant at least for
small and medium size rms. A lot of the corporate cash balances are held for
precautionary motives in the fear of future binding nancial constraints. From
this perspective, evidence of rising corporate net nancial assets in the 2008
nancial crisis are perfectly compatible with Arellano et als (2012)[12] precau-
tionnary fall in labour demand story: rms in part built up their cash reserves
by reducing hiring.
Nonconvex labour adjustment costs can also generate similar cutbacks in
employment in a recession. Bloom et al (2012) [34] build a model in which
hiring and ring decisions are subject to xed labour adjustment costs, and
proportional hiring and ring costs. These nonconvex adjustment costs gener-
ate inaction bands, where rms do not adjust their labour demand if the change
in their desired workforce is below certain thresholds. An increase in idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty increases the rms inaction bands, leading to less hiring of
new workers. The higher uncertainty is modelled as a 2nd moment shock that
also increases the likelihood of positive idiosyncratic shocks. This leads to a
reduction in ring of workers as well, but the decline in endogenous ring is
dominated by the much larger exogenous separation rate of workers (e.g due to
natural attrition, or idiosyncratic changes in the e¢ ciency of certain production
processes or product lines inside the rm). Consequently, the decline in hiring
dominates and labour demand falls.
This result is reinforced if we take into acount the growing evidence that
the increase in idiosyncratic risk in recessions is more skewed towards negative
22http://www.marketminder.com/c/sher-investments-how-strong-is-corporate-americas-
balance-sheet/b14e50c8-8ae3-42cb-b046-ee62a28051bb
http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2013/07/us-rms-holding-18-trillion-in-
liquid.html
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outcomes (Guvenen et al (2012)). In this case, an increase in uncertainty would
depress labour demand even more, this time also signicantly increasing ring
as well as reducing hiring. Again, Bloom et al (2012)[34] assume that rm
owners are fully diversied with respect to idiosyncratic production risk. But
similarly to the case of costly default in Arellano et al (2012) [12] we can imagine
an extension of their model in which rms are owned by entrepreneurs as in
Angeletos (2007) [8]. More generally rm owners or managers are not well
diversied with respect to idiosyncratic risk. In this case, higher idiosyncratic
uncertainty in the presence of labour adjustment costs will make having a large
workforce more risky for the owners, amplifying the reduction in labour demand.
Arellano et al (2012)[12] and Bloom et al (2012) [34] generate a recession
from an increase in idiosyncratic risk. An interesting question is where does the
countercyclicality of idiosyncratic business risk come from. One interpretation
of countercyclical risk is that there really is an increase in the dispersion of pro-
ductivity or demand facing di¤erent rms. Another interpretation is that the
volatility of idiosyncratic shocks in their model comes from the residual risk left
after the purchase of nancial insurance contracts or the short-selling of nan-
cial contracts that are positively correlated with the shocks to the rm. This
intuition is formalised in Angeletos and Calvets (2005) [9] model of idiosyn-
cratic production risk, in which entrepreneurs can diversify their rm-specic
risk by trading other nancial assets. The optimal portfolio of entrepreneurs in
their model minimise the variance of entrepreneur wealth for a given expected
return. By the projection theorem, after purchase of other nancial assets at
t  1 the original idiosyncratic risk zj;t can be decomposed into
zj;t = zj;t + "j;t
,where "j;t is uncorrelated with zj;t. zj;t is predetermined with respect to
t and "j;t is the residual undiversied risk. Higher business risk can be linked
to a decline in the availability of nancial contracts that provide insurance or
to stricter limits on shortselling, e.g due to lower trading of various derivatives
and more sophisticated loans, or due to tighter credit line limits. A reduction in
the amount of insurance provided by the nancial system translates into higher
residual risk "j;t for rms. More generally, we can envision other mechanisms
raising the shadow cost of borrowing to nance production inputs. For example,
collateral constraints on short term debt become tighter, more restrictive debt
covenant clauses are triggered etc...
Finally, we should note that the mechanisms we have discussed can also ap-
ply to purchases of other production factors such as marketing and distribution
expenses, or intermediate inputs that represent approximately 50% of the value
of production. In that case higher idiosyncratic uncertainty would discourage
purchase of intermediate inputs as long as some of those purchases are prede-
termined with respect to idiosyncratic shocks. From the perspective of a value
added production function a decline in the use of intermediate inputs or of mar-
keting and distribution would map into a TFP reduction. We will explore this
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mechanism in greater detail in separate section on the business cycle e¤ects of
the input-output structure of the economy.
7.3.2 Aggregation/composition e¤ects on the labour wedge, and fac-
tors increasing the sensitivity of labour supply to shocks
Here, I look at some explanations for the labour wedge coming from the labour
supply side. These labour supply channels help reconcile large movements in
employment with low cyclicality of wages. I focus on factors that are indepen-
dent of institutional restrictions preventing wage adjustments, i.e factors that
matter even if wages are completely exible. I will examine the consequences of
wage rigidity due to contractual limitations once we get to Keynesian economics.
A higher labour wedge in a recession could reect composition e¤ects in
labour demand and supply. What matters to the representative rm in a com-
petitive labour market is the number of e¢ ciency units, that is the number
of hours adjusted for di¤erences in individual worker productivity. Labour de-
mand shifts towards more qualied and skilled workers in a downturn. The
standard model of labour demand assumes workers of di¤erent qualities are
perfect substitutes in production, therefore it cannot explain the tendency to
re less productive workers rst. But a more realistic model in which the more
productive workers are better complements with the production of other workers
could easily explain why a rm keeps its most productive workers in a reces-
sion, and res the least productive rst. The change in the composition of the
workforce shows up as a higher labour demand wedge. In parallel, low produc-
tivity workers are less likely to get job o¤ers above their reservation wages in a
downturn.
In a model with incomplete markets as in Chang et al. (2011) [49], the
lower wage reduces labour supply by low productivity workers via a substitution
e¤ect. But conditional on deciding not to work, the lower wage does not produce
an o¤setting negative income e¤ect that would boost labour supply. So with
indivisible labour and incomplete markets, the labour supply of these households
declines. From the perspective of the representative household, this looks like
a shock increasing the disutility of working in a recession, or a higher labour
supply tax. 23
23This highlights that some divisibility in labour supply is key for the income e¤ect to
matter: for example the income e¤ect would be operational if the worker has a choice between
part time versus full time jobs or if , as argued in Mulligan and Rubinstein (2004) ,the
household can adjust the number of its members looking for work. Other sources of divisibility
are the number of shifts and the e¤ort per hour of work. Finally, if we have indivisible labour
but complete markets, the lower wages in a recession boost labour supply via a negative income
e¤ect for all workers, because the lower wages translate into lower intra-household insurance
payments to low productivity workers (see Chang et al (2007), Chang et al (2011)[49] for more
on these points).
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If the labour wedge is measured using aggregate hours without adjusting for
di¤erences in worker specic productivity, then we overestimate the decline in
e¤ective labour demand in a (adjusted for di¤erences in worker e¢ ciency) in
a downturn. Kydland (in Cooley et al (1995) [62] ch. 5) argues using micro
panel data evidence that incorrectly using total hours without adjusting for dif-
ferences in e¢ ciency across workers overstates the variability of labour demand
by around 40%. For a given estimate of the TFP process, this leads to a signif-
icant overestimate of labour wedge uctuations. To see how mismeasurement
of the labour input leads to the appearance of labour wedges, we can extend
our model to include di¤erences in worker e¢ ciency per hour. Let hjt be the
physical actual hours of work chosen by household j: Total hours in the economy
are
ht =
Z
hj;tdj:
Meanwhile the actual labour input relevant for rms is
nt =
Z
"j;thj;tdj
, where "j;t is the household specic labour productivity, and E"j;t = 1. This
measure of nt may not be the same measure of labour e¤ort thats relevant to the
representative household. However, Maliar and Maliar (2003) [139] show that
in some cases such as Cobb douglas preferences and complete nancial markets,
the representative household utility function can be written as u(ct; 1 nt) with
nt =
R
"j;thj;t: We will focus on this special case, while noting that the result
will still be valid as long as the representative households true labour e¤ort is
less procyclical than actual hours worked.
We have argued that in general nt will be less procyclical than ht due to a
higher employment rate of less productive workers in booms than in recessions.
Now suppose an economist uses ht instead of nt as the measure of the labour
input. One e¤ect of this measurement error is that for a given level of output, the
economist will underestimate the procyclicality of TFP (zh > z in a recession,
and vice versa in a boom). This may lead to a signicant underestimate of the
role of TFP shocks in the business cycle. We now show that the analyst using
mismeasured labour input data will also overestimate the procyclicality of the
labour wedge. The true labour demand equation can be written as
zfn = z
hfh
zfn
zhfh
= w;()
zhfh =
zhfh
zfn
w = (1 + nd)w:
In a recession a bigger fall in h than in n implies an increase in
zhfh
zfn
= 1 + nd
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by the concavity of the production function. Therefore, using the wrong measure
of the labour input the researcher nds a higher labour demand wedge in a
recession, and vice versa in a boom. For labour supply
ul = u1 n = u1 h
u1 n
u1 h
= w;()
u1 h =
u1 h
u1 n
w = (1  ns)w:
In a recession, leisure measured as 1  h increases by more than 1  n: By the
concavity of utility in leisure,
u1 h
u1 n
= 1  ns
declines. As a result, the wrong measure of the labour input leads the researcher
to conclude that the labour supply wedge has worsened. Chang and Kim (2007)
nd this bias is important in an incomplete markets model with indivisible
labour (see also Chang and Schorfheide (2011) for a more detailed analysis of
the results of estimating and forecasting with representative agent economies
when the true economy has non trivial heterogeneity due to incomplete nan-
cial markets). 24 From this perspective actual labour input uctuations are
signicantly less volatile when seen from the employersperspective. But, the
welfare costs of these uctuations is bigger than suggested by the utility func-
tion of a representative household, because it falls more heavily on the number
of jobs, particularly those of lower skilled, younger and poorer workers.
Another way to increases the procyclicality of employments while reducing
that of wages is to make the marginal utility of wealth t at which households
evaluate the benets of raising labour supply more procyclical. One realistic fea-
ture that helps in this direction is the incorporation of durable goods investment,
especially if durable and non durable consumption goods are complements. In
that case, if we measure the labour wedge using a t that ignores these e¤ects,
we will tend to exaggerate labour wedge uctuations (see the section on durable
goods for more discussion of this). Also, if there are increases in the costs of
consumer nancing (both higher interest rates or higher credit rationing), these
will often map into a higher consumption wedge  c;t: An increase in  c;t will
reduce the purchasing power of any given wage, making work less desirable and
reducing labour supply through a substitution e¤ect.
Note that while the higher consumption wedge  c;t also has a negative income
e¤ect which tends to stimulate labour supply, the substitution e¤ect dominates
in this case because the rise in the wedge is compensated through higher transfers
Tt: This is realistic if the rise in the consumption wedge represents frictions
24A related point is that wage exibility is underestimated because of composition bias, with
the pool of workers shifting towards more qualied and highly paid employees in a recession
and vice versa in a boom (see Romer (2001) [157] ch. 5) .
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that do not have a direct resource cost, such as tighter quantity constraints on
consumer credit, or increases in credit spreads on consumer credit that increase
the compensation of lenders for any given loan size.
Wen (2006)[176] shows that if the shock to the consumption wedge  c;t is
persistent enough, it can generate a business cycle with procyclical consumption,
investment and output. 25 But if this is the single source of business cycles,
real wages would be countercyclical, since the lower labour supply in a recession
would reduce wages. So  c;t shocks are best seen as complements to TFP or
labour demand shocks that can produe business cycles with procyclical wages.
The consumption wedge shocks helps in reducing the procyclicality of wages,
making them appear more "rigid". Models ignoring the consumption wedge
will once again tend to overestimate the volatility of the labour wedge. Finally
certain models of search frictions or intersectoral labour adjustment costs can
microfound procyclical movements in the labour supply wedge ns;t (e.g Beaudry
and Portier (2013) [24]): The main idea in these models is that in a recession it
becomes harder for unemployed workers to match with good job opportunities
at any given wage, for example if macroeconomic adjustments require a shift to
another sector of production and it is hard for workers to retrain for the new
sectors. As a result, labour supply declines and workers become more expensive.
8 Aggregate demand in real business cycle mod-
els and matching frictions in product markets
While real business cycle theory shows that supply side factors can be an im-
portant driver of aggregate economic uctuations, popular and business press
analysis of the economy still seems to think in terms of aggregate demand as
the main factor in business cycles. There is a sense in which in a exible price
model, any recession in which wages and other production factor prices go down
in real terms must be caused by negative shifts in the supply of goods. Low rel-
ative production factor prices are equivalent to high relative nal goods prices.
In this case, simple supply and demand logic in markets for nal goods would
argue that there has been a negative supply shock. This suggests that explaining
business cycles through demand shocks could be a challenge for market clearing
models, unless we can nd channels transforming demand shocks into supply
shocks. But before concluding that the focus on aggregate demand is just a
classical case of confusing symptoms with causes or that Keynesian price rigid-
ity must be important, we should dig deeper into the conditions required for
aggregate demand driven business cycles in a exible price and wage economy.
Consider an economy with xed capital and labour where the only endoge-
nous variation in output comes from changes in utilisation rates of production
25Wen (2006) examines preference shocks to consumption that shift the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure. But these shocks are isomorphic to our c;t
shock.
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capacity (due to e.g. time varying search frictions). The results would be similar
if mj was labour and pm was a wage, as long as 1) the aggregate labour demand
curve mj(w; z) is downward sloping, 2) labour supply is upward sloping and 3)
labour supply is independent of income or subject to standard income e¤ects.
26 The output of rm j is
yj = zjuj ;
uj = f(mj ; y; em);
fm > 0; fy > 0:
mj is the e¤ort dedicated to marketing,which costs mjpm ; where for sim-
plicity pm is exogenous. fy > 0 captures the aggregate demand externality.
Each rm solves
max
mj
yj   pmmj :
, which gives a rst order condition,
zjumj (:::) = pm:
In the simplest concept of general equilibrium, distribution e¤ects across
rms dont matter. This allows us to look at a symmetric equilibrium, where
y = zu(m; y):
Solving this equation for
y = f(m; z)
and plugging the result into the rst order condition, we get
zum(m; z; f(m; z); em) = pm:
A unique solution of this equation would give m = g(z; pm; em) indepen-
dently of y : search and marketing e¤ort is independent of the level of economic
activity once we have taken into account the e¤ect of other fundamental shocks.
In a sense this result is obvious: y is endogenous, so if there exists a unique
solution for it, that solution must be in terms of the exogenous fundamentals
z; pm; em: This does not mean that aggregate demand channels captured in u(:)
are irrelevant. The aggregate demand externality in u(:) can amplify the econ-
omys response to fundamental shocks to z for example, even though it has
no direct e¤ect. This is similar to exible price economies with countercycli-
cal markups and unique equilibria such as Jaimovich et al (2008) [112], or to
economies with nancial accelerator e¤ects amplifying productivity shocks such
as Bernanke et al (1999) [28].
26 If aggregate labour demand is upward sloping the discussion in the previous section ap-
plies.
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One way to get direct aggregate demand e¤ects on actual output in this
setup is to nd multiple solutions to either
y = zu(m; y; em); or
zum(m; z; f(m; z); em) = pm:
With multiple solutions we get sunspot shock equilibria which could be asso-
ciated with the popular notion of aggregate demand. Otherwise, within a funda-
mentals based model with unique equilibria, to get aggregate demand shocks to
directly cause recessions we must nd a more direct relation between e.g. con-
sumer credit conditions or consumer uncertainty/precautionary saving and the
e¢ ciency of the search and matching process that determines u(m; y; :::); linking
em;t with efph;t+1 or  c;t or t: For example this link can occur if consumer
credit availability a¤ects shopping e¤ort beyond its indirect e¤ect on desired
consumption spending. (see the discussion in Rios Rull et al (2012) [17]).
To formalise the role of consumer search, assume that to purchase ct units of
the consumption good requires the representative household to expand shopping
e¤ort Sct ; satisfying
ct  ctSct ; (St ):
The new consumption goods nding rate ct is taken as given by households
when choosing other variables. There is a matching function
ct  fM (Sct ;mt);
which is increasing in both shopping e¤ort and rmssales e¤oct mt; and has
constant returns to scale. This allows us to write ct =
ct
Sct
= f(mtSct
):There
are several common market mechanisms for determining ct : In the directed
search framework (e.g Rios Rull et al (2012) [17]) sellers post prices, and buyers
direct their shopping e¤ort to the best combination of prices and probabilities of
nding the desired goods ct . This focuses the analysis on ine¢ ciencies in other
wedges (e.g the labour wedge), since with directed search the matching process
is constrained Pareto optimal. A common alternative in labour market model
is to assume Nash bargaining in which the surplus from the trade is split using
a constant bargaining weight, but the bargaining assumption is less appealing
for goods markets where prices are usually posted. Alternatively, we can follow
Farmer (2011) [80] and use self fullling expectations about ct to determine the
equilibrium. Shopping requires an e¤ort v(Sct ); where for lack of clear evidence
we assume the marginal cost of shopping is independent of consumption and
work hours. The households utility function is
u(ct; lt)  v(Sct );
vSc > 0; vScSc  0:
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The rst order conditions are modied to
ct : t(1 +  c;t) = uc;t   ct
Sct : vSct = 
c
t
c
t
nst : ul;t = twt(1  ns;t)
bt+1 : t = Et
t+1
t
efph;t+1Rt+1t+1:
The shopping e¤ort constraint (ct) is always binding. Therefore we can
combine rst order conditions to get
t(1 +  c;t) = uc;t  
vSct
ct
:
Note that we can rewrite this rst order condition as
t(1 + ^ c;t) = uc;t; where
^ c;t =  c;t +
vSct
ctt
:
This version of the rst order condition highlights that search frictions here act
very similarly to another component of the consumption wedge. Consider an
increase in  c;t or in
t+1
t
efph;t+1: Ceteris paribus this increases t(1+ c;t) and
therefore reduces vSct : Since vScSc > 0, shopping e¤ort declines. As a result, the
number of matches in product markets declines and rms nd new buyers at a
lower rate (gt declines):
I will sketch informally a theory of how intertemporal consumption wedges
and the e¢ ciency of matching in product markets may be linked beyond any
impact through desired spending y: Suppose consumers must decide their shop-
ping e¤ort early during the period before they fully understand the costs of
nancing or the level of employment risk they will face during the period by
the time they can actually make a purchase. More formally, imagine a model
with search frictions in product markets and two subperiods inside each period
t: to nd a good match on the product markets, shopping must start in the 1st
subperiod before consumers fully observe the state of the economy during the
period).
A credit shock, besides a¤ecting intertemporal consumption wedges, can
raise the dispersion of nancing costs across consumers and rms. This in-
creases uncertainty about desired consumption spending for consumers both
directly and by raising the dispersion in the ability of rms to pay wages and
maintain their current workforce. Both these channels therefore lead to higher
income risk and higher uncertainty about the desirability of a high shopping
e¤ort for consumers. This higher uncertainty can reduce shopping e¤ort inde-
pendently of the direct e¤ect of changes of the realised y. But the decline in
shopping by consumers reduces the e¢ ciency of matching in product markets
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(think of a standard matching function using shopping e¤ort and marketing and
distribution expenses as inputs). As a result, output declines.
For plausible estimates of shopping time and e¤ort, the weight of household
shopping in the matching function is around 0.1 (e.g Rios-Rull et al (2012)[17],
Gourio and Rudanko (2013)[97]). A more important role for shopping e¤ort
is plausilbe once we take into account the distribution (both retail and whole-
sale), marketing and new product development sectors. These can be seen as
intermediate sectors that perform much of the shopping and matching e¤ort
indirectly for households. We can then formulate our model in terms of retail
stores,purchasing agents and marketing/advertising departments that must de-
cide on the amount of resources dedicated to marketing and distribution under
imperfect information, before knowing the full state of the economy.
A recession increases uncertainty about the buying power of customers. The
higher uncertainty reduces the incentives of retailers and marketers to search
for new products and customers, reducing the e¢ ciency of the search process.
Similar mechanisms would work if aggregate uncertainty increases, or if we
have sentiment shocks about the level of uncertainty as in Angeletos and Lao
(2012) [11]. In an economy with exible capital, similar mechanisms would
a¤ect the market for capital due to higher rm level idiosyncratic risk in a
recession. Therefore, by linking higher uncertainty directly with shopping e¤ort
we can generate a causal e¤ect of lower "aggregate demand" on output without
resorting to indeterminacy or sticky prices.
9 Adding capital,durable goods, intermediate pro-
duction inputs and search frictions
The section discusses several extensions of the previous model that allow for non
zero aggregate saving and intertemporal choices that a¤ect the production ca-
pacity of the economy. We examine economies with production functions that
allow for variable capital and intermediate inputs, and a distinction between
durable and nondurable consumption. We also analyse the intertemporal di-
mension of labour demand by introducing search frictions in labour markets.
We discuss intermediate inputs in this section because in the long run they are
very similar to a form of capital with 100% depreciation, and because they can
be an important mechanism for amplifying shocks that is often neglected. The
objective is to generalise the model from the previous section, until we reach an
RBC framework that encompasses most existing models as special cases.
9.1 The real business cycle model with capital
So far our model of the economy has ignored capital. Implicitly, it has assumed
that labour and intermediate goods were the only inputs, or that capital was
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xed (no depreciation and innite capital adjustment costs). We now add an
adjustable capital stock to the analysis.
Capital in our economy is owned by many identical rms producing the nal
good of the economy. The representative nal good rms problem now becomes
dynamic, so there is a role for intertemporal distortions through changes in the
rms discount factor f;t to a¤ect its decisions. Movements in the rms dis-
count factor can be caused by changes in the discount factor of its shareholders
(the representative household) as in standard interpretations of the complete
markets model. In fact in a standard complete markets economy f;t = tt of
the households. We allow for di¤erences in discount factors between households
and rms (f;t 6= tt) in order to incorporate in reduced form distortions in
the rmsdiscount factor coming from other sources. These could be justied in
a world with entrepreneurs or private equity, or in a world with dominant share-
holders, or in an environment where managers and shareholders have opposing
interests. In these situations we get rm level credit frictions and uninsured
business risk that can generate di¤erence between household and rm discount
factors.
As for households, the rm discount factor is stochastic, reecting for ex-
ample business cycle shifts in the level of precautionary saving or the external
nance premium faced by rms, or shifts in business ownersexpectations that
are not justied by rational expectations (e.g excessive optimism or pessimism).
We include a tax or wedge on investment as a way to capture regulatory dis-
tortions or nancing frictions specically a¤ecting investment (See Chari et al
(2007)[50], Buera and Moll (2012) [35]).
We follow the benchmark assumption in the literature that investment is
subject to a 1 period time to build delay. This may seem to be completely
at odds with the pervasiveness of multiperiod projects that are often started
more than a year prior to completion. In fact, the assumption can be a good
approximation in world with multiperiod projects as long as the scale of such
investments can be adjusted exibly enough to changes in business conditions
over the duration of the project.
There is conicting evidence on the importance of time to build frictions
for investment dynamics. New Keynesian models that try to match the SVAR
evidence on monetary policy shocks such as Smets and Wouters (2007) [164]
typically require high time to build adjustment costs (modelled to a rst order
approximation through convex investment adjustment costs). Jaimovich and
Rebelo (2009) [113] rely on signicant investment adjustment costs to explain
why investment increases in advance of positive news about future TFP. In
contrast Liu et al (2011) [136] nd that these costs are minimal in the estimation
of a RBC model with credit constraints, while Sims (2011) nds that matching
SVAR evidence on productivity shocks requires sticky price models to have low
investment adjustment costs. We do allow for convex adjustment costs on the
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level of capital (e.g Romer (2001) [157] ch. 8), though matching the time series
dynamics of investment requires that these capital adjustment costs be small or
moderate.
We start with the representative nal goods rm. It solves
max
fkt+1;mt;ntg
E0
1
t=0f;tdt;
dt = g(Atmt; em;t)ztf(kt; Atnt)  wt(1 + nd;t)(nt +mt)  pkt (1 + k;t)[kt+1   (1  t)kt];
gm > 0; gmm < 0; gem > 0; fn > 0; fnn < 0; fk > 0; fkk < 0
; g(am; :)f(ak; an)  ag(m; :)f(k; n) for all a  0: At = GyAt 1; Gy  1:
We also impose the transversality condition
lim
t!1E0f;tp
k
t kt+1 = 0:
k;t is an investment wedge that represents regulation, taxes, nancing fric-
tions and other changes in the actual or perceived costs of investments. The
depreciation rate t is often assumed constant or subject to endogenous capi-
tal utilisation (e.g Greenwood et al (2000) [99]). Here we allow for a possible
depreciation shock to t that captures time varying technological and economic
obsolescence. This is particularly relevant if we take the extended denition of
kt that includes intangible capital.
The transversality condition implies that under RE there are no bubbles in
the price of capital evaluated using the rms discount factor f;t: Here a bubble
is dened as the di¤erence between the price of capital and the present value
of buying and holding capital forever without reselling it. This present value
is often called the fundamental value. Note that the transversality condition is
always satised if there are no capital adjustment costs (pkt = 1); and the growth
rate of the capital stock is lower than that of discount rate

1
f;t
  1
1=t
:While
this no bubbles condition may sound restrictive in a world with big uctuations
in asset prices, it does allow for prices above RE fundamentals due to misper-
ceptions about the returns to capital. It also allows for the possibility that pkt
may look like it contains bubbles when evaluated under other discount factors,
for example under the complete markets assumption that f;t = tt: This is
always the case when capital can be used as collateral.
Just as for households, we can reformulate this dynamic optimisation prob-
lem recursively as
V f (kt;  t; St) = max
kt+1;mt;nt
dt + Et
f;t+1
f;t
V f (kt+1;  t+1; St+1); where
dt = g(Atmt; em;t)ztf(kt; Atnt)  wt(1 + nd;t)(nt +mt)  pkt (1 + k;t)[kt+1   (1  t)kt];
so that the rm optimises by taking into account the e¤ect of its decisions
on current payo¤s and the future value of the rm starting next period.
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9.1.1 Tangible versus intangible capital
In most existing models business capital is just tangible capital corresponding
to the investment variable in NIPA. Recent research has emphasized that intan-
gible capital such as R&D, some marketing expenses, rm specic training and
investment in improving total factor productivity may be almost as important
for both long run growth and business cycles. By some estimates, the intangible
capital investment is as big as tangible capital investment (e.g Corrado et al,
2006). Parente and Prescott (1999) [153] develop a theory of income di¤erences
across countries through distortions that a¤ect the accumulation of of intangible
capital. Johri et al (2009)[108] nd that taking intangible capital into account
can explain hump shaped responses to shocks without the typical appeal to
more controversial habit formation or investment adjustment costs.
One interpretation of our baseline model is that we lump these two sorts
of capital together and treat them as perfectly substitutable from the rms
perspective. This assumption underlies the vast majority of current business
cycle models, though of course taking adjustable intangible capital into account
would require them to use a higher share of capital in the production function.
If the model includes intangible capital we also need to modify the denition
of investment in the data that we use to match that in the model: In partic-
ular model GDP now includes intagible capital investment. MacGrattan and
Prescott (2012) [144] explicitly take into account intangible capital in an RBC
model. They nd it reverses some of the usual conclusions about business cy-
cles. For example, a common nding with standard calibrations based only on
tangible capital is that the correlation between labour productivity and out-
put has been negative in recent US recessions, implying a more prominent role
for labour wedge shocks in business cycles. Once we take into account the ex-
tra decline in output in a recession due to lower intangible investment labour
productivity becomes more procyclical and the role of TFP shocks in business
cycles increases.
9.1.2 More on the production function
The production function is usually specied to be Cobb-Douglas in capital and
labour:
f(k;An) = [k(An)1 ] ;
0    1; 0    1:
This formulation has the advantage that it no longer matters whether labour
augmenting, capital augmenting or neutral technological change have long run
trends. In contrast, more general production function require the long run
growth to be labour augmenting in order to have a balanced growth path.
Within the constant elasticity of substitution in k; n production functions, it
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can be shown that only the Cobb-Douglas function is compatible with a bal-
anced growth path (Gomme and Rupert (2006) [95]). Jones (2005) derives
a Cobb-Douglas production function as the the result of optimal choices by
rms over di¤erent xed input proportions production techniques. If di¤erent
techniques have a Pareto distribution, then optimal rm choices for di¤erent
production locations lead to an aggregate production function for the rm that
is Cobb-Douglas.
Another way to think of a production function is as coming from a match-
ing process inside the rm between workers and di¤erent physical production
inputs like capital. Under this interpretation the production function describes
the number of successful matches between di¤erent production inputs, with each
match resulting in one unit of the good. In this case, a Cobb-Douglas matching
function (see Stevens (2005) [165] or Lagos (2005) for a possible microfounda-
tion) implies a Cobb-Douglas production function. Long run shifts in the capital
intensity of production can be captured by changes in :
The standard RBC model assumes constant returns to scale, so that the
number and size of rms is indeterminate. But in some applications decreasing
returns to scale are more realistic as a simple way of incorporating procyclical
prots. With decreasing returns to scale, we must specify some entry cost or
some congestion cost (such that a larger number of rms reduces productivity)
or a xed resource required to operate a rm such as an entrepreneur (in which
case production has constant returns to scale when including the entrepreneurs
labour, and the measure/number of entrepreneurs determines the number of
rms) in order to pin down a nite number of rms. Otherwise, free entry
would lead to a very large (innite) number of very small (innitely small)
rms in the long run.
To take the Cobb-Douglas case
y = kn
with symmetric rms; aggregate output Y = My is invariant to the number of
rms M if we modify the production function to
y = M+ 1kn ; so that
Y = (Mk)a(Mn) :
M+ 1 is a congestion factor which disappears under constant returns to
scale. Alternatively, consider adding a manager as a production factor such
that
y = knn1  m ; nm = 1
for each rm. The rms prots are the same as before if we add back the
salary/rent of the manager wm: Decreasing returns to scale production functions
are common in models with heterogeneous rms (e.g Atkeson and Kehoe (2007)
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[13], Restuccia and Rogerson (2007) [156]) since they generate a non-degenerate
distribution of productivity across rms. In steady state, their e¤ects are similar
to the e¤ects of adding monopolistic competition with a constant markup as in
Rotemberg and Woodford (1995) (Cooley et al (1995) [62],ch. 9). They also
provide a simple way to introduce positive prots beyond the return to capital,
delinking the value of rms from the value of the capital stock.
9.1.3 Assumptions on long run growth
As before we assume an exogenous long run balanced growth path on which
output per worker grows at a constant rate Gy 1. The key feature of exogenous
growth models such as this one is that changes in the levels of distortions or
policy variables cannot a¤ect the long run growth rate of the economy. They
only a¤ect the detrended level of economic activity in the long run. Policy
changes can have signicant e¤ects on the growth rate of the economy for many
years or even decades if there are elements that slow down the transition of the
economy to a new balanced growth path (see Buera and Shin (2012) [36] for
example). Since most distortions or policy variables are bounded, this places a
limit on the ability of policy makers to a¤ect the growth rate of the economy
in the long run. If one nds an unbounded policy variable, then a process of
continual reforms could have permanent e¤ects on growth.
Endogenous growth models such as those in Jones et al (2005) [116] or Ljun-
qvist and Sargent (2004, ch. 14) ([137]) can generate long run growth e¤ects of
level policy changes. For example, some endogenous growth models predict that
higher saving rates lead to higher long run growth rates. However, they make
the unrealistic prediction that countries with larger populations grow faster or
have higher levels of income (Jones 1999). Furthermore, they predict long run,
almost permanent di¤erences in growth rates between countries that are hard
to nd (as opposed to long run di¤erences in the levels of income predicted
by exogenous growth models with TFP di¤erences, and they counterfactually
predict that very fast growth rates (growth miracles) are actually more likely
for rich countries with better institutions than for developing countries. Ex-
ogenous growth models can easily explain why growth miracles are more likely
in developing economies, and they do not predict any systematic link between
population size and growth rates ( see Parente and Prescott (1999) [153]).
The modern literature on the macroeconomics of development has focused
on exogenous growth models, in which the key questions are explaining the long
run di¤erences in income levels across countries and explaining the transition
path of economies in response to occasional discrete regime changes such as
major reforms or technological revolutions (e.g the shift from communism to
capitalism, the IT revolution, the development of electric power) as opposed
to endogenising a continuous growth process. See for example Buera and Shin
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(2012),[36], Atkeson and Kehoe (2007) [13], Restuccia and Rogerson (2007)
[156], Jones (2011a) [115].
At the same time, exogenous growth models have trouble explaining why
some very poor countries (e.g in Africa) seem to have not only failed to con-
verge towards rich countries but seem to have diverged. This divergence can be
explained in the context of a model in which a minimum threshold of develop-
ment needs to be reached in order to enter a modern economic growth regime,
with a constant growth trend. Below this threshold an economy still follows a
Malthusian regime with barely any growth (e.g Parente and Prescott (2004)).
For our purpose of business cycle analysis, we can approximate this di¤erence in
regimes by assuming a balanced growth path with approximately zero growth
for very poor countries, while allowing for long run growth of around 1.5% per
working age person in other economies.
9.1.4 The supply of capital and the aggregate resource constraint
To complete the description of the economy, we add a large number of identical
capital producers that transform output (i.e. labour and capital in the same
proportion as nal output) into new capital
xkt = kt+1   (1  t)kt = atG(
It
kt
)kt
; G0(:) > 0; G00(:)  0:
at represents investment specic technology shocks. A strictly concave G()
represents capital adjustment costs. The special case of G00 = 0 represents the
common case in RBC research of no adjustment costs. We can think of these
adjustment costs as representing extra frictions and bottlenecks in the process
of selling and distributing capital goods, that make it harder to expand sales
and installation of new goods quickly. Capital producers make prots
k;t = pk;tx
k
t   It:
These prots go to the households. Prot maximisation yields the rst order
condition for It;
atpk;tG
0(
It
kt
) = 1:
This denes a supply curve for capital. Finally, the resource constraint
becomes
ct + It = yt:
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9.1.5 The rms capital investment decision
Now return to the representative rms problem. The rst order conditions are
nt : gtztfn;t = wt(1 + nd;t);
mt : gm;tztft = wt(1 + nd;t);
kt+1 : pk;t(1 + k;t) = Et
f;t+1
f;t
[gt+1zt+1fk;t+1 + (1  t+1)(1 + k;t+1)pk;t+1]:
The rst order condition for capital has the standard interpretation of de-
cisions equating marginal costs and benets. On the left hand side, the cost
of a small increase in the capital stock is the price of capital adjusted by the
investment wedge. On the right hand side, the benet of a small increase in the
capital stock is the discounted return to capital.
Investment projects often come in discrete sizes, and often require signi-
cant xed costs to implement. The optimality condition for capital above can
be reinterpreted as the choice of a rm over a large number of xed size projects
with varying levels of protability, and a cost per project of pk;t(1+k;t): At the
optimum, new projects are implemented up to the point where the remaining
projects are unprotable at a cost of pk;t(1+k;t): The litterature on non convex
adjustment costs emphasizes that this is not a realistic model of investment at
the level of individual rms. But large idiosyncratic shocks to individual in-
vestment project returns and adjustment costs reduce the correlation between
individual rms investment decision and make aggregate investment smooth,
though much more volatile than aggregate consumption. While rms face signif-
icant adjustment costs, these costs can be swamped by the volatility of (mostly
idiosyncratic) shocks hitting rms. Furthermore, while the proportion of rms
adjusting under xed adjustment costs is lower than in the frictionless models,
rms that do adjust may make bigger changes in their capital stock. As a result,
the aggregate adjustment rate to shocks can be large despite even if each rm
is subject to signicant adjustment costs.
Elsby and Michaels (2014) [74] study a canonical partial equilibrium model
of rm decisions under xed adjustment costs, with both aggregate and idiosyn-
cratic shocks. They show that if the xed cost is independent of the size of the
rm, aggregate variables are independent of the adjustment costs to a 1st order
approximation around the frictionless, zero adjustment cost, limit. They show
for realistic calibrations in a labour demand application that this approximate
irrelevance of xed costs is often a good guide in practice, even in partial equi-
librium. More generally aggregate behaviour in the frictionless (no adjustment
costs) limit becomes a better approximation as the level of xed costs declines
relative to the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks. Adjustment costs reduce the
inow of rms into any point the new frictionless cross section distribution of
optimal rm decisions f(x) after an aggregate shock. But they also reduce the
outow of rms away from the same point in f(x). As the size of the xed ad-
justment cost falls relative to the magnitude of idiosyncratic shocks, the inow
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and outow tend to balance out so that the distribution of rm level decisions
f((x) converges to the frictionless f(x).
Khan and Thomas (2008) [122] generalise the RBC model to include het-
erogenous production units and nonconvex adjustment costs. They examine a
calibration where xed adjustment costs do matter for aggregate investment in
partial equilibrium, so the approximate irrelevance result of Elsby and Michaels
(2014) [74] does not hold. For example, the standard deviation of investment
in the xed adjustment costs model is around 2 thirds that in the frictionless
model in partial equilibrium. Nevertheless, they nd that absent other frictions
the aggregate investment dynamics of this more complex model in response to
aggregate TFP shocks are very close to those of the baseline RBC model with
a representative rm and low capital adjustment costs. They trace this result
to general equilibrium e¤ects, with price adjustments reducing the e¤ects of
adjustment costs at the aggregate level.
Intuitively, consumption smoothing by households that own rms reduces
movements in the frictionless optimal capital stock of rms, which is close to
the target capital stock of adjusting rms. The lower volatility of the friction-
less capital stock decisions lead to lower variation in the proportion of rms
deciding to adjust their capital in response to aggregate shocks. But without
time varying adjustment rates on the extensive margin much of the nonlinear
partial equilibrium investment dynamics that are supposed to characterise the
xed adjustment cost model is eliminated.
On the other hand, the response of aggregate investment to 2nd moment,uncertainty,
shocks can di¤er signicantly with xed adjustment costs. Higher idiosyncratic
rm-level uncertainty lower investment, because it increases the likelihood of
paying the xed cost and raises the ex-ante cost of investment (recall the dis-
cussion of uncertainty shocks in the presence of xed labour adjustment costs
earlier and the paper by Bloom et al (2012) [34]).
The rst order condition for capital can also be seen as a standard asset pric-
ing equation stating that the price of capital (including the investment wedge)
equals its expected dividend plus resale value adjusted by the appropriate dis-
count factor. Dene the ratio of rm and household discount factors
vf;t =
f;t
tt
:
In the baseline complete markets RBC model vf;t = 1. In models with limited
participation of households in equity markets (so there is a signicant divide be-
tween rm owners and workers) uctuations in vf;t capture di¤erences between
the marginal utility of consumption, external nance premia or misperceptions
about the future of rm owners and other households. To see the link to external
nance premia, introduce as in Khan and Thomas (2013) [123]a credit market in
which rms lend and borrow from each other or from saving households. Firm
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borrowing is subject to an external nance premium efpe;t+1: For simplicity,
we assume this external nance premium is taken as given by rms. The rms
dividend is now dened as
dt = g(Atmt; em;t)ztf(kt; Atnt)  wt(1 + nd;t)(nt +mt)  pkt (1 + k;t)[kt+1   (1  t)kt]
 bf;t+1 + bf;tRtefpe;t;
where bf;t is the rms stock of lending to other rms. The rm now also
chooses sequences of fbf;t+1g to maximise
E0
1
t=0f;tdt:
The rst order condition for bonds is
bf;t+1 : f;t = Rt+1Etefpe;t+1f;t+1;()
t = Rt+1Etefpe;t+1t+1
t+1
t
vf;t+1
vf;t
:
The other rst order conditions are the same: Debt market clearing implies
that
fbf;t+1 + sabsa;t+1 + bobbo;t+1 = 0:
First, note that if there are no di¤erences between the discount factors of
rms and households such that vf;t = 1 and if external nance premia are
predetermined; it must be the case that
efpe;t+1 = efph;t+1
and we get the the same rst order condition as for householdsbond holding
decision. In this case inter rm borrowing is equivalent to inter household
borrowing used to fund the rm via negative dividends (inows of cash from
the shareholders).
Di¤erences in the external nance premia of households and rms can only
occur if there is a di¤erence between their discount factors, vf;t 6= 1: Other-
wise, rms could always circumvent any extra nancing frictions by borrowing
through households (or vice versa households could use rms to borrow for them
and fund them if rms face lower nancing frictions). The di¤erence in discount
factors can arise from limited participation in rm ownership (e.g entrepreneurs
versus workers as in Iacoviellos (2005) [109] model) or because there are restric-
tions on having negative dividends or on reducing dividends when the rm wants
to borrow more. The latter restrictions could be due to potential conicts of
interests between managers and shareholders that are aggravated when the rm
keeps its cash ows or when it tries to get cash from shareholders (see Arellano
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et al (2012) [12] for a similar argument). Once we allow vf;t 6= 1; di¤erences
between efpe;t+1 and efph;t+1 will contribute to movements in vf;t and distort
investment decisions of the rm.
We will develop 2 complementary versions of the rms optimal investment
condition using either epfe;t+1 or efph;t+1. The 1st version emphasizes the link
between investment and borrowing costs, either in the form of interest rates or
other restrictions that can be mapped into an external nance premium. Using
a certainty equivalence approximation and combining the rmbond and capital
rst order conditions, we get
v1 ; kt+1 : pk;t(1+k;t) =
1
Rt+1Etefpe;t+1
Et[gt+1zt+1fk;t+1+(1 t+1)(1+k;t+1)pk;t+1]:
A similar equation is at the heart of many models with credit constraints on
investment (e.g Bernanke et al (1999) [28], Iacoviello (2005) [109], Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2010) [93] and Christiano et al (2012) [56]). An increase in the cost
of external nancing efpe;t+1 increases the required return on an extra unit of
capital, the marginal product of capital. By the concavity of the production
function, this implies a reduction in investment as rms cut o¤ funds to less
protable, marginal investments. Here, efpe is seen as an exogeneous wedge.
Models with explicit credit constraints endogenise part of this wedge, linking it
for example to the amount of debt to equity of rms (the leverage ratio).
The 2nd version of the optimality condition for capital investment decom-
poses the stochastic discount factor of the rm into its household component and
a rm specic component. It emphasizes the relation between rmsand house-
holds stochastic discount factors. Using a certainty equivalence approximation
again, we get
pk;t(1+k;t) ' Et
t+1t+1
tt
Et
vf;t+1
vf;t
Et[gt+1zt+1fk;t+1+(1 t+1)(1+k;t+1)pk;t+1];
which combining with the householdsEuler equation becomes
v2; kt+1 : pk;t(1+k;t) ' 1
Rt+1Etefph;t+1
Et
vf;t+1
vf;t
Et[gt+1zt+1fk;t+1+(1 t+1)(1+k;t+1)pk;t+1]:
To fully understand the relation between these two optimal investment con-
ditions we need to link these two external nance premia. Combine the opti-
mality conditions of the rm and household sectors, and use another certainty
equivalence approximation,
Et
t+1
t
t+1
t
vf;t+1
vf;t
' Et
t+1
t
t+1
t
Et
vf;t+1
vf;t
to obtain
Et
vf;t+1
vf;t
' Etefph;t+1
Etefpe;t+1
:
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This equation shows that at least for low enough levels of aggregate un-
certainty there is a one to one relation between shifts in the relative discount
factors between rms and households and the relative external nance premia.
So an increase in the rms discount factor vf;t+1vf;t will typically be associated
with a reduction in the relative external nance premium for rms. For example
an increase in rms precautionary saving that is not specically tied to idio-
syncratic investment risk is actually associated with a lower relative external
nance premium for rms and a higher demand for capital as a form of sav-
ing. In contrast, an increase in uninsured idiosyncratic investment risk lowers
the risk adjsted return on capital, which can reduce investment. This e¤ect is
captured in our framework through a higher investment wedge k;t:
In fact, in v1 of the optimal investment decision, any deviation from cer-
tainty equivalence that does not a¤ect efpe;t+1 will be captured by k;t: At the
same time by raising the desire for precautionary saving, higher idiosyncratic
investment risk could actually under certain circumstances increase investment
as captured by a higher vf;t+1vf;t (see Angeletos (2007) [8] and Covas (2005) for a
steady state analysis of the conditions under which higher idiosyncratic invest-
ment risk reduces investment). More generally, shocks to k;t capture changes
in the perceived riskiness of capital, or misperceptions about the returns to cap-
ital that deviate from RE (similar to some deviations in the discount factor for
households t).
Some basic partial equilibrium comparative dynamics of the rms
investment decision Both versions of the optimal investment equation es-
tablish an important link between interest rates on debt and the return to
capital investment. Ceteris paribus an increase in the marginal productivity
of capital will through general equilibrium e¤ects tend to raise real interest
rates. In the opposite direction an increase in interest rates Rt+1 or in bor-
rowing premia efph;t+1 will discourage investment in partial equilibrium. It
may seem surprising at 1st that the household external nance premium can
a¤ect rm investment. But this is quite natural if funding for the rm comes
from nancially constrained households, that have borrowed to nance the rm
(presumably giving them a higher rate of return than the cost of the loan).
To the degree that rm owners are una¤ected by changes in the household ex-
ternal nance premium efph;t+1 (for example if they are wealthy enough such
that borrowing constraints are irrelevant), this is captured by shifts in vf;t+1vf;t
that o¤set movements in efph;t+1 so that the rms external nance premium
efpe;t+1 does not change:
Other intuitive e¤ects can be derived based on the diminishing marginal
productivity of capital:
- A higher current investment wedge k;t relative to k;t+1 increases the
required return to capital and discourages investment.
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- If k;t and k;t+1 both increase by the same amount, investment declines
because the future investment wedge increase is discounted by
ft+1
ft
:
- An increase in future productivity gt+1zt+1 raises investment.
- An increase in current productivity gtzt raises investment if the shock is
persistent. Higher shock persistence leads to a bigger e¤ect on investment, since
it leads to a bigger rise in future productivity.
- Lower returns to scale in production  (or higher market power in a model
with imperfect competition) reduce the impact of any change in productivity
on the marginal product of capital. As a result, they reduce the change in
investment in response to productivity shocks.
- Concavity in the production function leads to an assymetric response of
investment to productivity shocks: because of diminishing marginal productivity
of capital a positive productivity shock requires a higher absolute value increase
in capital to get the same increase in production than the absolute value of the
decline in capital for a negative shock. As a result, investment is more responsive
to positive productivity shocks than to negative ones (Strebulaev and Whited,
2012 [6]).
- An increase in the ratio of rms to households discount factor vf;t+1vf;t
decreases the required return to capital and increases investment. This is asso-
ciated with a decline in the rms external nance premium efpe;t+1 relative to
that of households. Finally an increase in the current price of capital pk;t or a
decrease in pk;t+1 reduce investment.
Discount factor or external nance premium shocks and investment
Two key shocks often thought to be important for business cycles are the house-
hold discount factor shock to
t+1
t
and the external nance premium shock to
efph;t+1. From the household perspective in partial equilibrium these shocks
are very similar. However, these shocks have di¤erent e¤ects on investment. For
a xed fvf;t+jgj=0;:::1 sequence, discount factor shocks that increase
t+1
t
also
encourage investment as a form of saving. These shocks on their own cannot
be the main factor behind business cycles in an RBC model, because they tend
to generate negative comovement of consumption and investment. Households
become more eager to save, pushing them to reduce consumption and hold more
capital.
A shock to the external nance premium efph;t+1 is also incapable of gen-
erating realistic business cycles without some spillover into the labour wedge or
into TFP. If vf;t = 1 is and there is no compensating factor that reduces the re-
turn to capital, an increase in efph;t+1 = efpe;t+1 would lower investment. But
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if the same increase in the household external nance premium also decreases
consumption then in a closed economy with standard income e¤ects on labour
supply we get a violation of the resource constraint in the short run, when the
capital stock is almost xed. Similar reasoning in the opposite direction estab-
lishes that a pure efph;t+1 shock that does not a¤ect
vf;t+1
vf;t
or the marginal
return to capital at a xed kt+1 simply leads to an opposite movement in inter-
est rates Rt+1 such that output, consumption and investment do not change in
the end.
An increase in efph;t+1 will behave more like a higher household discount
factor shock to
t+1
t
if vf;t+1vf;t increases or labour supply increases su¢ ciently
due to a negative income e¤ect for households (since household consumption
declines). These movements in the relative discount factor of rms or in labour
supply increase the return to capital and encourage investment. In a model
with entrepreneurs owning production, the higher vf;t+1vf;t means rm owners
consumption falls by less in response to a higher household external nance
premium efph;t+1 so that the marginal utility of consumption of entrepreneurs
decreases relative to that of workers (the households in our model). Equiva-
lently vf;t+1vf;t increases because the rms external nance premium efpe;f;t+1
falls relative to that of households.
Note that shocks to efph;t+1 would produce positive comovement of con-
sumption and investment even with vf;t = 1 if nominal prices are sticky (see
Smets and Wouters (2007) [164] for the efph+1 "risk premium" shock, and com-
pare to the t+1=t "preference" shock in Smets and Wouters (2002) [163] ).
With sticky nominal prices, a shock that simultaneously increases consumption
and investment demand is accomodated in the short run by rising production
at xed prices.
Given our earlier discussion, the question arises about how to map shifts in
the level of precautionary saving into discount factor or external nance pre-
mium shocks. The following simplied setup may provide some guidance in
terms of the key di¤erence between shifts in precautionary saving and other
credit constraints. Consider an economy where households are subject to unin-
sured idiosyncratic income risk. Households can save or borrow in a risk free
asset or they can invest in a well diversied portfolio of capital. The only
credit constraint is the natural borrowing constraint which does not bind. We
assume perfect foresight on aggregate shocks so that investment in the capi-
tal portfolio earns a risk free return of Rkt+1: with the usual properties that
@Rkt+1
@kt+1
> 0;
@2Rkt+1
@2kt+1
< 0: Household i0s optimisation problem leads to the follow-
ing rst order conditions:
uci;t = Rt+1Etuc;it;+1 ;
uci;t = R
k
t+1Etuc;it;+1 :
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Regardless of the presence of uninsured idiosyncratic income risk, these rst
order conditions imply the classic result from the perfect foresight complete
markets RBC model,
Rt+1 = R
k
t+1:
It is clear in this economy that any increase in precautionary saving, for ex-
ample due to uninsured income risk will only a¤ect investment through changes
in the risk free interest rate Rt+1: Higher precautionary saving will tend to
increase investment by reducing Rt+1; unless we explicitly introduce a channel
linking higher precautionary saving to lower TFP (as in the section on aggregate
demand e¤ects): In contrast, explicit binding borrowing constraints or external
nance premia would lead to an equation of the form
Rt+1efph;t+1 = R
k
t+1:
This suggests that changes in aggregate precautionary saving will in general
map into changes in the household discount factor.
9.2 Search frictions in capital markets
The market for capital is believed by many to be subject to signicant search
frictions (e.g Kurman and Petrosky-Nadeau 2007, Rios Rull et al (2012) [17]).
Here we provide an extension that allows for search costs by rms buying new
capital. Searching for new capital requires the rm to post "vacancies" V kt ; such
that
xkt  'kt V kt ,(kt ).
'kt is the rate at which "vacancies" V
k
t are lled. There is a cost to post-
ing V kt ;  (V
k
t ); with  V k > 0; V kV k  0: This modies the rms cash ow
equation to
dt = g(Atmt; em;t)ztf(kt; Atnt)  wt(1 + nd;t)(nt +mt)  pkt (1 + k;t)[kt+1   (1  t)kt]
  (V kt ):
Finally we modify the rst order condition for capital, and add a rst order
condition for V kt :
kt+1 : pk;t(1 + k;t) + 
k
t = Et
f;t+1
f;t
(gt+1zt+1fk;t+1 + (1  t+1)[(1 + k;t+1)pk;t+1 + kt+1]);
V kt :  V kt = 
k
t'
k
t :
Increasing investment today now has an additional search cost, but it also
reduces search costs in the next period. As for search frictions in the market for
consumption goods, we can express the e¤ects of the search frictions in terms of
an extra investment wedge in the optimality condition for capital, by dening
^k;t = k;t +
 V kt
pk;t'kt
:
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In more microfounded matching frictions models, both 'kt and gt are functions
of V kt : From the rst order conditions and using certainty equivalence approxi-
mations, an increase in k;t or a decrease in
Et
vf;t+1
vf;t
' Etefph;t+1
Etefpe;t+1
would tend to reduce V kt which through the aggregate matching function in
the capital markets reduces investment specic TFP: This maps into a lower
marginal e¢ ciency of investment shock in models omitting this channel. Finally
note that the aggregate resource constraint is modied to
ct + It = yt    (V kt ) = GDPt:
9.3 Aggregate uctuations with a variable capital stock
9.3.1 Front loaded TFP and labour wedge shocks
The presence of capital provides agents in the economy with another channel for
separating changes in the output of the economy from changes in consumption
that they actually care about through saving. This can signicantly a¤ect the
dynamics of certain variables. For example, in a world with xed capital and
a closed economy, output equals consumption and real interest rates adjust
su¢ ciently to ensure savings demand equals the zero net supply. In a model
with adjustable capital, agents can smooth consumption in response to shocks
by changing their investment in capital. 27
To understand the di¤erence made by exible capital adjustment, it helps to
start with the case in which the price of capital pk;t is una¤ected by aggregate
uctuations This is the case without capital adjustment costs such that pk;t = 1
for all t: Consider a positive front loaded productivity shock such that zt+j >
zt+j+1 > z for all j: With xed capital, the Euler equation says that the real
interest rate must decline. This occurs because households would like to smooth
consumption by increasing saving in response to the higher current productivity
of the economy relative to the future. Since net saving is zero in equilibrium,
this higher urge to save reduces interest rates. The reduction in interest rates
leads households to accept an increase in their current consumption relative to
consumption next period.
Now allow rms to adjust their capital stock in aggregate. In this case the
higher desire to save of households can be channeled into higher investment.
Households no longer have to increase their consumption by as much as output.
27 In the current model this is done indirectly by rms to reect the desire saving of their
shareholders. In an environment with a clear separation between households and rm owners,
this is achived by households adjusting the quantity of lending to the business sector.
90
Therefore, consumption will be smoother than output and investment, and in-
terest rates will not have to decline so much to clear credit markets. In fact,
since the shock is usually quite persistent, the marginal product of capital will
increase which by the rst order condition for capital will push up real interest
rates. The rise in investment propagates the initial e¤ect of the TFP shock by
raising the capital stock, which increases future labour productivity for several
periods.
Finally, the smaller increase in consumption and the higher real interest in
comparison to the xed capital economy implies that the substitution e¤ect
of higher wages dominates the income e¤ect. As a result, labour supply now
actually increases even with BGP preferences, amplifying the e¤ect of the pro-
ductivity shock. In contrast in an economy with xed capital and household
preferences compatible with a balanced growth path, the income and substitu-
tion e¤ects of higher wages in response to a positive TFP shock o¤set each other
so that labour supply does not change.
A similar analysis applies to labour wedge shock (for example changes in the
labour demand wedge nd;t;,though the substitution e¤ect net of the income
e¤ect is stronger for labour demand shocks to tnd;t than for TFP shocks).
The ability to save some of the increase in income through higher investment
reduces the strength of the income e¤ect relative to the substitution e¤ect on
labour supply, and amplies the procyclicality of labour. Note that the in-
tertemporal substitution e¤ect of interest rates on labour supply also applies to
households with negative net assets: in this case higher interest rates on bor-
rowing also encourage labour supply in order to reduce debt repayments. For
a more comprehensive analysis of the interaction between investment, interest
rates, labour supply and the persistence of productivity shocks in the RBC
model with variable capital see King and Rebelo (2000)[126] .
If investment is exible but capital or investment adjustment costs are large
enough, then even highly persistent front loaded TFP shocks tend to generate
countercyclical interest rates (e.g Smets and Wouters (2002) [163]). This occurs
because an increase in pk;tpk;t+1 reduces the rate of return on capital, pushing
down real interest rates through arbitrage between di¤erent asset markets. The
model with xed capital stock is a special case with innite adjustment costs.
In contrast to the extreme case of a xed capital stock where hours of work do
not respond to TFP shocks for preferences compatible with a BGP, moderate
capital adjustment costs can actually lead to a countercyclical labour input for
su¢ ciently persistent TFP shocks. This occurs because a positive TFP shock
encourages a shift in the composition of GDP towards consumption, which is
associated with a stronger income e¤ect on labour supply (and vice versa for a
negative TFP shock).
To see this more formally, we return to a model with cobb douglas production
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and utility functions. The households labour supply optimality condition is
n
lt
=
wt(1  ns;t)
ct(1 +  c;t)
:
Labour demand satises

yt
nt
= wt(1 + nd;t)
=) yt = wt(1 + nd;t)nt

:
Using ct = ac;tyt for 0 < ac;t  1 implies
n
1  nt = 
wt(1  ns;t)
ac;twt(1 + nd;t)(1 +  c;t)nt
; ()
n
nt
1  nt =
(1  ns;t)
ac;t(1 + nd;t)(1 +  c;t)
:
This shows that a shift towards higher consumption as a proportion of output
(a higher ac;t ) reduces equilibrium labour supply. Thus, if investment is hard to
adjust in the short run in response to higher TFP, households will spend most
of the extra income through higher consumption and reduce their work hours.
Empirically, investment is more sensitive to business cycles. This means that
the consumption share of output ac;t is usually countercyclical. From this, we
conclude that if TFP shocks are important, capital adjustment costs should be
moderate. 28
Note that these results rely critically on the TFP shock a¤ecting the con-
sumption goods and investment goods sectors symmetrically. Under BGP com-
patible utility functions, random walk TFP shocks that only a¤ect the consump-
tion goods sector would simply shift up consumption while leaving investment
and hours una¤ected (Basu et al (2009)). Meanwhile investment specic TFP
shocks can easily generate negative comovement between consumption and in-
vestment, making them a poor candidate as the main source of business cycles.
9.3.2 Discount factor, household external nance premium and news
shocks
Consider a shock that increases the household discount factor, raising the de-
mand for savings. Or consider an increase in the household external nance
premium,due to nancial market shocks or due to other shocks that reduce
28With di¤erent household types, exact aggregation into these conditions is unlikely except
under the special conditions outlined in the section on household labour supply decisions. But
the general result that higher investment adjustment costs reduce the procyclicality of labour
hours in response to TFP shocks is likely to remain.
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the income of credit constrained households.This reduces consumption in the
current period for a given interest rate. In a model with xed capital, labour
market equilibrium implies that output does not respond to this shock (as long
as there is no relation to for example the e¢ ciency of product markets search).
Therefore, the real interest rate must drop signicantly to counter the increase
in desired savings and to maintain equilibrium in credit markets.
In contrast, in a model with capital the rise in desired savings of households
can be accommodated through higher investment. Consumption falls, which
raises labour supply for a given wage. The higher investment raises the capital
stock for a few periods and increase labour productivity. As a result, as long
as the slope of the aggregate labour demand function is lower than that of the
aggregate labour supply function, the negative consumption preference shock
actually increases output and we get a comovement problem: consumption falls
while investment increases contrary to what we usually observe for business
cycles. Interest rates decline due to the increased supply of savings, but because
of the ability of investment to adjust the decline in interest rates is typically
much smaller than in models with a xed capital stock. Note how di¤erent this
is from the popular Keynesian idea that higher desired savings can generate a
recession in the short run. Here, consumption declines but investment increases.
There is a shift in the composition of GDP, but output itself increases.
Similar results occur with TFP news or growth rate shocks ( Beaudry and
Portier (2007) [23]). News shocks are exogenous changes in peoples expecta-
tions about future economic conditions (e.g optimism about future technological
developments, greater concern about higher future taxes etc...). Coupled with
the possibility that agents in the economy overestimate the precision of the
signals they acquire about future economic conditions, these shocks are per-
haps the most straightforward way of formalising many peoples intuition that
changes in condence or in beliefs about the future are one of the key drivers
of business cycles (e.g excess optimism or pessimism). Formally, agents are too
optimistic when they assign too much weight to an imprecise positive signal
that they get about the future state of the economy. Reversing the sign of the
signal formalises the notion of excessive pessimism.
Most researchers still work with a rational expectations equilibrium in which
agents in the economy correctly perceive the true precision of the signals they get
about the future. However, current solution methods for DSGE models can also
handle the case in which agents are overcondent in the precision of the signals
they get, in which case we can get business cycles generated by overoptimism
and overpessimism.
A positive news shock generates a wealth e¤ect on consumption similar to
a positive consumption demand shock. Therefore, in many baseline business
cycle models, news shocks cannot be a main factor in business cycles: if it was,
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it would cause a similar counterfactual negative comovement of consumption
and investment and negative comovement of consumption and output.
There is a large literature on generating business cycles in response to news
shocks in RBC models with capital. Viewed from a business cycle accounting
perspective, these models create an endogenous relation between intertemporal
consumption or news shocks and either labour wedges ns;t, nd;t or the TFP
wedge zt.
For example, habit formation can lead to an increase in labour supply in re-
sponse to positive news, because higher expected future consumption increases
the marginal utility of wealth, raising the marginal benet of working (Chris-
tiano et al (2007) [55]) . This allows output to expand such that both consump-
tion and investment increase for a positive news shock.
Credit constraints on exible production inputs can be relaxed if a positive
news shock raises asset prices, and assets serve as collateral (Inaba et al [130],
Walentin (2009) [172]). This encourages rms to increase output ahead of a
positive news shock. For this story to work, there must be a mechanism en-
couraging higher demand for the collateral assets in response to positive news,
such as investment adjustment costs, or a high intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution. Alternatively, the value of the collateral must be strongly tied to the
higher future prots of rms.
Convex adjustment costs (e.g bottlenecks caused by having to train too many
employees or post too many vacancies simultaneously, or costs of increasing
output too fast ) can encourage a rm to increase its hiring and output in
advance of the realisation of a positive news shock (Den Haan and Kaltenbrunner
(2009) [104]). Countercyclical markups can also occasionally generate business
cycles in response to news shocks, though without other mechanisms this may
require an upward sloping labour demand curve (see Wang (2010) [174]).
One promising channel that is yet to be formally explored is the link be-
tween expectations shocks and search frictions in product markets, using for
example the framework in Bai et al (2012) [17]. Suppose an increase in opti-
mism stimulates consumer spending. This stimulates higher shopping e¤ort by
consumer which increases the probability for rms of nding buyers in product
markets. As a result of the increased e¢ ciency in the matching process, output
can expand to meet the extra consumption demand.
Finally, RBC models can generate realistic business cycles in response to
correlated new shocks, with less reliance on real frictions such as labour adjust-
ment costs or habit formation. This is especially important given the limited
empirical support at the micro level for the high levels of habit formation and
labour adjustment costs that are used in some macroeconomic models. For
example consider the ARMA(1,8) shock process for some wedge  t,
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ln  t =  ln  t 1 +Jj=0
j"t j ;
0 <  < 1; 0 <   1:
Suppose that  = 0:95 and  = 0:75; J = 7:This process has a hump shape
with a peak impact  t+8 at 8 quarters of around 2:8"t. We can think of this
process as representing the di¤usion of transitory changes in sentiment or news
through the economy. At period t; an optimism shock "t increases  t: In the
next period, the measure of optimists dissipates by a depreciation factor ; but
the new optimists from the previous period "t infect another "t agents with
their optimism. At t + 2; the stock of optimists again depreciates at a rate of
1   ; but the new optimists from the previous period infect 2"t new agents
with their optimism. In each period up to t+J the stock of optimists equals to
the sum of the remaining previous optimists ( ln  t+j 1) and the newly infected
optimists j"t: The same pattern applies to a pessimism shock.
Processes such as this one allow the RBC model to generate news driven busi-
ness cycles with much smaller real frictions (Leeper and Walker (2010)[135]).
The key di¤erence is that the news component in this process follows an instan-
taneous shock that raises rmsdesired production immediately. Christiano et
al (2012) [56] nd that correlated news about idiosyncratic risk can account
for around 60% of GDP growth uctuations in a medium sized New Keynesian
DSGE model.
Is there any plausible microfoundation for the MA components in this process?
Models with imperfect information, technological di¤usion and learning can gen-
erate what looks like a gradual boom-bust in certain wedges (see for example
Angeletos and Lao (2012) [11]). For example, a gradual spread of uncertainty
through the nancial system, followed by an eventual reduction in uncertainty
lead to hump shaped dynamics in nancing wedges. A gradual di¤usion of
higher uncertainty across rms in an environment where factor inputs cannot
be fully adjusted to idiosyncratic shocks as in Arellano et al (2012) [12] can
lead to the appearance of hump shaped TFP and labour wedges. To be more
concrete, suppose each rms labour demand follows

yi;t
ni;t
= wt(1 + nd;i;t);
then aggregate labour demand is
nt = ini;t =

wt
i
yit
1 + nd;i;t
= i
yi;t
yt
1
1 + nd;i;t
yt
wt
=
1
1 + nd;t
yt
wt
;
where the nd;i;t is the rm specic wedge in labour demand caused by the
extra uncertainty, and the average labour wedge is
1 + nd;t =
1
i
yi;t
yt
1
1+nd;i;t
' 1
i
yi
y
1
1+nd;i;t
;
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with the last approximation using the BGP output shares of di¤erent rms.
Taking a rst order Taylor approximation in percentage changes twice,
nd;t   nd ' i yi
y
(nd;i;t   nd;i);
so that the change in the aggregate labour demand wedge is approximately equal
to a weighted average of rm specic wedges.
Angeletos and Lao (2012) [11] show how gradual di¤usion across rms of
pessimistic expectations can lead to to a gradual increase in the proportion of
rms with a high labour demand wedge, and an increase in the average labour
demand wedge nd;t (with the opposite dynamics when expectations become
more optimistic):Eventually the wave of increased pessimism across rms dies
out, generating a hump shaped aggregate labour wedge shock process. The next
section explores these "sentiment" shocks in greater detail.
9.3.3 Imperfect information and sentiment shocks
News shocks are usually modelled as being about changes several periods into the
future. But one can also imagine intratemporal shocks to expectations. These
intratemporal expectations shocks or sentiment shocks provide a formalisation
of the Keynesian idea of animal spirits driven business cycles (Angeletos and Lao
(2012) [11] , Benhabib et al (2012) [26], Angeletos et al. (2014) [10]). In these
models, a recession can be explained by correlated (across rms), persistent,
pessimistic signals received by rms about demand for their products that cause
them to reduce output (with the reverse optimism leading to output booms).
These pessimistic signals are compatible with RE: we cannot just drop in a
smart economist who would eliminate the recession by showing decision makers
that their pessimism is unjustied, because the pessimism is in fact justied. 29
Sentiment shocks also imply that the economy can uctuate a lot in response
to hard to predict and quantify changes in expectations. As a result, they can
rationalise a situation where even if we were to understand the structure of
the economy reasonably well, accurate forecasting in the traditional sense of
providing a single number minimising forecast mean squared error would be
di¢ cult.
The main features of these models are:
1) heterogeneity between rms,
2) imperfect information,
3) inexible adjustment of production input purchases.
Heterogeneity between rms could be due to imperfect substitutability be-
tween di¤erent products, di¤erences in rm productivity or due to randomeness
in the matching process between buyers and sellers as in Angeletos and Lao
29Black (1986) [32] suggests a unied theory of nancial markets and business cycles re-
volving around imperfect information and misperceptions, which he labels "noise".
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(2012) [11]. Inexible adjustment could come in the form of partial irreversibil-
ity in production decisions, or in the form of other production input adjustment
costs.
While we have emphasized 3 elements, there is a sense in which 2) imperfect
information only matters because of 3) inexible adjustment : if rms could
always perfectly adjust their decision quickly to any available information, then
imperfect information would be irrelevant. Note the similarity of these elements
to those in the earlier model of the labour wedge with heterogeneous rms and
uncertainty shocks in Arellano et al (2012) [12] and Bloom et al (2012) [34].
Heterogenity across rms is not strictly necessary in these models (see Benhabib
et al(2013) for a model with imperfect information about an aggregate demand
shock), but by allowing for idiosyncratich shocks across the rms it greatly
expands the scope for realistic levels of imperfect information.
Suppose there are many rms each a¤ected by its own idiosycratic prof-
itability shock. These protability shocks could be to TFP, relative demand
or cost of production inputs shocks. Firms get imperfect signals about their
idiosyncratic shock, based on which they have to make hiring and other pro-
duction input purchase decisions. These decisions are (partially) irreversible
with respect the idiosyncratic shock (otherwise if rms could exibly readjust
their decision when information is revealed, the imperfect information would be
irrelevant). Consider a typical input demand function under perfect foresight
xit = fx(px;t; z
i
t);
where px;t is the price of input x relative to rm i0s output and zt is a vector
of other demand or cost variables, where
@xit
@px;t
< 0;
@xit
@zij;t
> 0
for each element zij;t of z
i
t: Now consider the situation where demand for x
i
t
must be set under imperfect information, before uncertainty is fully resolved.
In Angeletos and Lao (2012) [11] or Benhabib et al (2012) [26] labour demand
is simply predetermined inside the period. Perhaps more realistically, there are
labour adjustment costs that make the labour demand decision dynamic: the
rm decides how many workers to hire or re in the current period, taking into
account that its decision will also a¤ect costs of hiring and ring in the uncertain
future (e.g Bloom et al (2012) [34]). In general solving for the full e¤ect of this
uncertainty is nontrivial (see for example Arellano et al (2012) [12]). But if
we are willing to make a certainty equivalent approximation, or take a linear
approximation of the demand function, we have
xit = fx(Ei;tpx;t; Ei;tz
i
t); and
@xit
@Ei;tpx;t
< 0;
@xit
@Ei;tzij;t
> 0;
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where Ei;t(:) is rm i0s expectation about the prices it will be facing and
other demand factors during period t at the beginning of period, and a subset
of these variables (px2;t; zi2;t) is typically known in advance. Now imagine rms
get a negative signal si;t about the cost of their production inputs pix; t or about
demand for their product, their TFP or other factors in zit; with a lower si;t
indicating a more pessimistic signal. We can solve for a a reduced form demand
function
xit = fx(Ei;tpx;t; Ei;tz
i
t) = x
i
t = fx(si;t; px2;t; z
i
2;t):
Under what conditions do production decisions respond to the signal with
@xit
@si;t
> 0 ? If we allow for arbitary expectation formation mechanism, we can
clearly nd some examples in which the negative signal worsens rm expec-
tations and causes them to reduce demand for inputs and production. Firms
reduce labour and intermediate inputs demand. Lower wages lead to a reduction
in labour supply so that overall employment declines. If the negative signal is
persistent then the higher pessimism about future prots and the reduction in
future labour and intermediate inputs demand also reduce the expected return
to capital. As a result, investment also falls.
Can this recession scenario due to negative signals be sustained under RE?
Benhabib et al (2012) [26] and Angeletos and Lao (2012) [11] show that the
answer is yes under certain conditions. A rm getting an imperfect negative
signal about the protability of its product will have more pessimistic expec-
tations under RE. As a result it will scale down its production by hiring fewer
workers and purchasing fewer intermediate goods as long as it perceives the
signal to contain some true information. In this way correlated shocks to rms
expectations about their TFP or their terms of trade (the price of their output
relative to the cost of inputs) can cause business cycles.
In a loglinear approximation, we can write aggregate production in these
economies as
lnXt = A+B lnZt + C lnSt;
,where Zt is a vector of fundamental state variables and St is an aggregate
measure of the average signal perceived by rms in the economy. A higher
average signal represents greater business optimism, while a more negative St
represents greater pessimism. A negative aggregate sentiment shock to St can
generate persistent recessions, just like a TFP or labour wedge shock. From a
business cycle accounting perspective these sentiment shocks map into produc-
tion factor demand wedges. For example, Angeletos and Lao (2012) [11] show
how they can help explain the labour wedge. They also provide an example in
which the spread of optimistic signals through di¤erent rms and the gradual
revelation that the signal is false as rms communicate with each other leads
to a hump shaped sentiment shock, similar to the ARMA(1,q) process in the
section on news shocks.
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There are some limits to the noisy signals explanation of business cycles.
First, a general result in these models is that the aggregate volatility resulting
from noisy signals is bounded from above by the volatility of the source of the
fundamental uncertainty on which we get the signal (Angeletos and Lao (2012)
[11]). So for these shocks to signals to generate signicant aggregate uctuations
we need a source of large fundamental uncertainty. This criterion can be easily
satised by idiosyncratic rm level risk, which is typically much larger than
aggregate risk. 2nd there is a trade-o¤ in increasing the volatility of signals
relative to that of the underlying fundamental source of uncertainty. Higher
volatility of signals on 1 hand increases uctuations in the expectation of the
variables a¤ecting demand such as Ei;tpx;t or Ei;tzij;t: On the other hand under
RE a higher signals volatility for a given fundament volatility reduces the signal
to noise ratio and encourages agents to lter out more of the signal as noise.
The best case for sentiment shocks driven business cycles is based on nding
volatile signals with high signal to noise ratios, because the signals themselves
are about variables with high fundamental volatility.
Angeletos et al (2014) [10] estimate several variants of a DSGE model in
which sentiment shocks compete with more traditional news shocks (in which
the news on e.g productivity is actually realised), productivity shocks and other
frequently used business cycle shocks. They nd that in the US their sentiment
shocks can account for 40-60% of the variance of output and almost 70% of
the variance of hours at business cycle frequencies. Furthermore, a simple RBC
model with transitory sentiment shocks and permanent productivity shocks can
successfuly reproduces most of the business cycle moments of GDP components,
hours and labour productivity. TFP shocks help to match the positive correla-
tion between labour productivity and output. Meanwhile, the sentiment shocks
help match the volatility of employment that is usual much too low in RBC
models driven by TFP shocks. The sentiment shock extracted in their estima-
tion is also highly correlated with changes in consumer and business condence
indices.
Sentiment shocks can provide a microfoundation for nancial shocks. To
do this, we can apply Angeletos and Laos (2012) [11] model of a production
network in the nonnancial sector to the nancial system. Imagine a network of
nancial intermediaries (FI). Each period some FIs will need to borrow funds
from other FIs, while some FIs will have excess funds to lend. Trade is decen-
tralized with asymmetric information about the nancial health of the partner
FIs. Lending decisions to FIs and non nancial rms or households have to be
made before fully observing the state of trade partners in nancial markets.
Again we have the 3 key elements of 1) heterogeneity between nancial in-
termediaries,2) imperfect information and 3) inexible adjustment of borrowing
and lending decisions to new information. In this setup a negative signal about
the nancial health and lending terms of ones partner causes FIs to reduce
borrowing and lending in nancial markets. This reduction in trade volume is
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accompanied by tighter collateral requirements, or the outright refusal to trade
some types of nancial contracts. This lower trade volume in nancial mar-
kets and greater di¢ culty in obtaining funds then spill over into tighter credit
constraints on loans to households and non nancial rms.
Finally, we can imagine models where there are imperfect signals on the
amount of idiosyncratic risk facing rms, e.g on the standard deviation or skew-
ness of idiosyncratic shocks. Suppose each rm faces a stochastic volatility of its
productivity or relative demand for its product. Idiosycratic volatility shocks
wash out in the aggregate, but not from the perspective of an individual rm.
The rm gets an imperfect signal about the volatility it will face, and it has to
make production decisions beforehand. In the presence of non convex adjust-
ment costs as in Bloom et al (2012)[34], risk averse managers facing undiversied
business risk as in Angeletos (2007) [8] or nontrivial default costs as in Arellano
et a (2012)[12], a negative signal of higher volatility reduces rmswillingness
to hire, invest and pay for intermediate production inputs.
Imperfect signals on idiosyncratic risk are likely to reproduce many of the
e¤ects on labour demand and production of actual changes in idiosyncratic
risk (as in the model of Arellano et al (2012) discussed earlier). Unlike the
realised uncertainty shocks in Arellano et al (2012) [12] or Bloom et al (2012)[34],
imperfect signals about uncertainty are less dependent on the actual amount of
change in the amount of idiosyncratic risk. This opens up the route for a much
larger role for shifts in uncertainty in generating business cycles, in the form of
sentiment shocks.
9.3.4 Investment shocks
Investment shocks can capture various nancial frictions that are biased towards
investment. These can include loans that are specically for capital expendi-
ture, countercyclical uninsured business risk (as in Christiano et al (2012) [56])
or interaction between higher riskiness of investment in a recession and xed ad-
justment costs (e.g Bloom and Jaimovich (2012) [34]). They also represent shifts
in the riskiness of investment or misperceptions about the returns to investment
that are not captured by the (usually misspecied) endogenous mechanisms in
the model or by RE. We model this shock in our setup by changes in the in-
vestment tax k;t or in the relative discount factor of the rm vf;t (See Buera
and Moll (2012) [35] for a credit shock that can be mapped into a combination
of a change in the relative discount factor of the rm and a TFP news shock):
Investment shocks often lead to the opposite comovement problem of dis-
count factor shocks, with procyclical investment and countercyclical consump-
tion (see for example Greenwood et al (2000)[99] or in Liu et als (2011) [136] or
Khan and Thomas (2013) [123] models of credit shocks, or Bloom et als (2012)
model of uncertainty shocks in DSGE [34]).
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A positive shock is associated with a lower investment wedge k;t or a lower
rm relative discount rate vf;t=vf;t+1. The higher return to capital investment
in response to a positive shock increases saving so that absent any shift in ag-
gregate TFP or the labour demand wedge consumption declines initially. This
is partially mitigated by factors that act like endogenous aggregate TFP shocks
in response to higher marginal e¢ ciency of investment, such as variable capital
utilisation rates. In general, any theory of business cycles that focuses invest-
ment shocks must also simultaneously generate aggregate TFP or labour wedge
shocks to reproduce the comovement of GDP components in the data.
Capital utilisation rates increase in response to a positive investment shock
if the cost of higher utilisation is greater capital depreciation, and if the shock
increases the return to capital (Greenwood et al (2000) [99]). For this we need
the direct e¤ect of a lower k;t on the return on capital to be stronger than the
indirect e¤ect of a higher price of capital pk;t due to higher investment demand.
A more realistic and potentially more important mechanism reducing aggregate
TFP in the presence of negative investment shocks is the cost of adjusting
the composition of production between the investment goods sector and other
sectors.
The basic RBC model with constant returns to scale production functions
and without intersectoral adjustment costs assumes that it is easy to reallocate
production to other sectors if investing in capital becomes more expensive. But
in an economy with matching frictions, it may take some time for the new
buyers and sellers in the higher TFP sectors to form new longer term relations
and adjust their search strategy and e¤ort to the new sectors. Or it may take
time for the for rms in the higher TFP sector to expand their customer base
(e.g Gourio and Rudanko (2013)[97]). While this adjustment occurs, matching
in the economy is less e¢ cient (the simplest way to capture this is by assuming
decreasing returns to scale in sectoral production functions). Equivalently, there
is a higher degree of mismatch between buyers and sellers ( see for example Black
(1986) [32]). Lower matching e¢ ciency reduces the protability of production
for a given quantity of labour and capital, similarly to an aggregate TFP shock.
30
The impact of investment shocks on real interest rates is more ambiguous.
On one hand, a lower k;t increases the price of capital by raising investment
demand. This tends to reduce interest rates. On the other hand, the direct
e¤ect of lower k;t is to increase the return on capital, raising interest rates.
30We can also get comovement of investment and consumption for marginal e¢ ciency of
investment shocks in the exible price model without variable capital utilisation due to a
composition e¤ect when employed households consume more than the non employed as in
Euseppi Preston (2009) [77]. But with only this extra feature we would still predict negative
comovement of aggregate investment with consumption of employed households. Finally, if
higher desired investment stimulates search e¤orts by rms making new investments in the
capital goods market, this can raise the e¢ ciency of the production process through the
distribution and matching function gt:
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The second e¤ect dominates initially if the higher return to capital is associated
with a fall in consumption.
9.4 Adding Durables: home production capital
Until now we have only modelled non durable consumption goods such as ser-
vices or food. Durable consumption goods such as housing or consumer electric
goods are another form of saving available to households in the economy. By pro-
viding utility over many periods, they allow households to smooth consumption
across time similarly to nancial assets. They can also be seen as a form of capi-
tal used in non-market production, also known as home production. The size of
durable goods investment (including housing) can be larger than that of business
investment (see Gomme and Rupert (2006) [95] for the US). Durables invest-
ment behaviour has signicant di¤erences from that of nondurables consumption
over the business cycle. For example, it is much more volatile. Durables, par-
ticularly in the form of housing play an important role as borrowing collateral
for households.
Durables are also another form of aggregate saving in the closed economy.
From that perspective, their behaviour may be closer to that of business invest-
ment than to that of non-durable consumption. Adding durables to the analysis
as another form of household saving can have major implications for our under-
standing of comovement patterns between consumption and investment and of
the cyclicality of wages and labour supply. For all these reasons, business cycle
models with explicit treatment of durables have become increasingly common
(e.g, Davis and Heathcote (2005) [64], Campbell and Hercowitz (2006) [41] and
Iacoviello and Neri (2009) [110], Favilukis et al (2011) [82], Iacoviello and Pavan
(2013) [111] .
9.4.1 The households decision problem with durable goods
Households in period t choose the durables stock Dt+1 that they will hold at
the beginning of period t+ 1: Unlike business capital, we assume that durables
Dt+1 already yield utility in period t when they are chosen. This is common
in business cycle models, and it is reasonable for most durable goods with the
typical model period length of a quarter. The representative household problem
becomes
max
fct;nst ;Dt+1;bt+1g1t=0
E0
1
t=0tu(ct; Dt+1; lt)
subject to a sequence of constraints
ct(1 +  c;t) + pD;t(1 + D;t) [Dt+1   (1  D)Dt] + bt+1  btRtefph;t + wt(1  nst)ns;t + dht + Tt, (t);
ns;t = 1  lt;
uc > 0; ucc < 0; uD > 0; uDD < 0; ul > 0; ull < 0; uc;l  0:
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D;t is a wedge a¤ecting durable purchases, for example due nancial fric-
tions that are specically a¤ect buying durable goods. pD;t is the relative price
of durables and dht are total household dividends from rms including prots of
installed capital and durables producers.
To complete the model, we also have a representative durables producer
owned by households. It solves
max
Dt
D;t = max
Dt
pD;tx
D
t   IDt :
xDt = Dt+1   (1  D)Dt = aDt G(
IDt
Dt
)Dt
; G0(:) > 0; G00(:)  0:
As for capital, aDt represents durables investment specic technology shocks,
and a concave G() represents capital adjustment costs. This denes a supply
curve for capital. The resource constraint becomes
ct + It + I
D
t = yt:
The householdsrst order conditions for risk free bonds, non durable con-
sumption and labour supply have the same form as before. We now add a rst
order condition for durables:
pD;t(1 + D;t) =
uDt+1
t
+ Et
t+1
t
t+1
t
pD;t+1(1 + D;t+1)(1  D):
Using the bond rst order condition and a certainty equivalence approxima-
tion we get
pD;t(1 + D;t) '
uDt+1
t
+
EtpD;t+1(1 + D;t+1)(1  D)
Rt+1Etefph;t+1
:
These equations have some similarity to those we got earlier for business
capital. On the left there is the cost an extra unit of durables. on the right is
the marginal return to holding durables composed of an immediate gain from
holding the durable and from the future resale value. However, there are some
important di¤erences. First because durables contribute to non market activity,
the marginal product of capital is replaced by the marginal utility of durables.
Second, because durables are owned by households, the e¤ective discount factor
for durables is the same as that for nondurable consumption. In contrast, we
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argued that di¤erences between the rm owners or managers and the households
discount factors could play an important role in business investment decisions.
The comparative dynamics of the last equation are relatively straightforward,
at least under common utility functions for which
uDt+1
t
is a one to one function
of ctDt+1 : A higher price of durables pD;t or a higher durables wedge D;t relative
to next period reduce durables investment relative to non durables consump-
tion. Higher interest rates or a higher external nance premium efph;t+1 reduce
durables investment relative to non durables consumption. The conclusion that
durables investment is more sensitive to nancing frictions is common to many
models. This suggests that credit constraints may be an important explanation
for the much greater volatility of durables investment relative to consumption
over the business cycle. We can almost verbatim here our comments on business
investment with nonconvex adjustment costs to the relation between discrete
durables investment decisions at the household level and continuous aggregate
durables.
The representative households durables investment optimality condition can
also be interpreted as the result of aggregating individual household discrete
choices of a single unit of the durable good. Households purchase a new TV or a
new house as long as the marginal benet on the right hand side of our optimality
condition exceeds the marginal cost on the left hand side. Under some conditions
(e.g Caplin and Leahy (2002)[42]), aggregating the discrete choices of many
households leads to the same aggregate durables investment function as that
of the representative household in our model. The most important necessary
condition for this exact equivalence is to have complete nancial markets at the
household level, which equalises the shadow value of wealth t across households.
A similar result holds for continouous household choices subject to non convex
adjustment costs (for example a xed cost of searching for and moving to a new
house).
With incomplete nancial markets and uninsured idiosyncratic income risk,
the equivalence breaks down (Iacoviello and Pavan (2013) [111]) because of the
interaction between discretenss or nonconvex adjustment costs and the distrib-
ution of householdsshadow values of wealth i;t. However the representative
household approximation is still a useful simplication once we allow for sto-
chastic wedges capturing some of the e¤ects of nancial market incompleteness
in the durables investment optimality condition.
9.4.2 Business cycle dynamics with durable goods
Models without signicant movements in the external nance premium efph;t+1
often generate a counterfactual negative comovement between durables and con-
sumption or business investment. Consider a front loaded positive TFP shock.
With moderate capital adjustment costs, this tends increase interest rates. From
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the rst order condition for durables investment, a higher interest rate reduces
the durables stock to consumption ratio. Since the increase in consumption is
usually not that large in comparison to the durables stock, this usually requires
a decline in the stock of durables. As a result durables investment declines
in the short run. This is a problem, since empirically durables investment are
strongly procyclical and the real risk free rate Rt+1 is also procyclical. One way
to deal with this comovement problem is to assume high capital adjustment
costs, leading to countercyclical interest rates. But this leads to a volatility of
investment relative to output that is too low in comparison to the data.
Mechanisms that increase the response of output and consumption to TFP
shocks or shifts in the relative tax on durables D;t or in the external nance pre-
mium efph;t+1 can help generate positive comovement between durables invest-
ment and other GDP components. We will discuss some of these mechanisms
below. Adding household level nancial frictions can be particularly helpful.
Countercyclical external nance premia efph;t+1 can reduce the procyclicality
of the e¤ective interest rate Rt+1efph;t+1, or even make it countercyclical. On
top of that, other nancing frictions that are specic to purchasing durables
lead to a countercyclical D;t: Due to the sensitivity of aggregate durables in-
vestment to interest rates and wedges, these mechanisms can be enough to
generate strongly procyclical investment in durables.
The e¤ect of durables investment shocks such as D;t has some similarity
to that of investment in business capital shocks. A decline in D;t encourages
durables spending, but may discourage spending on non durables consumption
by increasing the return on saving. To the degree that similar changes in nanc-
ing frictions or in investment specic technology a¤ect durables and business
capital, the introduction of durables allows us to generate positive comovement
between rm investment and consumption including durables more easily 31 .
Positive comovement is also more likely if nondurables consumption is comple-
mentary with the durables stock. This would tend to encourage a positive link
between consumption of durables and nondurables goods.
In general equilibrium, a simultaneous increase in durables and nondurables
spending is incompatible with higher business investment in the short-run, un-
less it raises the labour input in production. Positive comovement with business
31 Including durables in the consumption variable is common in many models and empirical
exercises (e.g Smets and Wouters (2007) [164]). This is only a good approximation if durables
depreciation is implausibly high. An intermediate aproach in models without durables is to
add the implicit rental value of durables to the consumption measure in estimation or fore-
casting. Finally, some researchers treat durables investment as part of business investment
(e.g Justiniano et al (2011) [118]). In models with rm and household specic credit con-
straints, this can signicantly bias the assessment of the role of nancial frictions. The last
remaining approach is to redene GDP to exclude durables and then use an auxiliary reduced
form model to forecast durables when necessary. None of these methods is perfect. Given
the advances in the computational ability to handle larger state spaces, and the importance
of durables investment in business cycles, explicit inclusion of durables is probably the best
option for medium-large scale policy models.
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investment is more likely to happen if durables spending and hours of work are
complements in the utility function or if there is correlation between D;t and
the labour supply or nondurable consumption wedges ns;t;  c;t (for example,
a general improvement in credit conditions in an environment where part of
households labour supply is to pay downpayments on mortgages or durable
goods loans (e.g Tomura(2009) [170]).
Allowing for incomplete nancial markets and non-convex adjustment costs
can also generate countercyclical movements in the durables purchase wedge
D;t through several channels: These include countercyclical durables price idio-
syncratic risk and interaction between uninsured income risk and durable ad-
justment costs (Iacoviello and Pavan (2013) [111]). The rst channel is clearly
most relevant for housing. Higher housing price risk makes housing less attrac-
tive as an investment in a recession if it is not fully diversied. One suspects
that this risk is countercyclical, like idiosyncratic wage or business income risks,
though the empirical evidence on this point has been lacking for housing.
The interaction between uninsured idiosyncratic income risk and non convex
durables adjustment costs is probably more robust. In a recession xed costs of
adjustment, such as di¢ culty in reselling durables or the existence of a minimum
scale for durable purchases, together with the greater importance of uninsured
income risk when wealth is lower discourage spending on durables. While this
is true for any negative shock, this e¤ect is stronger in the empirically plausible
case of countercyclical idiosyncratic income risk. In that case the higher risk di-
rectly reduces desired durables investment.For example, a risk averse household
faced with higher unemployment risk is less willing to invest in a large house
when scaling back the investment in case of unemployment is costly.
The adjustment costs also discourage some existing homeowners from switch-
ing back to a smaller residence in a recession. But even though fewer households
adjust in the presence of xed costs of adjustment, the overall cross-section dis-
tribution of desired adjustment without xed costs shifts to lower durables in-
vestment. As a result the proportion of adjusting households who want to lower
their durables stock increases, leading to a reduction in durables investment. In
reverse, a reduction in idiosyncratic household income risk increases the desired
stock of durables as households are less concerned about having to downsize and
pay a signicant adjustment cost in case of a negative shock.
The combination of idiosyncratic income risk with non convex durables ad-
justment costs attenuates the response of durables investment to shocks in reces-
sions. This mechanism applies mostly to housing, which is typically estimated
to have a xed adjustment cost equal to around 5% of its value. The xed
cost of moving to a new house is more painful to pay when wealth is low in a
recession due to diminishing marginal utility of wealth. As a result, households
are more cautious in changing their housing stock in a recession.
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Now recall the main factor that complicates explaining the comovement
between durables and business capital investment: the procyclicality of real
interest rates for most shocks. The combination of xed adjustment costs with
idiosyncratic income risk makes households more reluctant to respond to lower
interest rates in a recession. In reverse, a boom when wealth and income increase
is a good time to spend the xed cost of adjusting housing, even if interest rates
are higher. Therefore, the countercyclical e¤ect of interest rates on durables
investment is weaker with realistic adjustment costs and income risk. This
makes durables investment more procyclical when we combine uninsured income
risk and non convex adjustment costs (Iacoviello and Pavan (2013)[111]).
Accounting for durables in the economy gives precautionary savings e¤ects
on consumption a more prominent role. Holdings of durables can help explain
a higher level of nancial wealth inequality (see Kaplan and Violante (2014)
[120], Gruber and Martin (2003) [101], Diaz and Luengo-Prado (2010) [66]).
Diminishing marginal utility of durables implies that wealthier households have
a lower weight of durables in their overall wealth portfolio. As result, the dis-
tribution of durables is more concentrated, and there is more inequality in the
distribution of nancial assets for a given overall wealth inequality level.
In an economy with uninsured idiosyncratic household risk, higher nancial
wealth inequality increases the size of precautionary savings changes in response
to shocks, and raises the average MPC out of current (or more recent periods)
income (see for example Carroll (2000) [45]). Furthermore, because of the ad-
justment cost durables cannot be used as e¤ectively to smooth consumption in
response to transitory shocks (Martin and Gruber (2003), Kaplan and Violante
(2012) [120]). In combination with the higher nancial wealth inequality in
the economy with durables, this tends to make non durables consumption more
procyclical.
Finally, including durable goods can also improve our ability to match em-
ployment changes over the business cycle. Financial market shocks a¤ecting
D;t ( or for that matter k;t; and  c;t as well) can help explain higher employ-
ment volatility and lower wage volatility. An rise in these wedges due to higher
nancing constraints can signicantly reduce householdswork incentives. From
the household rst order condition for durables investment, an increase in D;t
or in epfh;t+1 can lower the marginal value of income t by causing substitution
from durables to nondurables expenditure. This reduces the marginal value of
wage income, leading to lower labour supply.
In contrast, in the model without exible durables investment a higher
efph;t+1 would always tend to increase t and labour supply. In the empiri-
cally plausible case of complementarity between durables and nondurables (see
the evidence and discussion in Flavin and Yamashita (2008) [85]), lower durables
consumption due to higher efph;t+1 or D;t directly reduces the shadow cost
t and labour supply. From the perspective of models that omit durable goods
these mechanisms act like negative labour supply shocks in a recession.
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9.4.3 The savers and borrowers model with durable goods
This is a standard way of modeling borrowing frictions in DSGE (e.g Iacoviello
(2005) [109], Iacoviello and Neri (2009) [110]). It is an extension of our earlier
model of a representative borrower and a representative saver with an exogenous
debt limit, and provides an easy to implement micro foundation for the e¤ects of
the external nance premium on durables dynamics discussed earlier. Now bor-
rowers also have access to durables and they can use some of them as collateral
for borrowing. Even if durables cannot be used as collateral, durables still help
the borrowing household smooth its consumption relative to the case without
durables. For example a negative income shock can be partially smoothed by
reducing durables investment. A positive income shock will encourage saving in
the form of a higher durables stock. Of course, because the durable good yields
utility immediate, a reduction in durable goods will be felt by households quite
di¤erently than a reduction in nancial net worth.
The saver household has the same budget constraint and optimality condi-
tions as before, now indexed by i = sa: The representative borrower solves
max
fcbo;t;nbo;t;dbo;t+1;bbo;t+1g
E0
1
t=0bo;tu(cbo;t; Dbo;t+1; lbo;t)
subject to a sequence of constraints
cbo;t(1 +  c;t) + pD;t(1 + D;t) [Dbo;t+1   (1  D)Dbo;t] + bbo;t+1  bbo;tRtefpbo:h;t
+wt(1  nst)nbo;t + Tt, (bo;t);
 bbo;t+1  bt+1 +mbo;tpD;tDbo;t+1;
(t+1);
bt+1j  0; 0  mbo;t  1:
nbo;t = 1  lbo;t;
uc > 0; ucc < 0; ul > 0; ull < 0; uc;l  0:
The optimality conditions for bonds and durables change to
bbo;t+1 : bo;t = Et
bo;t+1
bo;t
efpbo;h;t+1Rt+1bo;t+1 + Et
bo;t+1
bo;t
t+1
 Et
bo;t+1
bo;t
ef pbo;h;t+1Rt+1bo;t+1
pD;t(1 + D;t) =
uDbo;t+1
bo;t
+ Et
bo;t+1
bo;t
bo;t+1
bo;t
pD;t+1(1 + D;t+1)(1  D) + Et
bo;t+1
bo;t
mbo;tpD;tt+1:
Note the extra term on the right hand side of the durables optimality con-
dition. This term reects the additional marginal benet of the durable good
as collateral.
Market clearing conditions become
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iicit = ct;
iiDit = Dt;
iini;t = nst;
iibi;t = 0:
.
9.4.4 Durable goods demand with costly consumer search
Following the ideas of Rios-Rull et al (2012) [17] about the e¤ect of search fric-
tions on business cycles, we introduce consumer search frictions in the market
for durable goods. Housing and other durables are notorious for requiring sig-
nicant consumer research and shopping e¤ort before making a purchase. In
comparison, an increase in non durable goods and services purchases in a boom
does not necessarily require more shopping e¤ort: for example in some case it is
enough to buy higher quality goods and services during regular shopping time
or visits to restaurants and other entertainment venues (that count as leisure
time). We stick to a representative household approach in which purchasing xDt
units of new durable goods requires a shopping e¤ort SDt ; satisfying
xDt  Dt SDt ; (St ):
The new durables nding rate Dt is taken as given by households. It is de-
termined in equilibrium by the joint search e¤ort of households and rms. We
modify the households utility function to
u(ct; Dt+1; lt)  v(SDt );
vSD > 0; vSDSD  0:
v(SD) is search e¤ort. We assume again that the marginal cost of search
is independent of the other variables a¤ecting household preferences. The rst
order condition for durables becomes
pD;t(1+D;t)+
St
t
=
uDt+1
t
+Et
t+1
t
t+1
t

pD;t+1(1 + D;t+1) +
St+1
t+1

(1 D):
We also add a rst order condition for search e¤ort
vSDt = 
S
t 
D
t :
This allows us to rewrite the rst order condition for durables as
pD;t(1 + D;t) +
vSDt
Dt t
=
uDt+1
t
+ Et
t+1
t
t+1
t
"
pD;t+1(1 + D;t+1) +
vSDt+1
Dt+1t+1
#
(1  D);()
pD;t(1 + ^D;t) =
uDt+1
t
+ Et
t+1
t
t+1
t
[pD;t+1(1 + ^D;t+1)] (1  D); where
^D;t = D;t +
vSDt
Dt t
:
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Using a certainty equivalence approximation,
pD;t(1 + D;t) +
vSDt
Dt t
' uDt+1
t
+
Et
h
pD;t+1(1 + D;t+1) +
v
SD
t+1
Dt+1t+1
i
(1  D)
Rt+1Etefph;t+1
:
These equations show that in the new model we essentially modify the mar-
ginal cost of durables to include the shopping e¤ort. Consider an increase in
pD;t(1 + D;t) or in the external nance premium efph;t+1: Ceteris Paribus,
these lead to a lower vSDt ; implying lower shopping e¤ort. In equilibrium, the
lower shopping e¤ort for durables reduces the probability of making a sale for
rms, which from a perspective of a model without these channels amounts to
lower TFP in the durables sector. This is similar to an endogenous D;t shocks.
In combination with a similar change in the capital goods sector, we would get
dynamics similar to those of a joint investment shock in the business capital
and consumer durables sectors.
9.5 Adding intermediate production goods: the input-
output structure, growth and business cycles
Until now we have assumed that capital and labour are the only production
factors. Modern economies have a complex input-output structures in which
part of the production of many rms is sold to other rms as an input into
their production. These inputs range from material inputs such as fuel or iron
to various business services. Under certain conditions we can recover a value
added production function in terms of only capital and labour for GDP net of
intermediate good expenditures . The value added production function already
incorporates optimal intermediate input choices.
This simplication is commonly used in most business cycle analysis, but it
is not innocuous. Explicit modeling of intermediate goods allows us to exam-
ine the robustness of conclusions from simpler 1 or 2 sector models to a more
realistic treatment of di¤erent production sectors. It reveals new sources of
e¢ ciency/TFP wedge shocks and of long run income di¤erences between coun-
tries. And it suggests a powerful amplication mechanism for shocks hitting the
economy, reducing our reliance on large exogenous sources of business cycles.
This section shows how to extend our framework to include these intermediate
goods.
The economy consists of N sectors, each producing a distinct good yit:
yi;t can be turned into a nal output good y
f
it or into an intermediate good
yxit = 
N
j=1xij;t sold to other sectors j = 1:::N (j includes i; but the sectors
use of its own product just nets out in its prots). Final output yt can be cost-
lessly transformed into nondurable consumption, or it can be transformed into
durable goods and capital subject to the previously specied adjustment costs.
The representative rm in sector i produces output using labour, capital and
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intermediate goods fxji;tgNj=1: Note the indexing convention: xij is produced
by i and sold to j: The production function of sector i is
yi;t = g(Atmit; emi;t)zitf(kit; Atnit; Xit);
Xit = h(fxji;tgNj=1);
yit = y
f
it + y
x
i;t;
yxit = 
N
j=1xij;t:
gm > 0; gmm < 0; gem > 0; fn > 0; fnn < 0; fk > 0; fkk < 0; hxj > 0; hxjxj < 0
; g(am; :)f(ak; an; aX)  ag(m; :)f(k; n;X) and h(faxji;tg) = ah(fxji;tg) for all a  0:
At = GyAt 1; Gy  1:
The representative rm in sector i solves
max
fkt+1;mt;nt;fxji;tgNj=1g
E0
1
t=0fi;tdt;
dit = p
x
i;tyit   wt(1 + ndi;t)(nt +mt)  j;tpxj;t(1 + xi;t)xji;t
 pkt (1 + ki;t)[kit+1   (1  )kit];
Note that we have allowed for sector specic wedges, and a common wedge
on the purchase of intermediate inputs by sector i. The rst order conditions
for capital and labour are the same as before except that the marginal revenue
term is now multiplied by the price of sector i output relative to the numeraire,
pxi;t: For each intermediate input we have the rst order condition
xji;t : p
x
i;tgtztfxji;t = p
x
j;t(1 + xi;t):
Under standard assumptions (e.g Mas Collel et al (1995)[143], Mathematical
Appendix) we can nd a unique solution to this system of N equations for
optimal fxji;tgj demands as a function of capital, labour, prices and the wedges.
Substituting these demand functions into di;t gives us the value added revenue
function for the rm
V A(kit;ni;t;mi;t; ) = pxi;tyit   j;tpxj;t(1 + xi;t)xji;t:
This leads to an equivalent problem where the rm pick optimal sequences
of fkit;ni;t;mi;tg to maximise
E0
1
t=0fi;t
~dt;
with
~dit = V A(kit;ni;t;mi;t; ) wt(1+ndi;t)(nit+mit) pkt (1+ki;t)[kit+1 (1 t)kit]:
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The use of the value added function above is implicit in both macroeconomic
and microeconomic studies that assume output is only a function of labour and
capital. In the special case of the Cobb-Douglas production function
yit = g(Atmit; emi;t)zit

kit(Atnit)
1  ; X1 it b ;
Xit = 
N
j=1x
ji
ji;t;
0 <  < 1;jji = 1; 0 <   1; 0 < b  1;
the value added function also has a Cobb-Douglas form with exponents less than
or equal to 1 (if we further assume b = 1, the sum of the exponents in the value
added function is again 1).
At this stage we can imagine a large number of identical aggregator rms
that produce nal output from the intermediate goods at zero prot, or we can
assume households, capital and durable goods rms purchase the intermediate
inputs directly. The two formulations yield equivalent results. The 1st approach
is closer to the model without explicit treatment of intermediary inputs, so we
follow it here. To do this, we must specify the link between the intermediate
goods and the nal output aggregate:
yt = F
n
yfit
oN
i=1

= ct + It + I
D
t ;
aF
n
yfit
oN
i=1

= F
n
ayfit
oN
i=1

; for any a  0:
The nal output aggregators optimisation problem implies the rst order
conditions for intermediate inputs used
@yt
@yfi;t
= pxi;t + 
f
i;t:
fi;t is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint y
f
it  0: This formulation allows
for the possibility that an intermediate inputs is only used to produce other
intermediate inputs. In this case yfi;t = 0 for that input. The system of equations
above has a solution yfit = h
yf
i (

pxj;t
	
j
): If we want to focus on the e¤ect of
intermediate inputs in production, a common simplifying assumption is that
intermediate goods are perfect substitutes so that
F
n
yfit
oN
i=1

= Ni=1ai;ty
f
i;t
; ait  0:
32 .
32 In that case, under constant returns to scale only the lowest cost intermediate goods sector
would produce nal output. All other produces would simply sell their output as inputs into
the production process of the most cost e¢ cient. With decreasing returns to scale, we can
have a nondegenerate distribution of sectors contributing directly to nal output.
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Market clearing conditions for this economy are
yit = y
f
it +
N
j=1xij;t for i = 1; :::; N:
xkt = 
N
i=1 [kit+1   (1  )kit] ;
xDt = Dt+1   (1  D)Dt;
yt = ct + It + I
D
t ;
ns;t = 
N
i=1ni;t +
N
i=1mi;t:
dh;t = 
N
i=1di;t + k;t + D;t:
bt+1 = 0;
Note that yt is the aggregate value added GDP, as reported in national in-
come and product accounts. By using the market clearing conditions for sectors
i = 1; :::; N in combination with our previous expressions for fxij;tgi;j ;
n
yfi;t
o
as
functions of prices, wedges and other production factors , we can solve for the
intermediate goods prices pxi;t also as a function of other prices in the economy,
other production factors, and the di¤erent wedges. Combining these results
with our sectoral value added functions, we can derive and expression for yt as
a function of the sectoral capital stocks, labour inputs and wedges.
Horvath (2000) [107] and Jones (2011b) [114] show that when sectoral pro-
duction function are Cobb-Douglas in k; n and X and X itself is a constant
elasticity of substitution function in intermediate inputs, then aggregate value
added can itself be written as a Cobb-Douglas function of aggregate capital and
labour. The total factor productivity term in the aggregate value added pro-
duction function is a decreasing function of the wedges on intermediate inputs
purchase and the level of sectoral e¢ ciency and labour demand wedges. Under
the plausible case in which intermediation inputs are complements, aggregate
TFP is also decreasing in the cross-sectional dispersion of the sectoral wedges
and productivities. DSGE models usually assume Cobb-Douglas production
functions. Since these are a special case of the constant elasticity of substi-
tution function, this result justies the common practice of focusing on value
added for most circumstances.
In that case, it would seem that we are justied in ignoring intermediate
goods. However, intermediate production inputs play an important role in en-
dogenising part of the TFP wedge. This is easiest to see for the Cobb-Douglas
production function with constant returns to scale. The result also applies
with decreasing returns to scale, introducing a xed production factor such as a
manager or entrepreneur. Consider the static problem of choosing intermediate
inputs
V A(kit;ni;t;mi;t; ) = pxi;tyvai;t = maxfxji;tg p
x
i;tgitzit

kit(Atnit)
1  Nj=1xjiji;t1  j;tpxj;t(1+xi;t)xji;t:
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The N rst order conditions can be written as
xji;t : (1  )jipxi;tyit = pxj;t(1 + xi;t)xj;t;
implying
pxi;ty
va
i;t = p
x
i;tyi;t:
Combining this with the rst order conditions gives
pxi;ty
va
i;t =
24pxi;t 1  1 + xi;t
1 
gitzit
N
j=1
 
ji
pxj;t
!ji(1 )35 1 kt n1 t :
Assume a symmetric equilibrium in which all sectors have the same produc-
tivity level, the same production function and the same wedges and in which
yt = 
N
i=1y
f
i;t: This leads to
yt
N
= yvai;t =
"


1  
1 + xt
1 
(1 )gtzt
# 1

kt n
1 
t :
The last expression highlights some of the key e¤ects of intermediate inputs.
First, any change in the e¢ ciency wedge zt or in gt is amplied by a factor of
1
 ; which is increasing in the weight of intermediate inputs in the production
function 1 : A reduction in the e¢ ciency of production or capacity utilisation
encourages rms to reduce intermediate inputs purchases. In terms of a value
added production function this reduces production e¢ ciency (TFP) even more.
The strength of this reduction in the TFP of capital and labour is larger when
intermediate inputs have a bigger role in production (higher 1 ). The nonlin-
ear amplication e¤ect comes from the complementarity between intermediate
inputs and zt or gt; so that a rm operating with one half the e¢ ciency of an-
other rm ends up with one quarter of the TFP in terms of value added for a
typical  = 0:5:
Second, any distortions in the purchase of intermediate inputs, measured
by 1 + x;t (e.g higher costs of short term nancing, greater business uncer-
tainty or lower competition in intermediate input markets) will lower measured
TFP. Once again, this e¤ect is stronger the higher the weight of intermediate
inputs 1 : For example, imagine as in Arellano et als (2012)[12] labour wedge
model that purchases of intermediate inputs must be decided before gaining full
knowledge of a rms idiosyncratic demand or TFP. Suppose also that these
purchases must be paid for before getting any revenue and they must there-
fore be nanced through short term nancial loans or trade credit, subject to
costly default. In this case higher idiosyncratic uncertainty, or a signal of higher
idiosyncratic uncertainty would discourage the purchase of intermediate inputs.
From the perspective of a model without heterogeneity this would map into a
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higher wedge on intermediate inputs 1 + x;t: From the perspective of a value
added production function this would amount to a reduction in TFP.
These mechanisms amplify common shocks hitting most sectors simultane-
ously. A plausible value for  is 0:5; yielding a multiplier of 2 (Jones (2011)
[115]): Jones shows how this multiplier helps explain long run income di¤erences
between rich and poor countries with reasonable shares of capital in production.
33 His arguments can also be applied to the amplication of TFP shocks. Hor-
vath (2000) [107] explores the possibility that shocks to a single sector may
propagate through the input-output structure to generate an aggregate TFP
shock. He nds that for the input-output structure of the US economy, sec-
toral shocks can be a signicant source of uctuations. Key to this result is to
have several critical sectors whose outputs are important inputs into most other
sectorsproduction.
10 Search frictions in labour markets
Here we allow for search frictions in labour labour markets. This can be seen as
a possible microfoundation for labour adjustment costs. We reinterpret labour
demand as employment times a xed number of hours h; or we can imagine
there are part time jobs as well with hours h0 < h; and the cost of posting a
vacancy is lower for part time work by a factor of h
0
h
(full time and part time
jobs are perfect substitutes for the rm and for the representative household in
this interpretation). Without loss of generality normalise h = 1 and assume all
jobs are full time. To hire ndt hours the rm must post vacancies V
n
t that are
lled at a rate 'n;dt such that
ndt   ndt 1(1  n;t)  'nd;tV nt ; (ndt ).
V nt  0, (ndt );
0  'nd;t; n; t  1:
Posting vacancies costs FN (V nt ); with F
N
V n > 0; F
N
V nV n  0: nd;t is a sep-
aration rate taken as exogenous by the rm. For simplicity we assume these
costs only a¤ect production workers. Hiring mt does not incur extra costs. The
rms cash ow becomes
dt = g(Atmt; em;t)ztf(kt; Atnt)  wt(1 + nd;t)(nt +mt)  pkt (1 + k;t)[kt+1   (1  t)kt]
 FN (V nt ):
33He emphasizes that in the BGP, intermediate inputs are very similar to capital. In gen-
eral, the neoclassical growth model is capable of accounting for large cross-country income
di¤erences with small di¤erences in physical capital investment rates if the share of overall
tangible and intangible capital or of capital and intermediate inputs is around 2/3.  = 0:5
delivers this share. See also Parente and Prescott (1999) [153] who make similar argument by
appealing to di¤erences in intagible capital between countries. Once again, lower productivity
reduces intangible capital investment, which reduces the TFP of physical capital and labour
even more. The 2 theories are complementary in terms of explaining large income per capita
di¤erences with plausible di¤erences in production e¢ ciency.
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Note that if the vacancy posting constraint binds we can rewrite cash ows
as
dt = g(Atmt; em;t)ztf(kt; Atnt)  wt(1 + nd;t)(nt +mt)  pkt (1 + k;t)[kt+1   (1  t)kt]
 FN

ndt   ndt 1(1  n;t)
'nd;t

:
This expression emphasizes that these search frictions are similar to other
forms of labour adjustment costs. An increase in the vacancy lling rate 'nd;t
acts like a reduction in these adjustment costs. More generally, we modify the
rst order condition for ndt and add an optimality condition for vacancies:
ndt : gtztfn;t + Et
ft+1
ft
ndt+1(1  n;t+1) = wt(1 + nd;t) + ndt :
V nt : F
N
V Nt
= ndt 'nd;t + 
nd
t :
Combining these 2 equations when vacancies are positive now and in the
future,
ndt : gtztfn;t + Et
f;t+1
f;t
FN
V Nt+1
'nd;t+1
(1  n;t+1) = wt(1 + nd;t) +
FNV nr
'nd;t
:
The interpretation of this rst order condition is similar to that of other
labour demand models with continuous labour adjustment costs. The marginal
cost of employment is increased by cost of posting new vacancies, but it is
reduced by the saving in terms of lower future vacancy costs. There are several
new factors a¤ecting labour demand with search frictions. First, an increase
in the vacancy lling rate 'nd;t reduces the cost of hiring and increases labour
demand. Second, iterating foreward and using the boundedness of FNVn
gtztfn;t + Et
1
j=0
j
k=0
f;t+1+k
f;t+k
(1  n;t+k)(gt+1+jzt+1+jfn;t+1+j   wt+1+j(1 + nd;t+1+j))
=
FNV nr
'nd;t
+ wt(1 + nd;t);()
gtztfn;t + Et
1
j=0
j
k=0
1
Rt+1+kefpe;t+1+k
(1  n;t+k)(gt+1+jzt+1+jfn;t+1+j   wt+1+j(1 + nd;t+1+j))
' F
N
V nr
'nd;t
+ wt(1 + nd;t):
With adjustment costs, the rm earns extra rents and the discounted value
of marginal prots per employee
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gtztfn;t wt(1+nd;t)+Et1j=0jk=0
f;t+1+k
f;t+k
(1 n;t+k)(gt+1+jzt+1+jfn;t+1+j wt+1+j(1+nd;t+1+j)) > 0:
:An increase in the future marginal prots per employee, or in the rms discount
factor used to value future prots raises the marginal benet of hiring workers.
This raises labour demand. Similarly, a reduction in future external nance
premia of the rm or in risk free interest rates raises labour demand.
On the household, side, we assume a simple search process with an exogenous
matching rate, so that in order to match with nt the representative household
must expand a search e¤ort ens;t to nd new jobs for its members at a rate of
'ns;t, so that
ns;t   (1  n;t)ns;t 1  'ns;tens;t; nst
This holds as an equality in equilibrium. Search e¤ort has a disutility cost of
ans;tens;t; modifying the utility function to
v(c; l; ens) = u(c; l)  ans;tens;t:
The labour supply optimality conditions for this model are
ul;t = twt(1  ns;t)  nst + Et
t+1
t
nst+1(1  n;t+1);
an;t = 
ns
t 'ns;t:
Combining these conditions leads to a new labour supply equation taking into
account search costs:
ul;t +
an;t
'ns;t
= twt(1  ns;t) + Et
t+1
t
an;t + 1
'ns;t+1
(1  n;t+1):
The marginal disutility of labour now includes the cost of searching for jobs.
On the other side of the equation, searching for a job now has the extra benet
of reducing future search costs. Comparative statics are quite straightforward.
For example an increase in the job nding rate 'ns;t reduces the labour supply
wedge and raises job search.
Normalising the number of households to 1 as before, aggregate consistency
requires
ns;t = nd;t:
That is the number of jobs successfully found by households must equal the
number of jobs succesfuly lled by rms. Closing the model requires us to
specify more details on either the wage formation process or the matching rates
'ns; 'nd: For example, we could specify exogenous matching rates, and solve the
equilibrium for wages ensuring that aggregate consistency holds. This would be
similar to a Walrasian, market clearing, equilibrium extended to allow for job
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rationing (see for example Krusell et al, 2012). More realistically perhaps, we
can follow the typical specication in matching models of labour markets and
use some combination of Nash bargaining, perhaps with some wage adjustment
costs (e.g Shimer, 2009 [161]). Assuming that the householdssearch e¤ort is in
terms of their utility function, the aggregate resource constraint of the economy
with search frictions is
ct + It = yt   FN (V nt ) = GDPt:
10.1 Involuntary unemployment
The addition of search frictions to the job nding process allows us to account for
the distinction between voluntary and involuntary unemployment. In the classic
RBC model the job nding rate 'ns;t = 1: There is unemployment because some
potential workersreservation wage is above their e¢ ciency units ajusted market
wage "j;twt > 0: But in theory those who are unemployed could always nd a
job with a lower but still positive wage. A qualied job seeker could nd a
less qualifed or less pleasant job, but at his reservation wage he prefers to keep
on looking for a better job. This "voluntary" unemployment is well captured
in standard DSGE models with indivisible labour but without explicit search
frictions. In this theory, unemployment went above 20% in the Great depression
in the US or in Spain during the great recession of 2008, because the wages that
would be o¤ered to those who ended up unemployed was too low to make it
worthwhile for them to work.
With the job nding rate 'ns;t < 1; unemployment is "involuntary", in the
sense that the job seeker may stay unemployed because he cannot nd any work
opportunities with a wage above zero. For example, the more highly skilled
worker may have trouble in nding a less qualied job, even if he wanted to,
because he is considered overqualied and unlikely to be productive in a less
skilled job. Voluntary unemployment can be thought of as coming from the
fundamental calculus of whether or not working is desirable given job condi-
tions compared to the benets of unemployment. Involuntary unemployment is
associated with genuine ine¢ ciency in the labour market in terms of matching
workers and jobs, similar to a productivity shock in the matching function.
10.2 Search frictions and the labour wedge
Search frictions in labour market are often seen as a prime candidate for ex-
plaining uctuations in the labour wedge. Formally, we can rewrite the rst
order conditions in the costly vacancy model as
gtztfn;t
wt
= (1 + nd;t) +
FNV nr
'nd;twt
  Et
f;t+1
f;t
FN
V Nt+1
'nd;t+1wt
(1  n;t+1) = 1 + ~nd;t:
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Search frictions add the term
FNV nr
'nd;twt
 Et f;t+1f;t
FN
VN
t+1
'nd;twt
(1  n;t+1) to the labour
demand wedge: This shows, that search frictions increase the labour demand
wedge in a recession if the vacancy lling rate is lower or if the marginal cost of
posting a vacancy is higher at time t. The marginal cost of posting a vacancy
is often assumed constant or increasing in the number of vacancies. This tends
to reduce the labour demand wedge in a recession, as the number of vacancies
declines. The vacancy lling rate also tends to increase in most recessions, as
the pool of unemployed people increases. Again, this makes the contribution of
search frictions to the labour wedge procyclical.
Shimer (2009) [161] argues that search frictions per se act like procyclical
labour wedges (essentially because search frictions are a form of labour ad-
justment costs), and are therefore incapable of explaining the signicant coun-
tercyclical labour wedges in the data. He emphasizes real wage rigidity as a
possible cause of countercyclical labour wedges with search frictions. Note that
he reaches this conclusion assuming front-loaded TFP shocks. For news shocks,
labour adjustment costs (and therefore search frictions) may stimulate labour
demand in advance of a positive shock, acting like a countercyclical labour
wedge. This can be seen in the equation above by noting that
FN
VN
t+1
'nd;t+1wt
enters
the labour wedge with a negative sign. Consider a positive news shocks that
leads to an increase in future vacancy postings. A future increase in the mar-
ginal cost of posting vacancies relative to the current cost encourages rms to
post vacancies earlier. Similarly a lower probability of lling a vacancy in the
future relative to the current period encourages hiring now rather than later
(see also Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) [113]).
Several other mechanisms have been proposed for amplifying labour wedge
movements through search frictions. More realistic recruitment costs with xed
components can amplify unemployment uctuations, generating what looks like
higher labour wedges in a recession (Pissaride (2009) [154]). Petrosky-Nadeau
(2009) and Chugh (2009) add nancing frictions a¤ecting recruitment costs to
search and matching DSGE models. They nd that these nancing frictions
have signicant potential to explain labour wedges. Both of these factors can
be mapped into our model as more countercyclical marginal costs of posting
vacancies FV nt : The matching process can be less e¢ cient in a recession, for
example if a higher proportion of vacancies is posted for harder to match skilled
workers.
Hall (2014) [105] nds that matching became signicantly less e¢ cient during
the great recession of 2008, contributing signicantly to the rise in unemploy-
ment in the US. Cheremukhin et al (2012) augment a standard RBC model with
search frictions by adding worker bargaining power, separation and matching
e¢ ciency shocks. They nd that matching e¢ ciency shocks are responsible for
much of the labour wedge in the US. Finally, matching frictions can lead to
119
higher uctuations in the labour wedge through shifts in the rms discount
factor
f;t+1
f;t
: Essentially, with labour adjustment costs hiring decisions become
similar to investment decisions. A fall in the discount factor (e.g due to a
higher rm external nance premium efpe;t+1) lowers the value of future prof-
its from hiring workers, and reduces labour demand (see Hall (2014) [105] for
an elaboration on this e¤ect and a quantitative exercise that shows its potential
importance in the 2008 nancial crisis and the ensuing Great Recession).
11 An explicit mapping between credit frictions,
imperfect competition frictions and distor-
tionnary wedges
Here, we provide an example of how nancing and market power frictions show
up as wedges in a neoclassical growth model. We start by imagining that rms
and households in the product, labour, intermediate input and investment goods
markets must nance a proportion 0 < al;t  1 of their expenditure using
intratemporal loans, where l = c;D; nd; k; x: Because the loans are intratemporal
, they cancel out inside the representative households budget constraint 34 . The
intratemporal nature of the loans also means that the initial gross interest rate
is 1; but due to nancing frictions there is an extra proportional cost to the loan
leading to an overall repayment of Rl;tLl;t  Ll;t:
We can think of these intratemporal loans as very short term loans for which
the benchmark risk free interest has almost no e¤ect, and the overwhelming com-
ponent of the nancing cost comes from external nancing spreads or from the
shadow cost of credit constraints (the Lagrange multipliers). Most of the credit
card debt, lines of credit, commercial paper and trade credit can be treated in
this way. We keep assuming that the costs are rebated to households through
lump-sum taxes: in other words the nancing cost is in the form of a Lagrange
multiplier on a credit constraint or loss of resale value due to asymmetric infor-
mation in secondary loan markets than due to actual physical loan processing
costs.
Relative to an economy without distortions, a rm must now spend an ad-
34For the household intratemporal loans we have to introduce at least 2 types of households.
One group has to fund some of its consumption spending before getting any revenue using
intratemporal loans. To preserve aggregation into a single representative household, allow
households to trade consumption insurance contracts among themselves. Alternatively, with
Cobb-Douglas CRRA preferences but without consumption insurance, aggregation holds to
a rst order approximation just like for efph;t+1 (despite the fact that the c;t wedge also
a¤ects labour supply).
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ditional
ak;t(Rk;t   1)pk;t[kit+1   (1  )kit];
and;t(Rnd;t   1)wt(nt +mt);
ax;t(Rx;t   1)pxj;txji;t:
A household must now spend an additional ac;t(Rc;t   1)ct and ad;t(Rd;t  
1)xDt to acquire consumption goods.
Equating  l;t = al;t(Rl;t   1) for l = c;D; nd; k; x gives the relation between
changes in nancing costs and the wedges. It is immediate that higher nancing
costs lead to higher wedges. While here we have assume intratemporal loans for
simplicity, the e¤ects would be similar if we had intertemporal loans.
A simple mapping from imperfect competition to wedges can be obtained
using the standard Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition (as in Walsh
(2003) ch. 5 [173] and Gali (2007) , ch. 3 [90] ). This is the workhorse model
for much of the time varying markups and sticky prices literature. For each
sector l = c; k; x imagine there is a continuum of measure 1 of di¤erent goods
xl;j . What actually enters household utility and rm production functions is an
aggregate
Xl =
Z 1
0
x
l 1
l
l;j dj
 l
l 1
; l > 1:
 is the elasticity of substitution among goods, with higher l indicating
higher substitution and a more price elastic demand function (l;t !1 leads to
perfect substitutes). Each product variety is produced by a single monopolistic
producer from the nal good of the economy, where for simplicity we have
assumed a linear aggregator of sectoral nal output into aggregate GDP. The
only cost of producing the variety is the cost of purchasing the initial nal output
good. The prots of the producers go to the representative household. From
the rst order condition
pl;t =
l;t
l;t   1
pl;t
pl;t = pk;t; pD;t; fpxj;tg; 1:
The markup
l;t
l;t 1  1, and is decreasing in the elasticity of substitution l;t:
Equating 1 +  l;t =
l;t
l;t 1 for l = c;D; xj ; k we get a mapping from imperfect
competition markups to time varying wedges on consumption, durables and cap-
ital investment and intermediate inputs purchases. An increase in the markup
(lower competition) is equivalent to a higher wedge. Finally, we can combine
nancing and imperfect competition wedges, and we can allow for interactions
between the imperfect competition and nancing wedge components. for exam-
ple, higher costs of nancing usually reduce entry by new rms, investment in
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new retail locations or new product lines that o¤er substitutes to existing prod-
ucts, and investment in advertising that can improve buyer information about
substitute products. Through all of these channels higher nancing shocks can
reduce competition and increase markups.
Finally our mapping of nancing frictions into wedges raises important ques-
tions on the identication of the e¤ects of changes in nancing supply conditions
from changes in the demand for nancing due to shifts in condence, expecta-
tions or uncertainty. Recall how these expectations shocks can also be mapped
into the same wedges. Recall also the di¢ culties we had in distinguishing be-
tween increases in the householdsexternal nance premium and in the desire
for precautionary saving for households that did not participate in the stock
market or that owned rms. This suggests that without a specic link between
the statistical processes for wedges and nancial variables such as credit spreads
or credit conditions indices or without further theoretical restrictions from more
explicit models of frictions, it is quite di¢ cult to separate nancial shocks from
expectations or uncertainty shocks.
11.1 The relation between heterogeneous nancing wedges
on production inputs and TFP shocks
Several papers have found an important e¤ect of negative nancial shocks in
lowering aggregate TFP when rms are heterogeneous (e.g Buera and Moll
(2012)[35], Khan and Thomas (2013) [123], Bloom et al (2012)[34]). Here we
illustrate this e¤ect in a simple context. Consider an economy with a measure 1
of potentially heterogeneous rms indexed by i that use the production function
yi = zf(

xik
	
k=1;;K
);
where f() is concave, z is a common TFP level and each xk is a produc-
tion input that can be adjusted exibly inside the period (for example labour,
materials or intermediate goods).
Each rm picks

xik
	
to maximise prots
i = yi   k(1 +  ixk)pxkxik:
The rst order conditions for this problem are of the form
zfx;ik = (1 + 
i
xk)pxk
Comparing two rms i and j we see that
fx;ik
fx;jk
=
1 +  ixk
1 +  jxk
:
For most commonly used production functions (e.g the CES production func-
tion), this relation implies that x
i
k
xjk
is decreasing in the relative wedge 1+
i
xk
1+jxk
:
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We assume this relation holds for the rest of this section. Suppose at t = 0; the
wedges  ixk = xk are common across rms. By the concavity of the production
function, all rms then make the same input choices. At t = 1 a nancial shock
raises the cost of nancing disproportionately for some rms so the dispersion
of the wedges increases in the cross-section of rms. Consider the e¤ect of rais-
ing the dispersion of the wedges for some of the inputs xik while holding the
total aggregate demand xk =
R
i
xikdi for each production input constant. The
higher dispersion in the wedges increases dispersion in the demand for inputs.
By Jensens inequality aggregate output at t = 0 will be higher at t = 1 :
y0 =
Z
i
yi0di = zf(fxkgk) > z
Z
i
f(

xik;1
	
k
)di =
R
i
f(
n
xik;1
o
k
)di
f(fxkgk)
zf(fxkgk) = y1;
)
R
i
f(
n
xik;1
o
k
)di
f(fxkgk)
< 1:
Dening aggregate TFP as z =
R
i
f(fxik;1gk)di
f(fxkgk) z; we see that the rising dis-
persion in nancing frictions a¤ecting rms reduces aggregate TFP. So from
the perspective of a model with a singly representative rm a nancial shock
that disproportionately worsens credit conditions for a subset of rms will look
like a loss in the production e¢ ciency of the economy. Other authors such as
Khan and Thomas (2013) [123] and Buera and Moll (2012) [35] focus instead
on aggregate TFP losses caused by misallocation of capital in response to a
nancial shock. But the general idea is the same: higher nancing frictions
typically increase the dispersion of marginal products of production inputs in
the cross section of rms. With diminishing marginal productivity this leads to
lower aggregate production for a given aggregate amount of production inputs:
in other words aggregate TFP declines.
12 Bringing the DSGE model to the data
Our analysis so far constitutes a relatively complete example of a DSGE model
of the economy. Here we discuss a potential setup for estimating and using such
a DSGE model for policy analysis and private sector forecasting or scenario
analysis (conditional forecasting). The following setup is inspired by Caldara et
al (2012)[40], and Schorfheide et al (2009)[159]. For convenience we repeat the
standard state space representation of a solution to a DSGE model,
st+1 = g(st; et+1);
yt = h(st):
We partition the state vector st = [kt;  t] where kt are variables that are
always endogenous states, and  t are wedges.
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The business cycle accounting framework (e.g Chari et al (2007)[50]) as-
sumes that  t follow exogenous processes. It emphasizes that there is no reason
to expect these wedges to be independent as assumed in many policy DSGE
models (e.g Smets and Wouters (2007) [164]). For example, a loss of condence
in nancial market can a¤ect labour wedges nd;t and ns;t, e¢ ciency wedges
zt; em;t; investment wedges kt; D;t and consumption wedges  c;t; efph;t+1 si-
multaneously. In general we should allow  t to depend on kt; so  t is no longer
part of the minimal state vector. For example higher output (which is partly a
function of kt) can reduce nancing costs through a nancial accelerator e¤ect.
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Without any further restrictions, we are faced with the possibility of ar-
bitrary patterns of contemporaneous and dynamic correlations between the
wedges  t. This situation can easily generate identication and estimation
problems. A possible solution is, following Caldara et al (2012)[40], to link
the wedges to a set of more fundamental truly structural factors Ft: For exam-
ple, Ft could represent a fundamental change in business condence or nancial
markets beliefs about certain assetsquality, or to go even deeper some common
news or condence factor that generates both higher business and household
uncertainty and higher asymmetric information in nancial markets. This leads
to a system of the form
kt+1 = g(kt;  t; e
k
t+1);
yt = h(kt;  t);
 t = (kt; Ft; e

t );
Ft+1 = (Ft; e
F
t+1);
et ; e
F
t v IID shocks.
The key simplication in this structure is that the dimension of Ft can
be signicantly lower than that of  t: Furthermore, if Ft truly contains only
structural shocks we can assume its elements are orthogonal to each other,
simplifying estimation. We can turn this into a state-space system in ~st = [kt;Ft]
by substituting out the equations for  t:
We allow for extra randomeness et in the  t equations to avoid the stochastic
singularity that occurs when the number of observables exceeds the number of
shocks. Stochastic singularity means that certain linear combinations of yt are
deterministic according to the model, making it impossible to dene a likelihood
function for the data (since the model is automatically falsied by any data set
violating the deterministic linear combination). This can be avoided by having
35An interesting example of wedges that are functions of other states or other endogenous
variables can be found in the scal policy DSGE litterature (e.g Leeper et al (JE2010)), where
tax rates are allowed to respond to variables such as the past stock of government debt or
current gdp.
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at least one "tax" wedge for each quantity variable and one cost or productivity
shock associated with each price variable, and allowing each  t component to
have a stochastic error term et . Alternatively, we can add measurement errors
to the observables or embed the DSGE model into a hybrid semi-structural
model. This is discussed in greater detail in the next section.
So far DSGE modelers have typically not dedicated enough attention to the
possibility of richer correlation and feedback patterns among the shocks. The
best specication of the path of the shocks has also been underexplored, with
excessive reliance on AR(1) processes, even though there is evidence that mov-
ing average components can signicantly improve model t and the economic
interpretation of the shocks (Leeper and Walker (2010) [135]). In particular
MA(q) components can capture some e¤ects of the gradual di¤usion of shocks
or information about shocks, making it easier to generate more realistic hump-
shaped dynamics for GDP and its components. For example the process with
correlated news (discussed in the section on news shocks)
zt = zt 1 +
q
j=0
j"t j
can generate more realistic dynamics while only adding a single parameter
 to estimate relative to the typical AR(1) process.
A useful source of priors on the parameters of (:) are macroeconomic mod-
els with more detailed frictions, such as heterogenous agent models or more
generally models with more explicit credit constraints. For example we can es-
timate the parameters of (:) on simulated data from an auxiliary model with
credit frictions. Because the sample is simulated, it can be much longer than a
real world sample and we can treat kt as observed, allowing much better iden-
tication of the parameters of (:). The estimates on simulated data will not
be converge to the population estimates of the parameters in the representa-
tive agent model, since the heterogenous agent model will typically omit other
frictions and shocks that are part of the representative agent model. But the es-
timates from simulated data should be useful in generating priors for estimating
(:):
Formally, we have a set of auxiliary models dened by
sm;t+1 = gm(sm;t) + "mt;
ym;t = hm(sm;t) + vm;t:

m=1;;;M
As long as the the auxiliary model variables (ym;t; sm;t) include (yt; st) from
our core DSGE model, we can form the wedges  t using simulated data from the
auxiliary model. We can use these simulation based m;t to estimate a process
for the wedges, e.g using OLS.
Caldara et al (2012)[40] suggest we pick parameters in the process for  t
to minimise the distance between the IRFs in response to eFt in the main
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DSGE model and the auxiliary model. They simplify estimation with a 2 step
approach. In the 1st step, they estimate parameters that are not related to the
wedge processes by Bayesian methods under the assumption that the wedges are
independent of each other, and follow simple ARMA(p,q) processes as in typical
DSGE models. In the 2nd stage they reestimate parameters  of the  t process
to minimise the distance between model IRFs and those from auxiliary models
that contain Ft in response to an eFt shock, while keeping the other parameters at
their estimated value from the the 1st stage. Formally we dene the IRF vector
in our main model for the jth shock eFj;t IRFt = (
dyt
deFj;t
:::; dyt+k
deFj;t
; :::): IRFmt is
dened in a similar way for the auxiliary model m: Then using some weighting
matrix W (e.g the identity matrix), we pick the parameters  for the process
 t to minimise the quadratic distance
(IRFt   IRFmt )TW (IRFt   IRFmt ):
For example, we can estimate the e¤ect of credit shocks on the TFP and invest-
ment or vf;t+1vf;t wedges by matching IRFs in response to a credit shock in the
Khan and Thomas (2013) [123] model.
More generally, the suite of auxiliary models m = 1; :::M can include other
DSGEmodels, structural partial equilibrium models as in Strebulaev andWhited
(2012) [6], and reduced form/time series models such as ARMAX or VARs. We
can use a combination of shocks to the wedges in our DSGE model to mimic a
weighted average of the response from the auxiliary models either by picking 
as in Caldara et al (2012) [40]. Or we can follow the more traditional approach
of estimating independent ARMA(p,q) processes for the components of  as
part of the main DSGE estimation, and then nding a sequence of shocks to  t
that mimic the IRFs of the auxiliary models. Formally, we use standard DSGE
estimation methods to estimate a process
ln  t   ln  =  (ln  t 1   ln ) + et
, where  is a diagonal matrix, and we focus on AR(1) shock processes without
loss of generality. Then, we pick a sequence of shocks (et :::e

t+k:::) to minimise
(IRFt   IRFmt )TW (IRFt   IRFmt ):
Note that in this procedure the parameters of the wedge processes  are re-
placed by realisations of the shocks to the wedges et+k: Both approaches allow us
to adjust DSGE model forecasts to account for shocks and transmission mech-
anisms that are not formally part of our DSGE. The reader is referred to the
documentation of Bank of Englands new forecasting and policy analysis system
(2013) [39] for a detailed discussion of these issues.
We will typically not be able to include all the variables of interest to a
decision maker in yt due to computational constraints. For example, the model
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may not distinguish between residential investment and other durable goods or
between equipment and structures business investment. Or it may be missing a
distinction between unemployed and out of the labour force. Call the unmod-
elled variables zt: Schorfheide et al (2009)[159] suggest that after solving and
estimating the model specied above, we estimate equations linking zt to ~st as
a reduced form
zt = l(~st; e
z
t ):
The last equations su¤er from many of the same aws as the old style macro-
economic models from the 1970s. They ignore potentially important cross-
equation restrictions. However, by using the states ~st as regressors we have
a better chance of avoiding Sims(1980)[162] critique of the older models for
having "incredible" identifying restrictions . In fact, under our assumed DSGE
data generating process the equation above is immune to endogeneity bias. So
we do not need to nd instruments, that are often unreliable for the typical
macroeconomic sample size. Given the estimation of the DSGE model, the aux-
iliary equations for zt are also easy to estimate if l(:) is linear, involving nothing
more than OLS.
Relative to older simultaneous equations,"structural", macroeconomic mod-
els these equations for zt are more robust to regime changes or uncertainty about
the values of structural parameters(they are less subject to the Lucas critique).
For example, suppose there is a fundamental shift in policy that is not accounted
for in the standard policy reaction functions. After re-solving the DSGE model
to account for the regime change, we can reestimate the l(:) functions linking zt
to the states on simulated data from the new DSGE system to take into account
the e¤ect of the new regime on the dynamics of zt: A similar technique applies
in parameter scenarios in which we examine the robustness of our forecasts and
analysis to alternative parameter values. 36 In some contexts we may also be
interested in the more exible specication
zt = a~st + zt 1 + ezt :
This amounts to an ARMAX model where the Xs are estimates of the DSGE
state vector.
12.1 Semi structural, hybrid DSGE-VARMAX models
Here I discuss several hybrid models combining the higher theoretical coherence
and economic interpretability of DSGE models with more exible time series
models that may improve short run forecasting and the statistical t of the
overall model. The idea of hybrid models is to nest a DSGE core within a more
exible, less restricted model. The strength of the DSGE based restrictions can
36Traditional simultaneous equations macroeconomic models that do not relate reduced
form parameters to "deep" parameters cannot be adjusted this way.
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be varied depending on the objective. For example, we can have looser restric-
tions for unconditional forecasts, while imposing the DSGE restrictions more
tightly to forecast the e¤ect of specic shocks - i.e. for conditional forecasting.
The best model in terms of unconditional forecasting and in terms of matching
the data typically involves partial incorporation of the DSGE restrictions. But
for conditional forecasting, imposing DSGE restrictions more tightly can help
with the identication of various scenarios and shocks.
The reduced form time series components of these hybrid models can be
reestimated more frequently than DSGE models, allowing a faster incorporation
of breaks in the DGP into forecasts. These models also allow easier incorporation
of new shock propagation and amplication channels than the wedge based
approach in the previous section. This is mainly because we do not use the
information in estimating the new parameters to improve the estimates of the
state vector process st: The cost of these approaches is related to the same
point. Since the estimation of the state vector is separate, we are not using all
the information that could help improve our knowledge of st:
A prominent example of this class of models is the DSGE-VAR framework
of Del Negro et al (2004)[150]. Their main idea is to improve the accuracy of
Bayesian Vector Autoregression (BVAR) forecasts by using priors based on a
DSGE model. To accomplish this, we start with a linear projection of the VAR
yt = Ayt 1 + vt:
on the DSGE data generating process (where we have assumed a VAR(1) for
simplicity). This gives us a prior A0 for the estimation of the BVAR in the
2nd stage. For example, one could simulate j = 1:::S long samples of the
DSGE model under di¤erent parameter vectors from the posterior distribution.
For each sample j we can estimate the VAR. This produces distribution for
the VAR parameters based on the DSGE model, which can be used as a prior
distribution for the VAR. Intuitively, the procedure is equivalent to increasing
the sample size available for the estimation of the VAR by augmenting the
original real world sample with articial observations coming from a simulation
of the DSGE model. A higher number of simulated DSGE based observations
amounts to putting more prior weight on the DSGE prior A0:
The original DSGE-VAR framework uses a time series model which is not the
same as that of the original DSGE state space model. The DSGE model in its
linearized approximation amounts to a VAR in the state variables. Conditioning
on the actual DSGE state variables may improve our forecasts (Fernandez de
Cordoba and Torres (2011)). The problem from the perspective of a simple VAR
estimation is that part of the DSGE state vector is unobserved. But we can use
the estimation of the DSGE model to recover estimates of the unobserved DSGE
state vector
stjT = E(stjyT );
where yT = y1; :::; yT
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is the real world sample of observed variables. Now we can estimate the
DSGE-VARX model
yt = Ayt 1 +Bst + vt;
st = Cst 1 + et;
replacing the unobserved st with stjT : As before we can use priors from the
DSGE model, setting A0 to 0 and B0; C0 to the corresponding matrix from the
DSGE equations
yt = gst;
st = fst 1 + et:
For observed variables zt that were not part of the DSGE model we can again
use the methods of Schorfheide et al (2009)[159]. The DSGE-VARX model is
similar to the factor augmented VAR model (Reichlin et al (2008)), with DSGE
model states acting as factors. In both cases the idea is similar: we can improve
the forecasting performance of a low dimension VAR and improve the ability to
conduct conditional forecasting/scenario analysis by including a small number
of key factors or state variables that drive other variables in the economy.
If we substitute out the state variables in the equations for yt we can rewrite
the DSGE-VARX as
yt = Ayt 1 +Dst 1 + ut;
st = Cst 1 + et;
D = BC; ut = Bet + vt:
This is DSGE-VAR in zt = (yt; st): If we use stjT as an estimate of the
unobserved state variables, we can apply the same methods as Del Negro and
Schorfheide (2004) [150] to estimate this system. Finally, the DSGE-VARX
model is closely linked to the core/non core models approach used for example
by the BoE (Harrison et al (2005)). The core model is a standard DSGE model.
The actual forecast for variables of interest is
yt = ay
core
t + bxt + cyt 1 + vt;
where xt is a set of other explanatory variables that are not part of the
DSGE model. Note that this is essentially an augmented DSGE-VARX with
some extra explanatory X variables and degenerate priors for the coe¢ cients on
st matrix B: The common practice of combining DSGE model forecasts ycoret
with those from another reduced form time series model ynct , setting
yt = y
core
t + (1  )ynct ;
0 <  < 1;
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can also be cast as a special case of the core/non core framework. Also note
that we can rewrite the last equation as
yt = y
nc
t + (y
core
t   ynct );
which is similar to the popular error correction (ECM) model. The di¤erence
compared to the usual ECM is that in the core/non core approach the analyst
puts more e¤ort into modelling the target value ycoret as a dynamic variable that
can also change signicantly in the short run.
12.2 A comparison to Keynesian structural equation mod-
els and structural VARs
Old style "structural" macroeconomic models, otherwise known as macroeco-
nomic Structural Equations Models (SEM), are still common in the private
sector and in some policy applications (e.g WEFA-DRI, Moodys Analytics,
Macro Advisers, CBO, OECD). Despite their "structural" label, these models
are closer to reduced form models than DSGE models, in the sense of directly
specifying economic relations without trying to derive them directly from beliefs,
preferences and constraints of agents.
The SEMs in their typical linear form can be seen as a form of structural
VAR. Consider the dynamic SEM
Ayt = Byt 1 + et:
, where the shocks in et are uncorrelated among themselves.This can be
turned into the reduced form VAR
yt = A
 1Byt 1 +A 1et
By imposing restrictions on A; SEMs can identify and estimate certain struc-
tural relations such as the e¤ect of household income on consumption. In reverse,
taking the VAR
yt = Cyt 1 + vt;
the SVAR litterature tries to identify uncorrelated shocks et with a better eco-
nomic/structural interpretation by rewriting the VAR as
yt = Cyt 1 +Det:
Multiplying this equation by D 1 we get the SEM
D 1yt = D 1Cyt 1 + et:
Setting A = D 1; we have found an equivalence between the SEM and
the SVAR. In SEM analysis we specify restrictions on A:Typically these are
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exclusion restrictions, setting certain coe¢ cients to zero. Sims (1980)[162]) has
argued that the theory underlying traditional SEMs is not strong enough to
justify these exclusion restrictions, making identication fragile. He pioneered
the SVAR approach as an alternative with more robust identfying restrictions.
In the SVAR approach, the analyst rst estimates the unrestricted VAR or a
Bayesian VAR with statistically motivated priors. This is the model that is used
for short term unconditional forecasting. For scenario and policy analysis, the
VAR is then further restricted by putting more structure on D:
For example, a common strategy is to assume a lag in the response of cer-
tain residuals in vt to some of the components in et: This is called recursive
identication (Killian, 2013 [125]). Consider the bivariate system
zt = Azyt 1 + vz;t;
xt = Axyt 1 + vx;t;
yt = (zt;xt) ; which can be written as
yt = Ayt 1 + vt:
A structural decomposition of the shocks yields
vt = Det;
et = (ezt ; ex;t); Eee
0 = I:
We are interested in the impact of the impact of a structural shock ex;t (for
example xt could be a monetary policy tool such as a short run interest rate, or
it could be an index of credit condition, in which case ex;t is a credit shock). A
common assumption is that
D =

Dzz 0
Dzx Dxx

Identication comes from assuming that zt does not initially respond to a
shock to xt : Dxz = 0: This allows to identify ez;t. Since this component of et
is now observable, we can now identify the e¤ect of ex;t on xt e.g through OLS.
The e¤ect on zt just involves simulating the VAR using our estimates of A and
D:
How plausible is the assumption that Dxz = 0? In many cases it is actually
quite restrictive. For example there is no reason to assume that shocks credit
conditions or interest rate conditions dont a¤ect GDP or investment inside the
quarter. Certainly, it is hard to justify this assumption in a DSGE model. This
example shows the promise and limitations that are common in SVAR analysis.
On one hand, we want to let "the data speak "by imposing minimal plausible
restrictions. On the other hand, such restrictions are hard to nd.
SEMs and SVARs have similar advantages and disadvantages relative to
DSGE models. They are more data driven and less restricted, with the SVAR
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being less restricted than the SEM. This can improve unconditional forecasting
especially in the short -term, but it may reduce the ability to answer certain
questions that require more economic theory based identifying restrictions, such
as the e¤ect of certain shocks or changes in economic regimes and institutions.
In general, there is a tradeo¤ in which imposing less economic structure on
models can improve forecasting and , but may reduce the reliability of scenario
and policy analysis which require a better understanding of the structure of the
economy.
In the previous section we took the perspective of starting from a theoretical
DSGE analysis, and extending the theoretical structure with extra data-driven,
atheoretical, dynamics to improve the statistical t of the model to the actual
economy. Here, we proceed in the opposite direction by assuming the analyst
starts with an SVAR or a SEM. From this perspective, we discuss how more
theoretical DSGE analysis can enhance the SEM or SVAR.
First, DSGE models are better at distinguishing agentsexpectations about
the future from adjustment costs. In contrast in a SEM or SVAR it can be hard
to distinguish adjustment costs from the usually assumed backward looking ex-
pectations (though some models allow for rational expectations, especially in the
UK (e.g the NIGEM model)). In practice the adjustment costs in DSGE models
may not be structural: they may simply be proxies for adaptive expectations
or other forms of delays in absorbing information (e.g due to learning), but the
DSGE model should still have an advantage in identifying agents expectations
e¤ects on the economy.
Second, DSGE models suggest new variables that should enter into the macro
model and that should drive the dynamics, the state variables st: These typi-
cally include capital stocks and shock processes such as for TFP and business or
consumer condence. The DSGE state variables have better economic interpre-
tation than those in a SVAR. Furthermore, from the DSGE model perspective,
the correct linear approximation to the economy is
yt = Ayt 1 +Dst 1 + ut;
st = Cst 1 + et; :
SVARs and SEMs typically ignore st; setting D = 0: But omitting these extra
variables omitting can lead to signicant misspecication bias if the DSGE is a
reasonable approximation of key aspects of the economy (see for example Mac-
Grattan et al. (2008)[51] and Killian (2013) [125].The state variables or factors
driving the economy may be unobservable, but DSGE models can help estimate
them.These estimates can be incorporated into SVAR or SEM analysis through
the hybrid DSGE-VARX models discussed above, for example by adding the
state variablesin-sample estimates from a DSGE model into the estimation of
the SVAR or SEM.
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Third, DSGE models are distinguished by cross equation restrictions on coef-
cients that come from the imposition of aggregate consistency/market clearing
and rational expectations (RE). SEMs are less restricted in estimation. More
formally, taking the linearised DSGE model
yt = g()st;
st = f()st 1 + et:
the matrices g and f depend on a smaller number of structural parameters  that
a¤ect simultaneously the coe¢ cients across di¤erent equations. The SEM and
SVAR approaches typically do not impose such a link between the coe¢ cients
in di¤erent equations.
A smaller number of restrictions can improve unconditional forecasting if
the restrictions are misspecied. On the other hand a smaller number of re-
strictions is likely to generate more imprecise parameter estimates increasing
forecast error variance. In some cases the lack of cross equation restrictions
can even increase misspecication if the modelers respond to the large parame-
ter condence intervals in the unrestricted equation system by imposing more
zero restrictions based on t-statistics below a certain threshold value. More
generally, ignoring cross equation restrictions can lead to much wider con-
dence bands, encouraging users to ignore parameter uncertainty altogether. For
conditional forecasting, without cross equation restrictions the user could acci-
dentally change coe¢ cients in one equation (possibly setting it to zero) as a part
of scenario analysis while forgetting that the resulting change in the economic
structure would probably change the behaviour of other equations.
Fourth, DSGE models by denition are consistent in terms of satisfying
aggregate accounting constraints. Unconstrained SEMs or SVARs may vio-
late these constraints. DSGE models can suggest restrictions that improve the
aggregate consistency of SEMs or SVARs, or they can help investigate the
robustness of SEM/SVAR results to aggregate consistency requirements.
Finally DSGE models are useful in clarifying the medium and long run equi-
librium that SEMs dynamics are supposed to converge to over time. The typical
wage or price equation in a SEM is based on partial adjustment of prices in re-
sponse to a disequilibrium between supply and demand. A generic example of
this theory is to specify wages as
wt = w
0
t + (n
d
t   nst );
 > 0:
w0t is the wage level that would prevail in a competitive equilibrium with
nst = n
d
t :
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A complete derivation of the market clearing wot would require posing and
solving an RBC model. Most SEMs in operational use have a much simpler
underlying model of the exible price equilibrium. To the degree that move-
ments in the exible price equilibrium only matter in the long run, this may be a
reasonable simplication. But DSGE analysis suggests that exible price or po-
tential output can be quite volatile even in the short run. In that case, analysing
the RBC model underlying the exible price equilibrium should improve fore-
casting and scenario analysis. Again the DSGE predictions can be partially
incorporated into the analysis through hybrid models such as a DSGE-VAR or
the related partial adjustment or core/non core model
xt = x
sem
t + (x
dsge
t   xsemt );
0 <  < 1:
A key advantage of SEMs is that they are easier to solve and estimate than
DSGE models. This advantage has diminished signicantly for linear DSGE
models with current computer speeds and solution algorithms. Nonlinear DSGE
models are signicantly harder to handle, at least if we also want to estimate the
model. But traditional macroeconomic models are themselves linear, so they
cannot be directly compared to nonlinear DSGE models. Further increases in
computing power should make this increasingly a moot point, with nonlinear
models becoming more commonly used. Programs such Dynare have now made
simulation of calibrated nonlinear DSGE model approximations almost rou-
tine (using perturbation methods for now, though higher accuracy projection
methods are likely to become much faster in coming years with more recent de-
velopments in solution methods (e.g Judd et al (2011)) and greater accessibility
of multi core computers.
As for estimation, with modern computers linear DSGE model estimation
can be achieved reasonably well within the decision making cycle of a policy or
private sector consulting institution, as long as we do not insist on reestimating
the model every quarter (DSGE models are usually reestimated once a year).
But a model whose parameters change signicantly based on adding an extra
quarter of estimation is arguably highly misspecied, and the parameter reesti-
mates should be treated with caution, especially if the goal is to use this as a
structural model for scenario and policy analysis (as opposed to unconditional
short term forecasting).
13 A monetary structure underlying the cash-
less economy
The real business cycle model (and many of its New Keynesian o¤spring) have
been criticised for ignoring money. The description of the cashless economy
above is in fact compatible with the existence of money required for transactions,
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as long as the creation of that money is unrestricted (e.g. perfect electronic
private money). Suppose we add a constraint that says a part of expenditures
must be nanced by showing an evidence of available purchasing power either
through notes or electronic evidence using a bank card. Call the previously
cumulated stock of these (electronic) notes money, Mt. The cash in advance
constraint is
sc;tct(1 +  c;t) + sb;t(bt+1   bt)  Mt+1pmt
0  sc;t; sb;t  1:
sc;t or sb;t are often known as the velocity of money. Since money is required
in some transactions, it has a positive value in an equilibrium with trade. 37
The stock of money held by households during the period is
Mt+1 =Mt + T
m
t :
Perfectly competitive nancial intermediaries and the government create new
money pmt T
m
t on demand and distribute it to households for free. The budget
constraint of households is modied to
ct(1+ c;t)+bt+1+p
m
t Mt+1  btRtefph;t+pmt Mt+wt(1 nst)ns;t+dt+pmt Tmt +Tt,
Since the household knows that Mt+1 = Mt + Tmt ; this budget constraint
reduces to the previous one in the cashless economy. The cash in advance
constraint does not bind, and therefore the economy reduces to the Real Business
Cycle economy except that we have in parallel another asset called money and
a denition of ination. Without any further structure, the process for ination
is indeterminate. For example, we could determine expected ination in an
economy where the central bank exercises complete control over private sector
nominal short run interest rates and follows a an interest rate rule as in modern
New Keynesian models (e.g. Gali ch. 3 [90]). Alternatively, we can determine
ination in an environment where budget surpluses do not adjust to ensure
scal solvency of the government, but we exclude explicit government default.
In that case, if debt is nominal then the price level adjusts to ensure solvency
(see Cochrane (2005) [57] for more details on the scal theory of the price level).
How come we get such a radically di¤erent conclusion from the classical cash
in advance model as presented e.g. in Walsh ch. 3 (2003 )[173]? The key is
that the textbook cash in advance model assumes that Tmt is exogenous or that
households do not perceive any endogenous response of nancial institutions or
the government in adjusting Tmt to satisfy money demand Mt+1: Here,we have
the other extreme of completely endogenous inside money. The real world is
an intermediate case, but many would argue that the modern payments system
37Whether this must be a legal imposition or self fullling belief of agents that money is
acceptable as a proof of purchasing power in daily transactions while other assets are not is
not so important in the current setup. A legal requirement does eliminate the bad sunspot
equilibrium in which people believe money has no value and trade collapses.
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is much closer to the endogenous inside money case. Formal empirical inves-
tigation of the importance of imperfect payments systems for business cycles
is subject to big endogeneity problems. But if we do not think the cost of
electronic transactions relative to the use of paper currency is a major cause
of business cycles uctuations in householdsand rms desired expenditure or
an important factor in long run income di¤erences between countries, then it
follows that the cashless economy is a good approximation for our purposes. 38
13.1 Government versus private issued money, and seignior-
age
We can extend the model above to distinguish between private and govern-
ment money. This extension allows us to introduce the governments budget
constraint and to discuss the possibility of seigniorage, the revenue gain of the
government from issuing from nancing itself with interest free money instead
of bonds. Let Mpt+1 be private money and M
g
t+1 be government (central bank)
issued money. Unlike the private sector, we assume that the government uses
changes in its money supply to nance its spending (if government money supply
has a component that simply adjusts passively to demand like private money,
then Mgt+1 represents the portion of government money supply that is used as
a source of nancing). The governments budget constraint is
Sgt + b
g
t+1 + p
m
t (M
g
t+1  Mgt ) = btRgt ;
where bgt are government bonds and S
g
t is the governments primary surplus
(taxes minus non interest rate spending and transfers). Using for simplicity
38This statement suggests that the cashless economy model will be misleading in important
dimensions for economies with very high ination rates (for example Latin America in the
1980s, the former USSR in the early 1990s, Germany in the early 1920s). There is little
doubt that the transaction and information costs due to hyperinations cause signicant
economic damage. Intuitively, unless the money creation technology is completely exible
(e.g perfect electronic money creation), at very high levels of ination it becomes harder to
fulll the need for Mt: At this point cash in advance constraints may start to bind. At the
same time, the di¢ culty of determining the price level in the fully endogenous money economy
highlights the potential for high ination to emerge from self fullling prophecies. It is quite
possible that some if not most of the highest observed ination levels were not just a matter
of the government trying to raise seignorage revenue as in the standard analysis of seignorage,
but also caused by the money supply responding to peoples expectations of higher prices.
The completely endogenous money limit in can also be derived in models of price rigidities
due to search frictions as in Williamson and Wright (2010) [178]. First, one has to change the
timing of Arrow Debreu and Burdett-Judd markets in their model so that agents get to carry
Mt+1 into time t BJ market . Second one assumes as here that nancial intermediaries can
create new money on demand. In that case, we get a theory of price rigidity that matches
micro pricing facts well while preserving monetary neutrality and many of the conclusions of
RBC models.
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bt+1 = 0 for private sector bonds, the representative households budget con-
straint is now
ct(1 +  c;t) + b
g
t+1 + p
m
t [M
g
t+1 +M
p
t+1]  btRgt + pmt [Mgt +Mpt ] + wt(1  nst)ns;t + dt + pmt Tmt + Tt,
Mpt+1 = M
p
t + T
m
t :
39 The cash in advance constraint is
sc;tct(1 +  c;t) + sb;t(bt+1   bt)  [Mgt+1 +Mpt+1]pmt :
The rst order condition with respect to private money Mpt+1 still implies
that the cash in advance constraint does not bind: its Lagrange multiplier is
zero. Assuming an interior solution, the rst order condition for Mgt+1 and b
g
t+1
are
1 = Et
t+1t+1
tt
pmt+1
pmt
;
1 = Et
t+1t+1
tt
Rgt+1
This condition leads to a contradiction whenever Rgt+1 >
pmt+1
pmt
; implying
thatMgt+1 = 0 and seigniorage revenue is also zero. This is always the case with
nominal risk-free bonds and positive nominal interest rates. When nominal
interest rates are zero, money and safe nominal bonds are perfect substitutes.
In this case expansion in government money supply can reduce its reliance on
debt, but because the nominal interest rate is zero there is still no seigniorage
revenue. The situation is more complicated when government default risk has
reached levels that make even short run government debt risky, so that we
cannot take Rgt+1 out of the expectations in the rst order condition. However,
those situations are usually accompanied by signicant ination risk as well, in
which case the inequality EtR
g
t+1 > Et
pmt+1
pmt
is still quite likely to hold. Using
the standard covariance formula, Mgt+1 > 0 if and only if cov(
t+1t+1
tt
;
pmt+1
pmt
) >
cov(
t+1t+1
tt
; Rgt+1): A priori, there is no reason for the inverse of ination to
covary more with the stochastic discount factor than the real return on short
term government debt.
Of course, even governments in economies with highly advanced payments
systems obtain a small amount of seigniorage revenue, since no modern economy
is yet fully at the cashless limit (see Walsh [173], ch. 4). There could also be
some agents that are limited in their access to bond markets, for whom money
and bonds are not perfect substitutes as saving instruments. Those agents would
39Here we assume efph;t+1 = 1; otherwise we would have to explicitly introduce a wedge
in the representative households government bond Euler equation to capture the underlying
heterogeneity in the economy between households with positive and zero government bond
holdings.
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be willing to hold additional government money despite the lower rate of return.
In a modern nancial system, one would suspect this channel has limited quan-
titative e¤ects. Overall, the results above cast doubt on the possibility of using
seigniorage as a signicant funding source in modern economies. At the very
least they suggest that attempts to raise anything beyond rather small amounts
of seigniorage revenue are bound to lead to extremely high ination, which may
cause more damage to the economy than the problems higher seigniorage is
supposed to solve (see Reis (2013) [155]for a formal discussion of the limits to
the central banks ability to generate revenue in a modern economy, with an
application to central bank asset purchases and the lender of last resort role).
40
14 Phillips curve e¤ects with exible prices
The Phillips curve in its most basic form is a positive correlation between in-
ation and the level of economic activity. Recent data has put into question
the robustness of this relation (Uhlig (2011) [171]), and its ability to forecast
ination better than purely time series models such as a random walk has also
been subject to strong debate (Stock and Watson (2008)). In this section we
take the Phillips curve relation as given. The most popular explanation for the
Phillips curve is based on nominal price rigidity. We review that explanation in
a latter section, but for now it is worthwhile to ask if there are modications of
the exible price framework that can lead to a Phillips curve, or a similar rela-
tionship. I start with a simple mechanism that generates Phillips curve e¤ects
from the interaction of typical monetary policy rules, exible price real interest
rates generated by the RBC model and the Fisher relation linking nominal and
real interest rates. Suppose the central bank controls the nominal short run
interest rate and follows a Taylor rule linking the interest rate to output and
ination,
it+1 = ayt + bt;
a; b > 0:
Under rational expectations,
it+1 = rt+1 + Ett+1 + rp

t+1;
t+1 = Ett+1 + v

t+1:
40A government that is desperate for seignorage could restrict the payments system and
make it less e¢ cient on purpose in order to create binding cash in advance constraints. This
would allow it to increase its seignorage revenue, but such a policy of distorting payments
systems on purpose can cause signicant damage to the economy. At the very least, this
policy would have to be carefully evaluated in welfare terms before using it to raise government
funding.
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rpt+1 is an ination risk premium compensating investors for the ination risk of
non-indexed nominal bonds. A common approximation i the Fisher relation that
assumes we can ignore the ination risk premium and set rpt+1 = 0:Equating
the 2 equations under this assumption, we get that
t+1 = ayt + bt   rt+1   vt+1:
The equation above implies that ination will be positively related to lagged
output and past ination. While this "Phillips Curve" is quite di¤erent from
its New Keynesian counterpart, Dittmar et al (2005) show it provides a good
t to the data. In comparison to the tradional Keynesian sticky prices Phillips
curve, it provides quite a di¤erent interpretation of the response of ination to
shocks. In Keynesian analysis, a recession causes producers to respond by grad-
ually reducing nominal prices, causing a positive correlation between ination
and output. In the exible price "Phillips curve", central bank reductions in
the policy interest rate it+1 in response to a recession lead to lower ination
expectations and eventually lower ination if the equilibrium real interest rate
rt+1 declines by less than it+1:
Another explanation for the Phillips curve with exible prices relies on coun-
tercyclical demand for more liquid assets such as money. For simplicity we go
back to the RBC model without capital. We complicate the environment by as-
suming there are transaction costs in adjusting bond holding and by introducing
another nancial instrument that can be adjusted without any costs but yields
a lower rate of return Rmt < Rt. Call the second asset "money", or deposits.
The budget constraint of the representative household becomes
ct(1 +  c;t) + bt+1 + g(bt+1   bt) +Mt+1  btRtefph;t +MtRmt + wt(1  nst)ns;t + dt + Tt,
g0(:) > 0; g00(::) > 0:
The rst order conditions are modied by
bt+1 : t[(1 + g
0(bt+1   bt)] = Et
t+1
t
t+1[efph;t+1Rt+1 + g
0(bt+2   bt+1)]
Mt+1 : t = Et
t+1
t
t+1R
m
t+1:
Under certain conditions both money and bonds will be desired by house-
holds despite lower return on money. This is due to the lower transaction costs
of money relative to bonds. Most monetary models focus on outside money
issued by the government, but in modern developed economies this is probably
less relevant than inside money that is in zero net supply (keeping with our
closed economy, no government baseline). Note that this notion of money as
a liquid store of value, in the sense that there are no costs to changing your
net portfolio position mt+1  mt; is di¤erent from another common denition
in deep microfoundations models of money such as those in Williamson and
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Wright (2010) [178] or in more traditional cash in advance models. Those mod-
els dene money as an asset whose only value is from the possibility of resale:
i.e. it is a rational bubble which is compatible with transversality conditions
because it loosens credit constraints in some states of the world. 41 Here, we
do not have to appeal to a resale market. "Money" in our model has value
because of a guarantee of a private agent (e.g. a bank) to always make available
 (Mt+1  Mt) > 0 for other purposes to any household that desires to spend
that amount on other goods or assets. 42
In a monetary economy neither Rmt+1 nor Rt+1 are risk-free in real terms
anymore, because of ination risk. While this is potentially important, one
can understand many issues while ignoring this risk and using our certainty
equivalence approximation. This yields
t '
Ett+1
t
Ett+1EtR
m
t+1:
Dene the price of mt in terms of goods as pmt ; such that EtR
m
t+1 =
1
pmt
: The
price of goods in terms ofmt is pt = 1pmt : The ination level is
pt
pt 1
= 1+t:Using
the commonly used isoelastic utility function over consumption u(ct) =
c1 t
1  ;
we obtain
EtR
m
t+1 = pt '
t
Ett+1
t
Ett+1
' t
Ett+1

Etct+1
ct

; i.e.
pt ' t
Ett+1

Etyt+1
yt

:
This equation says that ceteris paribus ination increases with higher ex-
pected output, decreases with current output, increases with positive current
intertemporal shocks (either higher t or lower Ett+1). If a boom is associated
with a big increase in tt+1 ; which is a proxy for an aggregate demand shock,
and a gradual increase in output so that Etyt+1yt increases, well get higher ina-
tion as predicted by a classical Phillips curve. If the current increase in output
41 In modern economic theory a bubble is dened as any asset whose value exceeds the
buy and hold forever value. A bubble is rational to the degree that it emerges in a Rational
Expectations equilibrium. The pure at money studied in modern monetary theory can be
seen as the limit of a very long horizon zero coupon bond whose main value comes from the
possibility of resale to other agents. The transversality condition limits the growth rate of the
value of money, or equivalently the deation in the price of goods in terms of money.
42Ljunqvist and Sargent (2004) [137], chapter 17, have a similar interpretation of perfectly
liquid risk-free debt as inside money. Barlevy (2007) [18] has a particularly clear exposition
of money as a rational bubble, and related issues with asset price bubbles. Kiyotaki and
Moore (2008) [127] develop a model with money as a bubble, where we also get what looks
like a Phillips curve based on a ight to liquidity in response to nancial shocks. Perez (2010)
explores similar arguments with government debt as a source of liquidity.
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dominates, we can get lower ination in a boom, as predicted for certain sup-
ply shocks by modern New Keynesian Phillips curves. If we allow for capital
investment, ination increases as long as the boom raises the growth rate of
consumption. Vice versa, in a recession this model can generate lower ina-
tion as agents in the economy increase their desired holdings of the safest and
most liquid assets. This phenomenon often goes under the name of a "ight to
liquidity" or a "ight to quality".
One problem with a direct interpretation of the ination rate here as the
ination rate of goods in terms of money is that even transaction deposits have
usually o¤ered positive real rates of return, whereas money has usually o¤ered
negative real rates of return (ination is usually positive). Nevertheless, to the
degree that theres some link between the rates of return on money and other
liquid assets such as deposits, the arguments for a Phillips curve relation above
would also apply to money.
15 Nominal Price Rigidity and New Keynesian
Economics
In a real business cycle model only real quantities and relative prices are im-
portant. Conventional monetary policy through interest rate announcements is
neutral. 43 To give a prominent role to conventional monetary policy we need
to introduce frictions slowing down the adjustment of nominal prices to shocks.
New Keynesian economics is the standard framework for studying these nominal
price rigidities. It can be seen as a microfoundation for the standard central
banker view of the macroeconomy, and for the common perception of business
cycles as being caused by disequilibria between supply and demand due to slug-
gish price adjustment. It also implies a more important role for intertemporal or
aggregate demand shocks in business cycles than the RBC framework, and can
justify a higher positive e¤ect on output of temporary increases in government
spending.
The key assumptions of New Keynesian economics is that
1) rms post prices in terms of a numeraire good (called money),
2) rms have signicant market power, and
3) prices posted in terms of money (nominal prices) are only partially read-
justed in response to demand and supply conditions.
As result, demand shocks (intertemporal shocks) play a much more impor-
tant role in business cycles than in an RBC economy.
43Central bank policies do matter in an RBC economy with nancing frictions if they
alleviate credit constraints. This will be discussed in the section on unconventional monetary
policy.
141
15.1 The microfoundations of the positive relation be-
tween ination and the level of economic activity (the
Phillips curve)
Consider a boom that raises aggregate demand. Sticky nominal prices mean that
the rising aggregate demand will be partially accommodated by rms,leading
to rising real marginal costs for all rms (for example because wages increase
as labour demand increases). Total nominal price rigidity implies zero ination.
Partial price rigidity implies that rms that exibly adjust their prices will want
to raise nominal prices relative to the xed price rms (for which theres zero
ination by denition) in an attempt to preserve the desired markup over the
increasing marginal cost. As a result we get positive ination for rms that
reset prices. Since the aggregate price level is a weighted average of xed price
rms and rms that reset prices, aggregate ination will rise. This establishes
a positive relation between ination and marginal costs that is at the heart of
the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
Forward looking rms that adjust their prices take into account that they
may not readjust their prices again for some time. So price adjustment in a
boom also responds positively to future marginal costs increases. Since future
marginal cost increases lead to higher future prices we get a positive relation
between current ination and future expected ination rates. Under commonly
used assumptions, we can link the marginal cost measure in the economy to an
output gap
ln yt   ln ynt :
Here the output gap is dened as output relative to the "natural" output level
that is compatible with stable ination, ynt . This leads to the new Keynesian
microfoundation for an expectations augmented Phillips curve
t = f
(fEtt+jgj>0; ln yt   ln ynt );
where t is ination, ynt is the exible price output level,
f1 > 0; f

2 > 0; f

3 > 0:
It may helpful at this stage to derive this relation from another direction.
Consider a negative aggregate supply shock. To be more specic, suppose rms
feel more pessimistic in the exible price equilibrium so that the labour demand
wedge nd;t increases (business sentiment deteriorates as modelled in Angeletos
and Lao (2012) [11]). Now exible price rms are tempted to decrease hiring
and production. To lower their sales, they want to raise prices relative to sticky
price rms. As a result, ination increases. Furthermore, since sticky price
rms do not reduce their production as much as exible price rms, the output
gap increases, while the natural output level ynt declines. This once again estab-
lishes a positive relation between ination and current or future output gaps.
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Under commonly used models of nominal price adjustment frictions (e.g Gali
ch. 3 (2007) [90])and a loglinear approximation around 0 long run ination, the
Phillips curve simplies to
t = aEtt+1 + b(ln yt   ln ynt )
0 < a  1; b > 0:
44 .
In most models, the natural output level is a¤ected by various frictions and
it can be quite volatile. This makes it di¤erent from a long run trend or from
output in a frictionless neoclassical model. New Keynesian models usually take
a cashless economy limit and assume that the central bank can fully control the
most relevant short run nominal interest rate in the economy.
15.2 Determining interest rates with sticky prices: mon-
etary policy enters the scene
To close the model, we specify an interest rate rule for the central bank. This
rule typically assumes that the central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate
it+1 to stabilise the output gap ln yt   ln ynt and ination: More formally, the
interest rate rule leads to a unique stationary solution for the output gap and
ination. A typical example of such a rule is
it+1   iss = ai(ln yt   ln ynt ) + bi(t   ss) + "i;t
where ai; bi > 0;
"i;t is an IID monetary policy shock,and xss is the steady state of balanced
growth path value of any variable xt:
To solve the model, we rst nd the exible price equilibrium. Then we
solve the original system of equations with rigid prices, taking as given the pre-
vious solution for the exible price equilibrium. If the central bank responds
aggressively enough to ination or output gaps, higher price exibility is stabil-
ising in the sense that output gaps dynamics become less important relative to
44From a practical perspective, in a model with a large set of real frictions like the one
we have been working with, it is common to add another group of retailing rms that are
only subject to nominal price rigidity. The other rms sell their output to these retailers,
taking the price of their output as given, while being subject to all the other frictions. This
generats a Phillips curve with a markup of retail price over wholesale prices which are a
function of the output gap (see Bernanke et als [28]nancial accelerator model for one of the
1st uses of this setup). Purely foreward looking Phillips Curves frequently imply too little
ination persistence. To deal with this, many models add lags of ination by assuming that
non optimising rms adjust prices as a function of past ination. This assumption has been
criticised as ad-hoc and unrealistic. Lagged ination related terms emerge more naturally in
models of imperfect information such as the sticky information model of Mankiw and Reis
(2010).
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the exible price output dynamics. In this case we have a unique equilibrium
in which deviations between sticky price output and exible price output die
out over time in response to a shock (formally, the output gap is stationary).
If the central bank doesnt adjust nominal rates su¢ ciently to ination or the
output gap we can have stationary sunspot shocks a¤ecting the output gap.
With a weak response of interest rates or if weve hit the zero lower bound on
nominal interest rates, price exibility can lose its stabilising power in the New
Keynesian model: it can even become destabilising at intermediate levels (see
Eggertson et al (2012) [29] ). We will have more to say about this possibility in
the next section. 45
15.3 The e¤ect of sticky prices on business cycles
15.3.1 The baseline model with xed capital
The New Keynesian economy would be almost indistinguishable from the exi-
ble price economy if the central bank set su¢ ciently high ai and bi in the interest
rate rule of the previous section. In that case policy would virtually eliminate
any di¤erences between the exible price and the sticky price equilibria. Other-
wise, we can get signicant gaps between sticky price and exible price output
levels (the output gap). 46 The di¤erence between the exible price RBC en-
vironment and the New Keynesian environment is easiest to see in the extreme
case of a xed central bank nominal interest rate target, xed nominal prices
(complete nominal rigidity) and a xed capital stock and durables stock (as in
the standard textbook exposition of New Keynesian economics) such as Gali
(2007) [90]). 47
45Another version of the interest rate rule in the text allows the central bank to react
positively to changes in the natural interest rate, dened as the rate of interest that would
emerge absent price and wage rigidities. This leads to
it+1   iss = ai(ln yt   ln ynt ) + bi(t   ss) + ci(rnt+1 + Ett+1   [rn + ss])
where ai; bi; ci > 0:
This extension is frequently dismissed because of of doubts regarding the central banks
ability to observe the natural interest rate. But a priori the central bank is not less capable of
tracking this variable (with some measurement error) than other agents in the private sector,
and potential output can be even harder to measure. At any rate, Curdia et al (2011)[63]
provide some informal evidence that central bankers have a notion of the natural interest rate
in mind when taking monetary policy decisions. The also nd that interest rate rules with
natural interest rate tracking provide a better t to the data in the US.
46This implies that a RBC model can be a good approximation if the central bank suc-
cessfully eliminates most of the output gap, which is a desirable policy objective under some
conditions. In this case, identifying price rigidity and interest rule parameers from aggregate
dynamics may be quite di¢ cult(see Cochrane [58]).
47Our analysis below would be similar with variable durables investment, as long as the level
of price rigidity in durable goods production is similar to that in nondurables production. In
reality, house prices for example are signicantly more exible than servicesprices, generating
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Consider shock to householdsdiscount factor t+1 or to the external nance
premium efph;t+1 that increases desired savings: Absent any link between this
shock and the e¢ ciency of the search process in product markets or other in-
tratemporal wedges, we have already seen that this shock will not a¤ect exible
price output. Since ct = yt and households want to save more and consume less,
in equilibrium real interest rates will fall such that households desired consump-
tion matches the unchanged yt: A crude way of describing this is that aggregate
supply determines output and nancial markets adjust to ensure equilibrium.
Now consider the e¤ect of the same shock in the xed price and the xed
nominal interest rate economy. By assumption, the real interest rate is xed.
Meanwhile, in the New Keynesian economy rms agree to satisfy any demand
at a xed nominal price. Since the real interest rate cannot adjust, house-
holds reduce their consumption and rms adjust by reducing production such
that yt = ct: Labour demand declines, and wages go down to induce the rep-
resentative household to reduce labour supply. Finally, the decline in output
reduces desired saving such that credit markets remain in equilibrium. Here,
intertemporal shocks determine aggregate demand, and aggregate supply ad-
justs to ensure equilibrium. This mechanism can be seen as a modern version of
the old Keynesian paradox of thrift, in which higher desired saving can reduce
output in the short run.
Similar reasoning explains why sticky prices can generate business cycles in
response to news shocks. Positive news about higher future income act like
a positive demand shock, increasing desired spending now. With imperfect
real interest rate adjustment due to sticky prices, this leads to higher current
output.48 Note that the response of the economy under sticky prices can be
decomposed into its response under a monetary policy that mimics the exible
price outcome by targeting the exible price real interest rate and a monetary
policy shock that causes a deviation of monetary policy from targeting the ex-
ible price real interest. This perspective explains the importance for Keynesian
economists of examining monetary policy shocks, even if pure monetary policy
shocks typically account for a small share of the variance of output.
Consider on the other hand a positive front loaded productivity shock in the
benchmark xed capital economy. In the exible price economy output increases
and the real interest rate falls as households try to smooth consumption through
higher savings. In the sticky price economy, if the central bank does not reduce
interest rates su¢ ciently, the real interest rate is too high and output is lower in
the short term relative to its exible price level. The general idea emerging from
comovement problems between durables and non durables. For further discussion and model
extensions that solve this issue see Carlstrom and Fuerst (2006), Bouakez et al (2008).
48However, the response of ination to a positive news shock need not be positive in the
sticky price model. The news shock increases the output gap which tends to raise ination.
For the case of a trend stationnary news shock the expectation of a future increase in TFP
also generates expectation of lower future ination. Because of forward looking price setting
behaviour, this reduces rmsdesired prices today, lowering ination (see Kobayashi (2008)).
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the New Keynesian literature is that such productivity shocks generate counter-
cyclical output gaps, because the central bank rarely adjusts monetary policy
su¢ ciently to completely stabilise the output gap. This generates countercycli-
cal ination for TFP shocks, which allows New Keynesian theory to explain
stagation episodes such as the 1970s in the developed economies.
15.3.2 The New Keynesian model with exible capital
In contrast to the central role of exible capital in RBC analysis, the standard
New Keynesian analysis of business cycles often assumes a xed capital stock
as a benchmark. This is unfortunate, since exible investment is important in
quantitative New Keynesian monetary policy models and in traditional Keyne-
sian thinking about business cycles. This section will attempt a more theoretical
analysis of the interaction between nominal price rigidity and investment.
Relative to a exible price economy, the key di¤erence is that in Keynesian
sticky prices economy investment is a¤ected by aggregate demand constraints
on future output,
gtztf(kt; nt)  yt; (yt ):
Keeping the consumption good as the numeraire, the rst order condition for
investment becomes
kt+1 : pk;t(1+k;t) = Et
f;t+1
f;t
[gt+1zt+1fk;t+1(1 yt+1)+(1 )(1+k;t+1)pk;t+1]:
A tighter aggregate demand constraint (for example due to a Keynesian aggre-
gate demand recession) raises the Lagrange multiplier yt+1; reducing desired
kt+1: Rewriting this equation in terms of the risk-free interest rate Rt+1 as be-
fore, we also see that any rigidity in Rt+1 induced by sticky prices will amplify
the response of kt+1 to demand shocks. In contrast, in a exible price environ-
ment, drops in Rt+1 in a demand driven recession would encourage investment.
Consider a front loaded positive total factor productivity (TFP) shock. Us-
ing a log utility function, the consumption Euler equation
ct+1
ct
=
t+1
t
efph;t+1Rt+1
can be rewritten as
yt+1
yt
cyt+1
cyt
=
t+1
t
efph;t+1Rt+1 where
cyt = ct=yt:
Combining this with the Euler equation for the exible price economy, and
ignoring for now the feedback from output and price rigidity to t or efph;t, we
get 
yt+1
yt
cyt+1
cyt

=

ynt+1
ynt
cynt+1
cynt

=
Rt+1
Rnt+1
;
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where xnt is the exible price value of xt (often called the "natural" x; for
example the natural interest rate Rnt+1): With exible capital investment we
know Rnt+1 will rise above the steady state value for a positive TFP shock.
Since the output gap is stationary,
yt+jynt+j  will diminish over time. Suppose as
a drastic approximation that the output gap vanishes after 1 period. Then the
above equation reduces to
ynt
yt
cynt
cyt
=
Rt+1
Rnt+1
:
Under what conditions can we still say that the output gap
ln yt   ln ynt
will be negative for positive TFP shocks? We need some combination of the
interest rate Rt+1 rising more than the exible price interest rate Rnt+1 or a
bigger increase in the investment to output ratio of the exible price economy
relative to the sticky price economy. In other words, investment must be more
sensitive to Total Factor Productivity shocks under exible prices. The analysis
for the Total Factor Productivity shock can also be applied to demand shocks.
For a given Rt+1Rnt+1
a positive demand shock in our simplied setup will cause a
higher output gap if cy
n
t
cyt
rises, that is investment must increase more relative to
output in response to the demand shock under sticky prices. If Rt+1Rnt+1
declines (a
typical situation), the condition for a higher output gap is relaxed to requiring
that any fall in cy
n
t
cyt
is small enough.
If we take for example an intertemporal consumption shock that raises cur-
rent consumption, in many exible price economies this shock will actually lead
to a fall in investment due to a negative income e¤ect on labour supply and a
xed labour demand curve in the short run (see the discussion of the response to
shocks of the exible price economy with exible capital). Sticky prices weaken
these e¤ects so that the change in the investment to output ratio is higher for
this shock relative to the exible prices economy (see Smets and Wouters (2002)
[163] for an example). Note that in the presence of feedback e¤ects between
credit constraints and the level of economic activity, efph;t+1
t+1
t
will no longer
be the same for the exible price and the sticky price economies. This term is
usually more sensitive to demand shocks in the presence of price rigidities. In
this case, it acts as an amplier of any output gap dynamics that would occur
in its absence. More generally if the output gap (approximately) vanishes after
T periods,
ynt
yt
cynt
cyt
=
Rt;t+T
Rnt;t+T
where Rt;t+T = 
T 1
j=0 Rt+j;t+j+1 is the product of gross interest rates between
periods t and t + T: The analysis above still applies with the new longer term
interest rate ratio

Rt;t+T
Rnt;t+T
1=T
replacing Rt+1Rnt+1
:
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To gain more intuition, we take a 2 period economy with a representative
household and a representative rm where prices are exible in the 2nd period,
and in the rst period prices are xed at the 2nd period price level. Investment
only occurs in the 1st period. We can think of the 1st period as the short run
and the 2nd period as the longer run or the medium run.This model cannot
capture the e¤ect of future aggregate demand shifts with sticky prices on cur-
rent investment. It can nevertheless provide a good approximation, if due to
investment adjustment costs, most of investment a¤ects production only by
the time prices have had the time to adjust to aggregate conditions. We take a
perfect foresight approximation and ignore Jensens inequality.
Suppose the central bank targets a constant nominal interest rate it+1 = i; so
it does not respond at all to demand shocks. As a result, the real gross interest
rate R2 is constant. Consider a shock to the discount factor between the 1st and
2nd periods 2: An increase in 2 does not a¤ect c2 for a given k2: Since
R2
2
= 0;
the Euler equation implies a decline in c1 if k22  0 (equivalently if
c2
2
 0).
Solving out the labour market for equilibrium hours and combining the bond
and capital rst order conditions to get a no arbitrage condition between capital
and bonds, we nd that k2 is a function of 2nd period productivity z2, k1 (which
is exogenous) and R2: But since neither productivity z2 nor R2 are a¤ected by
the discount factor shock, k22 = 0: As a result period 1 output y1 declines. In
contrast, with exible 1st period prices, householdshigher desire to save will
reduce consumption and increase investment for realistic levels of intertemporal
elasticity of substitution below 1, with real interest rates declining to increase
demand for capital.
Now consider a temporary positive productivity shock that lasts only for the
1st period. In the exible price economy this raises output in the 1st period.
Households also try to smooth consumption by increasing investment (or more
realistically with rms holding the capital stock, rms increase investment in
the interest of their shareholders). As a result 2nd period output also increases.
This is the standard RBC analysis of a temporary increase in productivity. Now
imagine prices are sticky the 1st period. Similar arguments as for the discount
factor shock lead to the conclusion, that with a xed real interest rate y2 and
k2 do not change in response to a higher 1st period productivity. By the Euler
equation for bonds, 1st period consumption c1 also does not change. Since k2
does not change, neither does investment, so y1z1 = 0. As a result, 1st period
employment goes down. These results are similar to the earlier ones obtained
with a xed capital stock.
Marginal e¢ ciency of investment shocks also have di¤erent e¤ects when nom-
inal prices are sticky. To continue with our 2 period model where 1st period
prices are xed, suppose that there is a negative marginal e¢ ciency of invest-
ment k1 shock. With a xed real interest rate, this shock reduces investment
and therefore next periods capital stock. As a result, output and consumption
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go down in the next period when prices are exible. By the Euler equation, con-
sumption in the 1st period also declines. So similarly to a a negative news shock
e¤ect, a negative marginal e¢ ciency of investment shock generates a simulta-
neous decline in both investment and consumption. In contrast, with exible
prices, this shock frequently generates negative consumption and investment
comovement (see Justiniano et al (2011) [4] for a more detailed analysis of this
point in a quantitative New Keynesian model).
The 2 period model does not allow us to study the e¤ect on investment of
future aggregate demand changes due to sticky prices. To analyse this requires
at least a 3 period model (the short run, the medium run and the long run),
in which prices are xed for the 1st 2 periods. Suppose there is a negative
aggregate demand shock (either k;t+j or t+j or a combination of both) during
the 1st 2 periods. In the next to last period T   1; output goes down by the
same arguments as for the 2 period model. Let households own the capital stock
and rent it to rms, and suppose price rigidities are at the level of retailers that
buy goods wholesale and sell it at a markup. We also simplify by setting the
depreciation rate  = 1:
Assuming the usual Cobb-Douglas production function, prot maximisation
by the wholesale producer implies that

py;2y2
k2
= r2;
where py;t is the price at which produces sell their output to retailers. As
before, price rigidity implies that r2 is xed. By the same arguments as for the
2 period model y2 goes down, and therefore py;2 declines as well. This implies a
lower k2 and therefore a fall in period 1 investment. 49 By the Euler equation
the decline in c2 and the higher 2 reduces c1:With investment and consumption
both declining, y1 goes down as well. If the model has T > 3 periods, a similar
argument holds when prices are xed for T 1 periods, using backward induction
to establish yT j 1 < 0,cT j 1 < 0 when yT j < 0;cT j < 0:
The analysis above assumed xed prices and a constant nominal interest
monetary policy for all periods before the last one, in order to highlight the dis-
tortions caused by price stickiness. To the degree that monetary policy responds
49Alternatively, if the producers themselves have market power and are subject to nominal
price rigidities, cost minimisation implie the following optimal capital to labour ratio:
kt
nt
=


wt
rt
:
n2 will go down only if w2 declines (labour demand must decline). But then the cost
minimising capital to labour ratio implies that k2 declines as well. If n2  0 (because the
negative income e¤ect dominates labour supply), then since y2 < 0 and z2 is the same, k2
again declines. Either way, k2 < 0 so 1st period investment goes down.
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by targeting the output gap or the natural interest rate (either directly or indi-
rectly through ination targets), the magnitude of the output gap will decline
over time in response to stationary shocks, and in the medium-run outcomes in
the economy should be similar to those of the exible price economy.
15.3.3 Sticky prices and wedges
The sticky price mechanism can be mapped into a countercyclical markup for
demand shocks. The sticky price economy behaves as if rms prefer to charge
higher markups and reduce production in the face of a negative demand shock.
To achieve this lower production, they pay lower real wages which in equilib-
rium reduce labour supply. Consider the simple xed capital model with the
production function
y = zf(n); fn > 0; fnn < 0:
In a exible price economy without labour demand wedges, the rms hiring
decision follows
zfn = w
A negative aggregate demand shock reduces labour demand and wages.
Starting from the exible price output, this implies
zfn
w
> 1;() zfn = w(1 + nd)
for some nd > 0: More generally, the aggregate demand shock looks like a
higher labour demand tax.
Now suppose the rm also uses intermediate inputs in its production process.
Making the same assumptions on the marginal productivity of intermediate
inputs as before, and using similar reasoning as for labour demand we see that
the negative aggregate demand shock increases the wedge on intermediate inputs
1 + x;t . From the perspective of a value added function for output we know
that the increase in x;t will be like a reduction in TFP. For demand shocks,
this implies that in a exible price model omitted price rigidity frictions can
show up in the e¢ ciency wedge, or in a mixture of production input wedges.
See Goodfriend (2004) [96] and Sustek (2011)[168] for more on this point.
Increases in market power can also be mapped into an increase in production
input wedges. Therefore, the negative e¤ect of sticky prices on output in a
recession is mathematically equivalent to an increase in market power. In both
cases rms set prices that are too high, leading to output which is too low. In
reverse, combinations of production input wedges can be mapped into a sticky
price model subject to aggregate demand shocks.
How do sticky price based wedges compare to exible price theories of aggre-
gate demand or condence shocks that also map into labour demand and TFP
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wedges, such as the search frictions model of Rios Rull et al (2012) [17] or the
imperfect information model of Angeletos and Lao (2012) [11]? The sticky price
perspective is that a recession happens or is amplied because rms systemati-
cally underadjust their prices to economic conditions so prices are set too high.
The exible price imperfect information model perspective is that a recession
happens or is amplied because rms become pessimistic and think demand
for their products is lower even if they adopt the best possible pricing strategy
given their information set. The matching frictions model argues similarly that
a recession happens or is amplied because it is indeed harder to sell products
due to lower search e¤ort by buyers even if rms adopt the best possible pricing
strategy.
The equivalence results between the sticky price mechanism and wedges, in
combination with questions about the actual allocational importance of sticky
prices highlight the di¢ culty of identifying exible price versus Keynesian sticky
price economies using standard data sets on business cycles, at least if we only
rely on aggregate quantities. The fundamental problem is that if we allow su¢ -
cient (and arguably quite plausible) exibility in the shock processes, then real
business cycle and sticky price models di¤er mainly in terms of their condi-
tional forecasts for aggregate quantities given a specic shock. But the data
themselves can only be directly mapped into an unconditional forecast and un-
conditional moments such as standard deviations or correlations. Any attempt
to decompose the data into more fundamental shocks must be based on a model
imposing some structure, which is itself subject to debate.
Data on ination and nominal interest rates may provide better identi-
cation. But even with nominal variables, there are several reasons to suspect
identication is complicated: exible price models can also generate Phillips
curves using similar central bank interest rate rules as in sticky price models
(see our discussion of Phillips curves in exible price economies), the Phillips
curve relation is often hard to nd in more recent data (Uhlig (2011) [171]),
and interest rate rules are themselves subject to severe identication problems
(Cochrane (2011)) [58].
It would seem that certain episodes can provide identication conditional
on relatively weak auxiliary assumptions. For example the combination of high
ex-post real interest rates and a severe decline in investment in the US during
the early years of the Great Depression are hard to reconcile with exible price
and wage models if the high real interest rates were anticipated. Alternatively,
the Great Depression in the US is compatible with a real business cycle model if
agentsination expectations were signicantly higher than the actual deation
over 1929-1933. In this case, ex ante real interest rates were actually low despite
the high ex-post real interest rates. This hypothesis is hard to falsify given the
lack of data on ination expectations during that period and the rare nature
of this episode. It is compatible with evidence that ination was almost IID
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for most of the pre World War 2 period in the US, so agents might not have
expected the deation of 1929-1933 to persist for several years.
As for the countercyclicality of markups, the empirical evidence is inconclu-
sive. A simple measure in many models is the inverse of the share of wages
in output (the labour share). The labour share is usually countercyclical, sug-
gesting procyclical markups. Adjustments for other factors of production and
overtime labour costs sometimes imply countercyclical and sometimes procycli-
cal markups (Ramey and Nekarda (2013)[151]). Bils et al (2012)[31] use the fact
that durables goods are more procyclical than nondurables to test the cyclical
behaviour of markups. A key prediction of countercyclical markup models is
that as long as cost curves are upward sloping industries with more procycli-
cal output will have more countercyclical markups. After adjusting for di¤er-
ences in TFP and the capital share, they nd signicantly more countercyclical
markups for durable goods industries. At the same time, some of their evidence
is inconsistent with sticky price theories of countercyclical markups. For exam-
ple, they do not nd more countercyclical markups for luxury products, even
though output of those industries is highly procyclical. Also, industries with
more frequent price adjustments do not have more procyclical markups, sug-
gesting other theories of countercyclical markups besides nominall price rigidity
are also important.
A signicant complication in measuring markup cyclicality is the frequency
of long term contracts. Long term employment or busines-to-business supplies
contracts imply smoother and less procyclical average production costs than the
marginal cost thats relevant for assessing markups. This biases existing studies
that do not take this into account towards nding procyclical markups (though
this bias may be less applicable to Bils et al (2012) [31], to the degree that it
applies equally across durable and non durable goods industries).
15.3.4 Nominal wage rigidity
In modern New Keynesian DSGE models, the combination of both price and
wage nominal rigidity plays an important role. This section explores the e¤ect of
nominal wage rigidity for aggregate demand shocks. Imagine a 2 period closed
economy with CRRA utility in consumption. There is a continuum of perfectly
competitive identical rms that use the production function
y = zf(n);
fn > 0; fnn  0:
The rms optimisation yields the familiar rst order condition
zfn = w =
Wn
P
;
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where Wn is the nominal wage and P is the nominal price level and w is
the real wage. The representative household has a log/log utility function in
consumption and leisure. Credit markets open only in the 1st period. The 2nd
period is a static exible price and wage economy in which labour supply is
determined by the standard neoclassical labour market rst order condition
ul2 = uc;2w2:
In the 1st period there is a credit market providing the risk free return
R2 =
1+i2
P2=P1
: Householdsoptimal choices satisfy the usual Euler equation
c2
c1
= 2R2:
The 2nd period P2 price level is indeterminate. Suppose it is xed. i2
is the nominal interest rate controlled by the central bank. To highlight the
ine¢ ciency caused by wage rigidity, we assume that the central bank does not
adjust i2: The rst period wage is subject to downwards nominal wage rigidity,
that is
Wn1  0
With downward nominal wage rigidity, householdslabour supply can no longer
satisfy the standard rst order condition as in the 2nd period. In this case,
households agree to supply whatever amount of labour is demanded by rms at
the given real wage w1: 2 is subject to shocks, with 2 > 0 reducing desired
1st period consumption for a given interest rate and 2nd period consumption.
Recall that the discount factor shock has no e¤ect on output in a exible price
and wage economy.
We examine the e¤ect of nominal wage rigidity on the response of the econ-
omy to an increase in the discount factor 2: Start with the case of a linear pro-
duction function where fnn = 0: In this case Wn1  0 implies that P1  0:
As a result, the change in ination (P2P1   1)  0; increasing the real interest
rate R2 1: Since the shock to 2 has no e¤ect on c2 = y2; then using the Euler
equation a higher 2 combined with higher real interest rates reduces 1st period
consumption and output. Firms are willing to produce less since they make zero
prots regardless of the level of production (more generally with monopolistic
competition they target a constant markup). The constant marginal product
case highlights that one of the key e¤ects of nominal wage rigidity is to increase
nominal price rigidity in product markets. We will return to this point latter
when we discuss elements that amplify the e¤ects of price adjustment costs.
We can extend this argument to the more realistic case with diminishing
marginal productivity of labour. Suppose the higher discount factor increases
1st period output. By fnn < 0 and the rms labour demand condition, w1
must decline: real wages must fall to make hiring more workers attractive to
rms. With downward nominal wage rigidity this requires an increase in the 1st
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period price level P1: But this reduces ination and raises the real interest rate
R2   1: From the Euler equation and 2  0 this implies a decline in c1 and
1st period output. But this contradicts the initial hypothesis that 1st period
output increases. Therefore the discount factor shock must reduce 1st period
output.
A scenario which is consistent is that in response to the higher discount
factor, 1st period nominal prices fall. This increases real wages and depresses
hiring and production by rms. Meanwhile looking at the Euler equation, while
the decline in P1 attenuates the e¤ect of the rise in 1 through a lower real
interest rate, this is not enough to prevent a decline in desired 1st period
consumption expenditure and output.
Finally, as in Chari et al (2007) [50], we can map nominal wage rigidity into
a labour wedge in a business cycle accounting exible prices and wages model.
Suppose a negative aggregate demand shock (e.g a higher 2) reduces 1st period
output and consumption. For a standard utility function of the representative
household , the reduction in work hours reduces the marginal utility of leisure,
while the decline in consumption increases the marginal utility of consumption.
Meanwhile the real wage is constant or higher. This implies
ul1
uc1
< w1;
or equivalently
ul1
uc1
= w1(1  ns;1)
for some 0 < ns;1 < 1: So nominal wage rigidity behaves like a labour
supply tax, which is part of the labour wedge.
15.4 Ination shocks and trade-o¤s between stabilising
output and ination
In the previous sections we assumed that the output gap targeted by monetary
policy is relative to the natural level of output ynt , dened as output with exible
prices and wages. The implicit hypothesis was that the only distortion in the
economy that monetary policy could x was nominal price rigidity. This is a
common assumption in baseline New Keynesian analysis (e.g Gali (2007) [90], ch.
3). But much of our discussion of RBC models showed how this natural output
level was itself distorted by various "real" frictions. In these circumstances,
targeting the natural output level is suboptimal for monetary policy.
The central bank may prefer to stabilise the output gap relative to a level
of output that is Pareto optimal, yot ; so the interest rate rule is for example
it+1   iss = ai(ln yt   ln yot ) + bi(t   ss);
where ai; bi > 0:
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In this case, it faces a trade-o¤ between stabilising the output gap and ination.
To see this, go back to a simple linear New-Keynesian Phillips curve,
t    = aEt(t+1   ) + b(ln yt   ln ynt );
0 < a  1; b > 0:
Here stabilising the output gap yt   ynt is equivalent to stabilising ination
around : A pure ination target with literally no concern about deviations in
yot   ynt and perfect implementation would eliminate the output gap relative to
ynt : But now assume the central bank is interested in stabilising a more e¢ cient
level of exible price and wage output yot : In many textbooks such as Gali
(2007, ch. 5) [90] yot is Pareto optimal, but more generally y
o
t simply has fewer
distortions than ynt : We can rewrite the Phillips curve as
t    = aEt(t+1   ) + b(ln yt   ln yot ) + b(ln yot   ln ynt )
= aEt(t+1   ) + b(ln yt   ln yot ) + "t :
If monetary policy aims to completely stabilise the output gap
ln yt   ln yot ;
then yot 6= ynt implies that ination cannot be completely stabilised. There is
a trade-o¤ between eliminating the output gap relative to yot and eliminating
ination uctuations. In general, yot is less volatile than y
n
t : For a given ln yt  
ln yot ; ination will rise when y
n
t falls by more than y
o
t in response to a shock
and vice versa in a boom. From a modeling perspective, any misspecication of
the ination relevant output gap ln yt   ln ynt will generate a residual
"t = f(ln y
o
t   ln ynt );
where yot is the misspecied measure of exible price and wage output. Models
often use a measure yot that is too smooth, leading to residuals in the ination
equation that move countercyclically. These residuals, often called ination
shocks or markup shocks, play a large role in explaining ination volatility in
New Keynesian models (e.g Smets and Wouters (2007) [164]).
15.5 Zero lower bound dynamics: is higher price exibility
stabilising for aggregate demand shocks:?
A common intuition in many older Keynesian models (of the kind that are still
at the core of most undergraduate macroeconomics courses and private sector
macro analysis) is that higher price exibility reduces the impact of demand
shocks. From a modern macroeconomics perspective, this is still true if the
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central bank interest rate rule reacts aggressively enough to some combination
of ination, the output gap or the natural interest rate (some combination of
su¢ ciently high positive coe¢ cients on these variables). This is the usual as-
sumption of Keynesian models about central bank policy in ordinary times. In
this case higher price exibility implies that a negative aggregate demand shock
leads to a bigger decline in real interest rates. Lower real interest rates boost
aggregate demand, countering the e¤ect of the negative shock. This conclusion
may be reversed when nominal interest rates hit the zero lower bound (ZLB).
A su¢ ciently negative aggregate demand shock can push the central bank to
reduce nominal interest rates to zero(e.g an increase in consumer uncertainty or
in the external nance premium). Now imagine that having already hit the ZLB,
the economy is hit by another negative demand shock (e.g a further increase
in uncertainty, further rise in external nance premia, or government spending
cuts). Relative to the xed prices benchmark, the negative demand shock can
have a bigger negative e¤ect on output in the economy with more exible (but
still partially rigid) prices. The shock generates persistently lower output gaps.
Through the Phillips curve, these lower expected output gaps generate more
expected deation with more exible prices. The expected deation raises real
interest rates, which depress aggregate demand further. The bigger reductions
in aggregate demand lead to more deation and a bigger drop in the output
gap. Under some conditions, this feedback process is stable with higher price
exibility leading to a bigger drop in output in response to negative aggregate
demand shocks.
At the same time, if prices are very close to the exible price extreme, we can
have a large drop in current ination in response to lower aggregate demand,
followed by higher expected ination and lower real interest rates in the next
periods (this is intuitively what happens in the exible price economy). In this
case higher price exibility can reduce the impact of the aggregate demand shock
The analysis is complicated because in modern macroeconomic models ag-
gregate demand depends on the whole path of expected real interest rates rt+j ,
and therefore the whole path of expected ination rates at the ZLB (since
rt+j = it+j   Ett+j). To clarify things, we can examine the two key equa-
tions of the basic New Keynesian model: the consumption Euler equation and
the Phillips curve. We make the usual simplifying assumption of zero steady
state ination. In log deviations from the steady-state,
y^t = Ety^t+1   1

(it+1   Ett+1) + vt;
t = aEtt+1 + b(ln yt   ln ynt ):
vt is an aggregate demand shock such a shift in the external nance premium
or a change in government spending. The exible output level ynt is assumed to
be exogenous. Suppose the economy is at the ZLB for T periods (it+j = 0 for
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t+ j < T ), and monetary policy successfuly closes the output gap by period ~T :
Private sector agents have perfect foresight about T and ~T : Iterating forward
on these two equations, we get
y^t =
1

Tj=1Ett+j  
1


~T
j=T+1(it+j   Ett+j) +  ~Tj=0Etvt+j ;
t = b
~T
j=0a
jEt(ln yt+j   ln ynt+j):
The rst equation clearly shows that at the ZLB anything that increases
ination expectations raises output, by reducing real interest rates. Future
commitments by the central bank to reduce interest rates once the economy
exits the ZLB can also raise output today to the degree that they are not fully
o¤set by lower ination expectations (lower ination expectations can occur
for example, if these commitments communicate to the private secto greater
pessimism about future output gaps).
Ination today is a weighted average of future expected output gaps. Rewrit-
ing this as
t+j = b
~T
k=0a
jEt(ln yt+j+k   ln ynt+j+k);
and substituting into the Euler equation, we have
y^t =
b

Tj=1
~T
k=0a
jEt(ln yt+j+k   ln ynt+j+k) 
1


~T
j=T+1it+j +
b


~T
j=T+1
~T
k=0a
jEt(ln yt+j+k   ln ynt+j+k)
+
~T
j=0Etvt+j :
The e¤ect of increasing price exibility (higher b) depends on two oppos-
ing forces. On one hand, any given decline in expected future output gaps
Et(ln yt+j+k   ln ynt+j+k) is more deationary with higher price exibility. On
the other hand, higher price exilibility can reduce the magnitude of changes
in expected future output gaps, which reduces expected future deation. Using
loglinear approximations, Eggertson et al (2012) [29] and Werning (2012) [177]
nd that under the assumption that ination is at or below target when it exits
the ZLB (so that ~T = T ), and that the ZLB is hit due to a shock that reduces
exible price real interest rates (e.g an increase in external nance premia or in
uncertainty), higher price exibility worsens the decline in output at the zero
lower bound. That is, the e¤ect of higher price exibility in terms of increasing
the expected ination impact of any change in the output gap dominates. Eg-
gertson and Krugman (2012) [71] nd that this e¤ect is amplied when nancing
frictions are tighter, e.g in a nancial crisis.These dynamics have a discontinu-
ity in the behaviour of the model: higher price exibility is destabilising for
any intermediate level, even though with fully exible prices demand shocks are
completely stabilised.
Cochrane (2014) [60] questions the assumption that ination and the output
gap are expected to be at or below target upon exiting the ZLB episode. He nds
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that there are multiple equilibria in the basic New Keynesian model with sticky
prices, which di¤er by the assumptions about ination expectations towards
the beginning and the end of the ZLB episode. Equilibria which allow for
ination and the output gap to be above target after the economy exits the
ZLB converge continuously to the exible price/frictionless limit ( ~T > T and
ln yt+j+k   ln ynt+j+k > 0 at T +1) , so that higher price exibility is stabilising
for aggregate demand shocks. The key to this result is that the magnitude of
expected future output gap movements in response to demand shocks declines
as price exibility increases.
Cochrane also shows that those other "local to frictionless" equilibria are
compatible with Taylor rules if we allow more exibility in the behaviour of the
monetary policy error "i;t in
it+1   iss = ai(ln yt   ln ynt ) + bi(t   ss) + "i;t:
Di¤erent selections of the path of "i;t implement di¤erent equilibria. These
alternate equilibria may see empirically implausible for explaining the 2008 -
nancial crisis, since we have not seen ination above target in most advanced
economies (the only notable exception is the UK). But, ination may also be
low in these local to frictionless equilibria if the reason we hit the ZLB is that
the central bank overreacted and reduced interest rates by more than is nec-
essary to eliminate a negative output gap (recall the analysis of exible price
Phillips curves). In the exible price economy, if the central bank reduces inter-
est rates this leads to lower ination expectations since the real interest rate is
not a¤ected. By continuity, a similar result holds for local to frictionless sticky
price equilibria if theyre close enough the exible price limit. Nevertheless,
Cochranes suggested interpretation of that output gaps were actually close to
zero or even positive in 2008-2013 in advanced economies is highly controversial.
Mertens and Ravn (2014) [146] nd that even if we assume ination returns
to target from below at the end of the ZLB episode (equivalent to assuming
that "i;t = 0) higher price exibility can be stabilising for aggregate demand
shocks if prices are su¢ ciently exible to begin with, or if the ZLB episode is
expected to be long enough. The alternative ZLB equilibria with stabilising
price exibility in Mertens and Ravns paper are due to condence shocks, in
which the economy moves to the neighbourhood of an alternative steady state
with long-term deation( or long-term ination below target more generally).
This is in contrast to the implicit assumption in the equations above that the
economy stays close to the zero (or positive) long term ination target steady
state. In the condence shock equilibria the ZLB episode occurs purely because
agents expect deation, an expectation that is fullled in a rational expectations
equilibrium. These shocks have no e¤ect on the exible price (natural) real
interest rates of the economy.
In contrast, the shocks driving the economy to the ZLB in Eggertson et
al (2012) [29](e.g higher demand for precautionnary saving) also reduce the
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economys exible price real interest rates. In terms of their e¤ects on output
and ination the condence shock in Mertens and Ravns equilibrium and the
more fundamental shocks in Eggertson et als equilibrium are similar. In both
cases we get persistent below trend ination and negative output gaps due
to higher real interest rates. But in the Mertens and Ravn condence shock
equilibrium the e¤ect of a negative aggregate demand shock conditional on
being at the ZLB are much smaller. The negative aggregate demand shock has
a smaller negative e¤ect because it paradoxically leads to expectations of higher
future output gaps and consequently lower expected deation. This lowers real
interest rates and increases private consumption.
The condence shock ZLB equilibria in Mertens and Ravns model are also
local to frictionless: they converge continously to the exible price equilibrium as
we reduce the amount of price rigidity. While this property may seem intuitive,
the result that negative aggregate demand shocks can actually increase output
may seem strange. If we insist that the equilibrium that is closest to the actual
economy is local to frictionless, and at the same time we insist that changes in
aggregate demand move output in the same direction at the ZLB, then Mertens
and Ravns results suggest that this combination is probably incompatible with
RE. There must be some systematic misperceptions on the part of agents in the
local to frictionless equilibrium that a¤ects the exible price equilibrium, e.g
through sentiment shocks a la Angeletos and Lao (2012) [11].
Finally, Kiley (2014) [124] nds that higher price exibility is stabilising at
the ZLB if we assume sticky information instead of sticky prices. In the sticky
information model costs of price adjustment are low, but rms adjust prices
infrequently due to signicant costs of updating their information about the
state of the economy. Overall, the state of the art research has shown that the
behaviour of the economy at the ZLB under Keynesians price or information
stickiness is subject to multiple equilibria (or regimes) and signicant model
uncertainty. From positive perspective, this is a rich area for future research.
On a more negative note, monetary or scal policy decisions at the ZLB are
more complex than was initially thought.
15.6 Zero lower bound equilibria: a simple model
This section illustrates the di¤erences between the destablising price exibility
ZLB equilibrium of Eggertson and Krugman (2012) [71],Eggertson et al (2012)
[29], and the stabilising price exibility ZLB equilibrium of Mertens and Ravn
(2014) [146] using a simple 2 equations model. Imagine an economy described by
the basic New Keynesian model without capital. As a short-hand, we shall call
these the Eggertson-Krugman equilibrium and the Mertens-Ravn equilibrium,
reecting some of the key exponents of these models.
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Due to either sunspot or more fundamental shocks, the economy has entered
the ZLB regime. The economy will stay at the ZLB in the next period with
probability q. With a probability 1   q; the economy exits the ZLB regime
forever. Once outside the ZLB, the central bank sets the interest at its exible
price level, the output gap ~y is zero and ination is at its target, normalised to
zero. We also allow for an exogeneous demand component x; such as government
spending or investment (modelled here as exogenous and ignoring its implica-
tions in terms of changes to the capital stock). This setup is similar to that
of Mertens and Ravn (2014) [146]Our key simplifying assumption is that there
are no transition dynamics: the economy is either in a ZLB steady state or in
a zero ination steady state. This approximates many of the results from more
accurate numerical solutions, while allowing for a simple graphical analysis.
The economy in the ZLB regime is described by a Phillips curve for ination
;
zlb = qzlb + q~yzlb
and by a consumption Euler equation
~yzlb   xzlb = q(~yzlb   xzlb) + q

(zlb + rn;zlb)
, where rn is the exible price real interest rate. This model can be repre-
sented as two equations for ination as a function of the output gap:
PC : zlb =
q
1  q ~yzlb;
AD : zlb =  
q
h
(1  q)xzlb + q

rn;zlb
i
+
(1  q)
q
~yzlb:
The solution of the model is at the intersection of these two curves. We
can get di¤erent equilibria depending on the relative slopes of the PC and AD
(aggregate demand) equations. If
q
1  q >
(1  q)
q
(the PC curve is steeper than the AD curve) we get the Mertens-Ravn equilib-
rium. In this case, a shock that increases the exible price interest rate rn;zlb
(e.g lower uncertainty, a lower efph) or that increases xzlb (e.g a temporary
increase in government spending) leads to lower expected ZLB ination zlb
and a worsening output gap ~yzlb: The same shocks lead to higher ination and
a higher output gap in the Eggertson et al. equilibrium with
q
1  q <
(1  q)
q
:
In the Mertens-Ravn equlibrium a higher slope of the PC equation (e.g
higher ) reduces the absolute value of changes in zlb and ~yzlb in response to
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AD shocks. In this sense, price exibility is stabilising in this equilibrium. In
contrast, in the Eggertson-Krugman equilibrium the AD curve is steeper than
the PC curve, and higher price exibility  amplies the e¤ects of shocks to AD
in absolute value.
Note that the Mertens-Ravn equilibrium is more likely to occur the greater
the level of price exibility ; the greater the expected length of the ZLB episode
(higher q) and the higher the responsiveness of consumption to interest rates
(lower ): The Eggertson-Krugman equilibrium is more likely for higher levels
of price-rigidity, short or moderate length ZLB episodes and when consumption
is quite insensitive to interest rates.
15.7 Central bank interest rate control in New Keynesian
models
One question left unanswered in most New Keynesian models is how exactly the
central bank controls the short run nominal interest rate in the economy. There
is a long tradition of more explicitly modeling central bank interest rate control
by positing a demand for a monetary aggregate for which the central bank has
a monopoly. In such a setup, central bank manipulations of the quantity of this
"base" money will change interest rates to ensure money demand equals money
supply. Associating the denition of money in such a model with something like
M2 or even M1 leads to misleading conclusion about the conduct of monetary
policy, and is inconsistent with the functioning of a modern payments system.
A more modern version of this theory is that nancial institutions have a
highly interest rate inelastic demand for central bank reserves, so that very
small shifts in reserves supply can shift the short run nominal rate that is the
opportunity cost of holding these reserves. The central bank targets the short
run nominal rate by elastically supplying these reserves at the desired interest
rate. The reserves market graph with the interest rate on the vertical axis has
a at supply curve and at the limit a vertical reserve demand function. This
allows the central bank to determine a nominal short run interest rate, at least
in theory (see Woodford (2000) [179] for discussion of monetary policy in a mod-
ern almost cashless economy. See Disyatat (2008) [67] for a detailed discussion
of these points and the consequences of misconceptions about monetary policy
operating procedures, such as the overemphasis on open market operations and
the frequent assumption that the central bank uses control of a broader mon-
etary aggregate to change interest rates). In combination with nominal price
rigidity this allows the central bank to control short term real interest rates. In
conjunction with the expectations hypothesis that long run interest rates are
the sum of expected short run interest rates, this allows the central bank to
have a strong inuence on longer run real interest rates.
Note that that nancial market imperfections are key here: the central bank
must have a monopoly (more generally strong market power) in an asset (central
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bank reserves) whose role cannot be duplicated by other private sector assets like
Arrow securities. Of course, this somewhat contradicts the spirit of many New
Keynesian analysis that claim to assume fully complete markets. The role of
central bank reserves is also never explicitly modeled in the vast majority of New
Keynesian models. This makes them inappropriate for studying changes in the
implementation process of monetary policy, and it leaves them vulnerable to the
possibility that future nancial developments will make reserves less important.
In practice, di¤erent short run safe interest rates are not perfect substitutes,
due for example to liquidity considerations, so that the 3 month nominal T-bill
rate does not mechanically follow the federal funds rate. Alternatively, if prices
are relatively exible the combination of real interest rates and ination pre-
mia mostly determined by nancial markets together with partially exogenous
ination expectations means that short run interest rates can be in large part
determined by nancial markets. There is some evidence for the US of persistent
di¤erences between market interest rates such as the 3 month T-bill rate and
the central bank target interest rate (e.g Thornton (2010)[169], Fama (2013)[79]
).
Fama (2013)[79] argues that the econometric evidence is inconclusive, re-
maining compatible both with an active central bank control of short run inter-
est rates and a passive central bank whose target interest rates mostly respond
to private nancial market interest rate movements. In addition the evidence
for the expectations hypothesis as a good approximation is mixed.50 To the
degree that short term rates are strongly related to long term rate movements,
a lot of this may reect the central bank reacting to long rates (see Cochrane
and Piazzesi (2002) [61]).
15.8 Do sticky prices at the rm level imply aggregate
price stickiness?
The critical part of the traditional Keynesian story is aggregate price rigidity.
Micro level price rigidity is compatible with signicant aggregate price exibility
as long as the price changes of of those rms readjusting their price are large
enough and move in the right direction. In this case price adjustment by some
rms can compensate for the rigidity of other rmschoices. This is similar to
the way in which aggregate investment or labour supply can be quite exible de-
spite individual agent level xed adjustment costs (see Khan and Thomas (2008)
[122] for investment, and the basic indivisible labour RBC model (Ljunqvist and
Sargent ch. 26 (2004) [137])).
50See Gurkaynak and Wright [102] for a survey of the recent evidence about the expectations
hypothesis, mostly suggesting it does not hold. In contrast, De Graeve et al [98] nd that
within a medium scale NKDSGE model à la Smets and Wouters [164], the expectations
hypothesis is a good approximation.
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The e¤ect is probably most familiar from discrete choice econometric mod-
els, where individuals can only choose a few discrete values j = 1; ::J; and as
a result their choice may exhibit signicant inertia. For example a household
may not buy a car for the next 2 year, or it may only change its television set or
fridge infrequently. In this sense, durable goods (or business capital goods) are
sticky. Yet the probability of buying a durable good is a continuous function,
and aggregate durable goods or capital demand functions are generally smooth
and quite volatile due to continuous variation in the proportion of households
purchasing new durables. In fact, durable goods and housing investment usually
have much higher standard deviations than nondurable and services consump-
tion. So aggregate investment demand is actually quite exible.
The general idea is that while individual decisions may adjust only in discrete
values or infrequently, because idiosyncratic shocks typically dominate aggregate
shocks in importance, individual agentsdecisions are usually weakly correlated
in the cross-section. Therefore, despite the potentially signicant xed costs of
adjusting, there are alwasy some agents adjusting and responding to aggregate
shocks. In fact, while xed costs of adjustment will prevent some agents from
reacting to a shock in comparison to the costless adjustment case, they will also
increase the proportion of adjusting agents whose idiosyncratic shock leads them
to change their decisions in the same direction as in response to the aggregate
shock alone. Agents whose idiosyncratic shock would lead them to change
decisions in the opposite direction to that dictated by the aggregate shock end
up with a smaller magnitude of desired frictionless adjustment. As a result they
are less willing to pay the xed adjustment cost, and they are less likely to
adjust.
This selection e¤ect increases the response of the economy to a shock, and
partially compensates for the lower adjustment probabilities caused by the ad-
justment costs (see for example Golosov and Lucas (2007) [94] or Elsby and
Michaels (2014) [74] for demonstrations of the quasi-irrelevance of non convex
adjustment costs under certain conditions). Consequently, the aggregate index
over those who adjust and those who dont is not necessarily sticky.
Golosov and Lucas (2007) [94] examine the e¤ects of nominal shocks in a
canonical model of rm pricing decisions, with idiosyncratic shocks and xed
price adjustment costs. They nd small e¤ects of monetary shocks when the
model is calibrated to match the mean frequency of price adjustment in the US.
Kehoe and Midrigan (2012) [121] nd that if one calibrates the idiosyncratic
shock process to match the frequency of small price changes in the data, there
can be signicant monetary non neutrality with xed price adjustment costs.
Eichenbaum et al (2013) [72] cast some doubt on this nding by suggesting most
of the recorded small price changes are due to measurement error. Overall, this
suggests that price rigidity need not imply large monetary non-neutrality in the
short-run.
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Another realistic nonconvexity is the discreteness of price decisions by rms.
Discrete choice restrictions on prices are a special case of nonconvex adjustment
costs in which adjustment costs are innite over some range and then drop to 0
once a certain level of adjustment is reached (see for example the models with
price plans of Eden and Jaremsky (2009 [69],2010 [70])). Similar to xed costs,
they induce a form of selection e¤ect. Some rms do not adjust to an aggregate
shocks when choices are discrete, because the next value on the discrete grid
is too high relative to the optimal continuous adjustment. But some rms will
adjust, and relative to the continuous choice case they will adjust by more,
because they will be forced to choose a higher value on the discrete choice grid
(relative to the optimal continuous choice). 51
Finally, from the individual buyers perspective price rigidity may not a¤ect
the quantity of a good they want to purchase if due to bounded rationality they
do not distinguish between paying a higher price within some band (for example
the car purchase decision may be insensitive to di¤erences in price of 500$, and
consumers may very well buy the same amount of chocolate bars whether the
price is 2.50$ or 2.99$). In this case moderate amounts of price rigidity need
not a¤ect sales (see Knotek 2009 for a model of this e¤ect for price points).
Formally, this partial irrelevance of price rigidity is similar to our earlier model
of wage rigidity with long term contracts. The message is similar: price rigidity
does not increase the volatility of aggregate demand if it is accompanied by
su¢ cient quantity rigidity at the individual level.
Much of the price adjustment occurs through sales. Kehoe and Midrigan
(2012) [121] model sales as a transitory price change that incurs a smaller ad-
justment cost. They nd that sales provide little aggregate price exibility, with
the rigidity of regular prices dominating the overall response to shocks of the
aggregate price level. They suggest that in simpler price adjustment models
we can ignore sales when calibrating the amount of price rigidity. In contrast
Hernaiz (2010) [106] formulates a model where sales are used as a form of price
discrimination. He nds small e¤ects of nominal shocks in such a model, because
sales are e¤ective in increasing aggregate price exibility. Eden and Jaremski
(2009 [69],2010[70]) focus on the distribution of prices across a chain of stores,
nding it to be quite exible. They argue that despite the discreteness in price
choices and rigidity in the store specic regular price, the exibility of the price
level across stores can generate signicant aggregate price exibility. They also
suggest that the higher rigidity of regular prices may be specic to the relatively
mild business cycles in the US during the great moderation. A larger shock such
as the great recession of 2009 may have increased the frequency of regular price
adjustment, though this has yet to be conrmed.
There are several arguably realistic models of aggregate exibility of the
nominal price level despite individual level rigidity. Here we focus on one
51Note the similarity to the exibility of aggregate labour supply in models with indivisible
household labour supply model (Kydland (1995) [62]).
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of the most realistic and recent examples,The Burdett Judd model of price
dispersion, described in Williamson and Wright (2010) [178]. In each market
some consumers sample prices from several stores, while other consumers only
examine a single price. A higher price discourages sales to consumers who have
compared several prices, but it may raise revenue from those consumers who did
not compare prices. As a result, rms can charge prices above marginal cost.
In fact the prot maximising price is indeterminate over a certain range, which
means the same homogeneous product can sell at di¤erent prices even without
product di¤erentiation. Firms can make the same prot through a high price
and lower sales volume strategy or through a lower price and high sales volume
strategy.
As long as rms charge a price within the prot maximising range they can
keep it xed. However, the prot maximising range of prices that denes the
price distribution adjusts as a function of shocks so that for example monetary
policy is neutral. Therefore, even though this model can match the frequency
of micro level price adjustment and other facts about the price distribution
quite well (and in fact better than most commonly used Keynesian sticky price
models), its aggregate dynamics are like those of a exible price level economy.52
Burdett and Menzio (2014) [38] add xed price adjustment costs to the Burdett
and Judd price dispersion model and calibrate the extended model to US micro
level data. They estimate that price adjustment costs account for at most
35% of the observed price rigidity. The remaining price rigidity is due to search
frictions. These estimates are still quite preliminary, but they suggest that price
rigidity may not be the main factor in explaining monetary non neutrality.
Regardless of ones opinion on the realism of the Burdett Judd sticky price
model, the analysis highlights the critical role of complementarity between the
pricing decisions of rms holding xed prices and rms resetting their prices.
Given the observed frequency of price adjustment in many economies, a sig-
nicant quantitative role for Keynesian price rigidity requires price resetters to
want to set a price close to that of other rms that are not adjusting their price.
This explains the large amount of research e¤ort dedicated by New Keynesians
to nding such sources of pricing complementarity (also known in the literature
as real rigidities). These range from rm specic production factors (Altig et al
2009), to kinked demand curves (Smets and Wouters (2007) [164]).
The e¤ect of these real rigidities is highly dependant on the form of price
stickiness. For example, rm specic production factors can increase aggre-
gate price rigidity in the Calvo model with exogenous probability of price ad-
justment, but decrease it in state dependant pricing models (Dotsey and King
(2005)). More elastic demand increases real rigidity in the Calvo model(Gali ch.
3 (2007) [90]) because the dominant e¤ect is for higher elasticity to reduce the
52 In fact, in the baseline calibration of the model, the average time between price changes is
11.6 months, which is similar to the typical duration of prices in the Eurozone. Yet monetary
policy is neutral.
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desired deviation of price adjusters from the price set by non adjusting rms.
But in models where the probability is endogenous (state dependent pricing)
or the price rigidity a¤ects the size of the adjustment (the Rotemberg partial
adjustment model) more elastic demand encourages more frequent and larger
price adjustments in response to aggregate shocks (see for example the IMFs
GEM (2008) model).
Other sources of pricing complementarity are sticky production input prices
which reduce movements in marginal costs. Smaller movements in marginal
costs in turn reduce desired price adjustments. The most important of these in-
put price rigidities is wage rigidity, either due to contractual frictions or because
of a highly elastic labour supply. Again, New Keynesians have done a lot of re-
search on the level of wage rigidity, either due to rigid contract terms or elastic
aggregate labour supply. Whether the observed amount of wage rigidity has a
signicant e¤ect on costs in a way that a¤ects pricing is controversial (Barro
(1977) [20], Pissarides (2009) [154], Chetty et al (2011)[53] ). The problem is
that while wages of workers with tenure are rigid, wages of new hires, which
is what matters most for pricing decisions (if pricing is close to optimal) are
actually quite exible. Therefore, observed wage rigidity inside a contract can
be compatible with exible marginal costs.
As for other explanations of elastic labour supply, Chetty et al (2011) [53]suggest
that aggregate labour supply elasticity is much lower than the estimate used
typical DSGE models: many macro models which match low elasticity on the
intensive margin but assume a highly elastic extensive margin overpredict the
response of hours of work to past historical events such as tax reforms. Rogerson
and Keane (2011) argue that labour supply is quite elastic if we take into account
e¤ort and human capital formation. Erosa et al (2014)[75] nd that a model
combining several realistic features such as idiosyncratic income risk, matching
frictions, partially indivisible labour supply and life cycle saving can match the
response to historical tax changes while delivering an aggregate labour supply
elasticity of around 1.3-1.75. This is still much lower than the aggregate labour
supply elasticity of 2-4 often assumed in macroeconomic models. 53
Finally, recent micro level evidence for the US (Bils et al (2012) [142]) nd
that reset price ination (in the price index of those rms adjusting their price
in a given period) is actually quite volatile and has low persistence. This sug-
gests a low level of pricing complementarity between price resetters and xed
53A low aggregate labour supply elasticity is a challenge for both Keynesian and RBC
models, to the degree that one of the goals is to endogenise aggregate uctuations as much
as possible and to reduce dependence on large exogeneous shocks. Of course this is less of
a problem to the degree that the large shocks (the wedges in our model) can actually be
endogenised through some of the mechanisms we have discussed (e.g credit frictions, changes
in the e¢ ciency of the search and distribution processes in goods markets, shifts in the level
of competition etc...), or to the degree that we can generate shifts in the labour supply curve
(e.g from changes in demand for durables or the cost of nancing nondurable consumption
c;t).
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price rms, posing a challenge to standard New Keynesian models relying on a
high level of aggregate price stickiness and ination persistence (e.g the Smets
and Wouters model). It remains to be seen how these results apply in other
important economies such as the Eurozone or emerging markets.
15.9 Do we need large price adjustment costs for aggre-
gate price rigidity?
We can get signicant aggregate nominal price rigidity in response to certain
shocks despite low price adjustment costs if there are delays in absorbing new
information about the economy (e.g Mankiw and Reis(2010) [141] sticky in-
formation model ) or if there are costs to simultaneously paying the same level
of attention to aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. In the last situation, a rm
will typically prefer to focus on adjusting its price in response to more volatile
and signicant idiosyncratic shock and adjust more infrequently to aggregate
shocks (see Mackowiak and Wiederholt(2011) [138] DSGE model with rational
inattention54). The ability to generate nominal e¤ects even with low costs of
price adjustment costs is important for Keynesian sticky price theory to the de-
gree that recent evidence has found price adjustment in the US and many other
countries is not so infrequent after al, e.g once every 4-7 months on average
(Klenow and Malin, 2010)[129].
Limited attention models also predict that when unusually large aggregate
shocks a¤ect the economy (especially negative crises) rms will dedicate rela-
tively more e¤ort to understanding the impact of the aggregate shock. In theory,
it is even possible that rms pay more attention in this case to the aggregate
shock than to the idiosyncratic shocks. Price adjustment may be signicantly
more exible for example in a nancial crisis than in an ordinary recession.
Firms will also pay more attention to more important aggregate shocks such as
productivity or nancial shocks than to monetary shocks. As a result, prices
are likely to be much more exible for these shocks.
Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2011) [138] nd in their preferred calibration
that the output gap is almost completely eliminated after 1 year in response to
a technology shock. In contrast, monetary policy shocks a¤ect output signi-
cantly for more than a year and a half. These mechanism are missing from the
most commonly used time dependent price adjustment models, which assume
the frequency of price adjustment is (approximately) independent of economic
conditions. For example, a similar calibration with Calvo price adjustment costs
implies that productivity shocks lead to output gaps that are signicant for more
than 3 years after the shock. To the degree that real shocks dominate business
54They use the Rational Inattention model in which agents optimise subject to noisy mea-
surements of the variables a¤ecting their decisions. Unlike in the standard state-space ltering
framework, agents can reduce the measurement errors in the signals they get, subject to in-
formation processing constraints.
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cycles, these results suggest a much larger role for the RBC dynamics towards
which the sticky price economy converges. At the same time, sticky prices are
still important in understanding and tracking business cycles if demand shocks
are large and frequent, so that in any given quarter the output gap is signi-
cant. And rational inattention models can also rationalise strong output e¤ects
in response to disinations, such as the one in the US in the early 1980s or in
Canada in the early 1990s, because of imperfect credibility of the changes in
the ination target or because it takes time for people to realise there was a
change in the monetary policy regime.
16 A large open economy extension of the RBC
model
Until now we have assumed a closed economy. This section cannot possibly cover
all of the issues raised by an open economy (see Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe (2014)
for a comprehensive textbook on open-economy DSGE models). The objective
is a more modest extension of the closed economy model to allow us to consider
current account uctuations. Much has been written about the business cycle
dynamics of a small open economy with little control over interest rates it faces
and extensions to small or moderate frictions generating systematic di¤erences
between domestic and foreign risk free rates. The small open economy setup
can be seen as having a perfectly elastic supply of world lending to the country.
Here we consider the opposite extreme of an exogenous current account
which may be more relevant for large countries or blocks like the US, the Euro-
zone, Japan and maybe even China (though many would argue that the large
Chinese current account surplus is an important factor in Chinas growth path
and business cycle). For most of the post 2nd world war period, current ac-
counts have been much smaller than would be predicted by DSGE models with
unrestricted international nancial markets. Heathcote and Perri (2002) com-
pare international RBC models with complete international nancial markets,
incomplete markets and nancial autarky, in which the current account cannot
be adjusted. They nd that the nancial autarky model provides a better empir-
ical t to the data in several dimensions. From this perspective, the exogenous
current account model may be seen as a useful simplication.
Suppose there is a perfectly inelastic world demand for domestic debt, as in
Favilukis et al (2011) [82]. This changes the bond market equilibrium condition
to
bt+1 = nfat+1;
where nfat+1 is the exogenous process for net foreign assets. Alternatively we
can express this as
bt+1 + b
f
t+1 = 0;
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where bft+1 are exogenous domestic bond holdings by foreigners. In this case
movement in domestic demand for loans will simply shift interest rates, just like
in the closed economy. If this is a good approximation, then the closed economy
framework may not be too inaccurate. At least for current accounts which are
not too large in magnitude, the previous analysis of the reaction of the economy
to di¤erent shocks remains true. But allowing for a non-zero current account
does introduce an extra source of shocks.
What happens if world demand for domestic debt shifts for some time (a
stationary shock), for example because China desires to hold more US debt?
Consider rst the real business cycle economy in the case where the economy
is a net borrower from global nancial markets. The current account balance
decreases by assumption (it becomes even lower than zero). Intuitively the
increased supply of debt to the US causes real interest rates to go down, en-
couraging investment and consumption. Households feel wealthier and reduce
their labour supply. If there is no feedback from the better borrowing conditions
to the demand for exible production inputs such as labour or to the utilisation
rate of the inputs (due to e.g. lower nancing or search frictions), domestic pro-
duction goes down despite the increase in consumption and investment. This
is compatible with equilibrium because of the decline in net exports. On the
other hand if there are positive feedback e¤ects on utilisation rates and labour
demand, domestic production can increase despite the decline in net exports.55
The analysis changes for a country that is a net lender to the world. In
that case we would still expect a decline in interest rates and an increase in
investment. The e¤ect on consumption may be di¤erent because lower interest
rates generate a negative income e¤ect for savers, going against the direction of
the substitution e¤ect and the wealth e¤ect. So we would expect any increase
in consumption to be lower, or we could even have a decline in consumption.
If we know that the shock above actually reduces net exports
yt   ct   xkt = bt+1   bt(1 + rt)
; then the conclusions are clearer. In this case, Chari et al (2007) [50] note that
this shock is identical to a lower government spending shock nanced by cuts in
lump-sum taxes. So we can apply the analysis from government spending shocks
in a closed economy to argue that if net exports go down, absent any e¤ects
on TFP or e¤ects on the household marginal utility of consumption through
changes in durables investment, then consumption and investment increase while
labour supply and output decline. The same analysis with reversed signs applies
to a "sudden stop" where international nancial markets are less willing to lend
to the domestic economy. This shows that in a baseline RBC model, a pure
55 In theory lower labour supply could reduce investment if it lasts several periods, by re-
ducing the marginal product of capital. In practice, the e¤ect of a lower interest rate probably
dominates.
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sudden stop would actually lead to higher output! Of course, sudden stops
are usually accompanied by negative terms of trade shocks and nancial shocks
that worsen nancing conditions for rms. Terms of trade shocks are similar to
a reduction in TFP, and we have already seen how worse nancing conditions
lower TFP and increase labour demand wedges. These factors can explain the
decline in output during a sudden stop (see for example Mendoza (2008)).
17 Government SpendingMultipliers in Real Busi-
ness Cycle and New Keynesian Models
We now return to the close economy and introduce government. In the baseline
analysis, we follow most of the literature in assuming that government spending
does not directly increase productivity in order to highlight the pure e¤ect on
output. Government spending simply represents a stream of expenditures that
have to be nanced somehow. This does not mean that it is a complete waste.
Another interpretation is that it is essential spending that cannot be avoided, or
it may accomplish some redistributional goals but with only minor direct e¤ects
on productivity.
We follow the baseline assumption that government goods are produced us-
ing the same production function and under the same prot maximisation con-
siderations as in the private sector. Essentially this says that the equilibrium
is the same if the government produces its own goods or subcontracts to the
private sector We also assume perfect substitutability in labour supply to either
the government or the private sectors. These are strong assumptions, but they
allow to highlight the main e¤ects of changes in government spending without
worrying about the costs of intersectoral reallocation of production. We will
discuss the consequences of relaxing these assumptions latter.
The resource constraint of the economy becomes
ct + It + gt = yt:
In the single representative household framework, Ricardian equivalence
holds as long as the government uses only non-distortionnary taxation and we
ignore the e¤ect of the timing of taxes on the wedges. That is, for any xed
stream of government sending plans fgt+jgj=0;::1 ; we get the same path for
other non scal variables regardless of the timing of taxes or debt changes. This
occurs because the higher demand for debt by the government is met by an
increase in the supply of savings demanded by the private sector. These hy-
potheses are a frequent starting point for discussion of these issues despite their
lack of realism. We also start with lump sump taxes and Ricardian equivalence
as a benchmark in order to emphasize some of the key issues in a simplied
way. This allows us to impose a balanced budget every period without loss of
generality,
T gt = gt;
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where T gt are government taxes
56 . Note that that our analysis of government
spending shocks applies more generally to sectors of the economy for which
output is taken as exogenous. For example, net exports can be modelled as
exogenous in closed economy models (see. for example Smets and Wouters
(2002), [163]).
17.1 A digression on Ricardian equivalence and the crowd-
ing out e¤ects of government debt: how important
is the timing of government taxes and decits?
Ricardian equivalence has been particularly contentious in many circles (Elmen-
dorf and Mankiw (1999) [73]and Romer (2001) [157], ch. 10) ). To some analysts
the idea that households increase saving in response to higher future tax liabili-
ties is far fetched. For households that are not borrowing constrained Ricardian
equivalence requires that on average households realise that signicant increases
in government decits are likely to lead to future scal austerity measures if the
government avoids default, or more plausibly if the probability of default is low.
Alternatively, households would be concerned about the possibility of costly
default. In either case, such concerns should lead to higher household saving
when government decits increase. This is a natural consequence of the RE
assumption that on average households estimate their expected future income
net of taxes sequence correctly.
From an RE perspective, important deviations from Ricardian equivalence
have to be justied by appealing to more fundamental frictions such as credit
constraints. In fact, Evans et al (2010) argue that without these frictions under
some assumptions Ricardian equivalence may hold even under learning dynam-
ics. 57 For a tax cut, Ricardian equivalence is a good approximation as long as
households save most of the tax cut to smooth their consumption.
From a general equilibrium perspective, Ricardian equivalence forces us to
take into account that a priori, whether the private sector funds new government
spending through higher taxes of through higher government bond purchases,
in either case this constitutes a reduction of the private sectors disposable in-
come available for consumption or investment. This is true even if Ricardian
equivalence itself fails. A priori, it is not clear why reducing disposable income
through government bond purchases should lead to a smaller negative e¤ect on
56Recall that Tt includes other lump sum taxes transfers to households to compensate for
deadweight losses from the wedges.
57The key assumptions for Ricardian equivalence to hold under learning dynamics are that
forecasting rules for interest rates are independent of scal variables (which is unrealistic if
we allow for default risk, but Evans et a (2010) ignore default risk and anyways default risk
would break Ricardian equivalence under RE) and government spending is exogenous (though
again, Ricardian equivalence can fail with RE as well if changes in government decits inuence
agentsbeliefs on the path of government spending).
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consumption and investment than paying higher taxes. Both types of fund-
ing can reduce private sector spending. Ricardian equivalence determines the
interest rate e¤ects of changes in government debt. The closer we are to full
equivalence, the less interest rates have to rise to induce the private sector to
increase its bond holdings. Conventional old Keynesian analysis that assumes
only taxes reduces the private sectors ability to spend simply ignores this point,
precisely because it is inconsistent in its treatment of the economys resource
and budget constraints.
Ricardian equivalence requires lump sum taxation and no government de-
fault risk. Government debt levels matter even under Ricardian equivalence
when they a¤ect the timing of distortionnary taxes or when they can lead to
costly sovereign default. Default becomes unavoidable once debt levels become
so high that economically and politically feasible tax increases or spending cuts
are insu¢ cient to ensure repayment. For example, this is a major concern with
the scale of unfunded pension and healthcare liabilities facing many developed
economies over the next decades (see Leeper and Walker 2011, Trabandt and
Uhlig (2012)). Finally, Ricardian equivalence is a statement about the e¤ects
of the sequence of taxes and decits hold the sequence of government expendi-
tures constant. Forward looking households would rationally consume a large
portion of a tax cut if it leads them to expect signicant cuts in future govern-
ment spending.58 The point of Ricardian equivalence is that these e¤ects are
distinct and can have quite a di¤erent from the old Keynesian argument that
government decits crowd out private saving.
The complete markets and intertemporal optimisation consumption/saving
model underlying the initial version of Ricardian equivalence is clearly false.
But the recent evidence suggests moderate marginal propensities to consume
out of tax rebates when taking an average over many households, with the
best estimates somewhere around the range of 20%-25%. Kaplan and Violante
(2014) [120] survey the evidence from reduced form regressions and develop an
extension of the optimising PIH with precautionary savings and illiquid assets
that matches the empirical evidence. One of their key ndings is that the MPC
out of tax rebates depends on the size of the rebate: as transfers become larger,
it can go down by up to a factor of 3. This suggests caution in generalising from
small tax rebates to larger ones. There is also evidence of signicant insurance
against individual income shocks (e.g Kaplan and Violante (2010) [119] and
the references they cite). This suggests that the other extreme of assuming
household saving does not respond at all to changes in the government decit
is probably an even worse approximation.
In general, Ricardian equivalence will fail in the presence of credit constraints
if the government can borrow and lend to credit constrained agents more e¢ -
ciently than the private sector (Romer (2001), ch. 11 [157]). For example the
58See Simon Wren Lewis blog post for a discussion of this point
(http://mainlymacro.blogspot.com/2013/02/ricardian-equivalence-and-political.html).
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government may have easier access to credit if it can provide a stronger commit-
ment to repay its debt than the private sector. In this case government borrow-
ing a¤ects aggregate macroeconomic quantities by increasing the e¤ectivenes of
nancial intermediation. A special case of this result is the positive e¤ect on
aggregate consumption of tax cuts in models with rule of thumb households
who simply consume their after tax income each period (a common assumption
in many scal policy DSGE models, e.g Gali et al (2007) [91] and the IMFs
GIMF model (2013) [7]). These households are unable to borrow even though
they would like to. A reduction in taxes relaxes their borrowing constraint.
Alternatively, because transfers to credit constrained agents can a¤ect con-
sumption and interest rates with incomplete markets, Ricardian equivalence fails
if the government uses the debt issue to implement a transfer from unconstrained
agents (typically the government bondholders) to the credit constrained agents .
The government does this by cutting current taxes for credit constrained agents,
and paying the debt by raising future taxes for unconstrained agents. This is
similar to a transfer from unconstrained to credit constrained agents. In this
case a rise in government debt at moderate levels (so sovereign default risk con-
cerns are minimal) behaves similarly to a lower discount factor ~t+1 shock: In a
exible price economy this leads to higher loan demand, pushes up consumption
and interest rates while reducing investment. In a sticky price economy, inter-
est rate e¤ects are smaller, and instead output increases. Similarly, in an open
economy, suppose the government has more credibility in repaying its debt to
foreigners than the private sector in a nancial crisis. In this case, a nancial
crisis like the one in the US in 2008 will be accompanied simultaneously by
higher government borrowing from foreigners that is not fully o¤set by lower
private borrowing.
Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) [73] and Romer (2001) [157] provide excellent
discussions of these issues and a review of more reduced form empirical evidence.
Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) conclude that the vast number of empirical stud-
ies trying to test Ricardian equivalence are bogged by deep endogeneity and
measurement issues, making it di¢ cult to draw any strong conclusions.
Perez (2010) develops a DSGE model where non Ricardian e¤ects of gov-
ernment debt are signicant due to heterogenous liquidity constraints on rms.
He nds that if credit markets are tight enough, higher government debt raises
interest rates and crowds in investment by increasing the returns on savings by
rms. On the other hand for more realistic levels of credit constraints higher
government debt raises interest rates and crowds out private investment by
making private borrowing more expensive. His model makes several extreme
assumptions such as no saving by workers. It remains to be seen how these re-
sults extend to more general setting and more serious estimation or calibration
exercises.
17.2 The government spending multiplier
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The key question in this section is how e¤ective are increases in government
spending in raising GDP? Dene the government spending multiplier for horizon
J as
Jg;y =
Jj=0
yt+j
Rgt;t+j
Jj=0
gt+j
Rgt;t+j
;
where gt+j is the change in government spending in period t+ j; yt+j is
the change in GDP in period t+j and Rgt;t+j is the gross discount rate between t
and t+j. The main question for the evaluation of scal stimulus plans is whether
or not Jg;y is bigger or less than 1. A multiplier below 1 implies that while
GDP increases, private spending has actually gone down so that the increase
in government spending can only be justied as an unavoidable necessity or as
a potentially ine¢ cient redistribution mechanism. A multiplier above 1 means
that private spending has actually increased. While this does not imply higher
private sector welfare, it makes it much more likely that welfare has increased.
A low multiplier coupled with decit nancing also increases the likelihood that
scal stimulus spending reduces the sustainability of government debt. A high
multiplier increases the probability that a scal stimulus program may actually
lower debt to GDP ratios and improve the governments scal position.
Keynesian economists often argue for large scal stimulus plans in a reces-
sion based on the belief in large scal multiplier above 1 (e.g the American
scal stimulus plan of 2009 was premised on a short run multiplier of 1.5). Of
course, if the multiplier is always above 1, then the government could always
boost GDP and private spending by increasing the proportion of government
spending in GDP. The fact that many analysts are wary of the conclusion that
higher government spending as a proportion of output is always better, and the
frequent arguments to the contrary that high government spending as a propor-
tion of output can lead to lower output suggests that there are doubts about
the linearity of the e¤ects of government spending. Perhaps the same large
multipliers that apply for small stimulus programs do not apply to larger ones.
To analyse this issue requires a more formal, systematic investigation: precisely
what the DSGE approach tries to accomplish.
17.3 Two cases when the government spending multiplier
is (almost) irrelevant
Before proceeding we should note the implications of another extreme assump-
tion on how government spending enters the model, that delivers stunningly
di¤erent conclusions from the standard analysis in the next sections. Suppose
that government spending and private consumption are perfect substitutes, so
that the utility function is u(ct+ gt; 1 nt; Dt+1). This may be a good approxi-
mation to government spending programs that duplicate goods and services that
are usually produced by the private sector with an equal level of e¢ ciency. Since
ct and gt are perfect substitutes, the households problem for a given sequence
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of prices only depends on ct + gt: The rmsproblem for a given sequence of
prices is also independent of the composition of ct + gt: Furthemore, the split
of ct + gt between its two components is indeterminate without speciying the
process for gt. Therefore, we can solve the model for all variables and for ct+gt
independently of gt as long as the governments choice of gt does not imply
ct < 0 (this would almost never happen for plausibly low gt).
In this case the equilibrium of the economy is independent of gt and the
government spending multiplier is zero. Intuitively, this case is analogous to the
government increasing its spending simply by taking over a private business. In
this case, there is no reason for economic activity to change unless there is a
change in the e¢ ciency of running the business (output would increase if the
government improves the businesse¢ ciency and vice versa output would decline
if the government is less e¤ective at managing the business). While households
have less income to spend on private consumption, there is no negative wealth
e¤ect because higher government consumption is a perfect substitute for the
reduced private consumption. Furthermore, under this hypothesis, we can model
the economy without explicitly discussing the government sector after redening
the relevant consumption index for the purpose of estimation and forecasting to
be ct + gt:
In reality, activities that are usually performed by the public sector are quite
di¤erent from those performed by the private sector. However, the analysis with
perfect substitutability of government and private consumption does suggest
that to the degree that large scal stimulus plans may increasingly spend on
activities that are already performed well by the private sector, they will lose
some of their e¤ectiveness in raising output.
In the opposite direction, to the degree that government spending is well
directed towards projects that complement private sector consumption and in-
vestment (e.g infrastructure spending or education and healthcare spending),
this will increase the government spending multiplier (see for example Coenen
et als (2012) analysis using a scal policy version of the ECBs NAWM). In
some cases with highly productive government investment even exible price
models can generate large government spending multipliers. At the same time,
recognizing the importance of productive government spending suggests that we
should be careful in linear extrapolation of government spending multipliers in
certain episodes. In the most plausible case of diminishing returns to govern-
ment investment, government spending multipliers observed in economies with
a small government sector are likely to be larger than those in economies with
an already large government sector with lower returns on additional spending.
There is another reason for why the e¤ectiveness of government spending in-
creases in stimulating economic activities may be severely overestimated. Con-
sider the classic caricature Keynesian thought experiment in which higher gov-
ernment spending is simply used to pay salaries to the unemployed while en-
gaging them in completely unproductive activities (e.g digging holes and lling
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them up again). Since the unemployed are not really producing anything, this
is equivalent to a transfer from employed workers to the unemployed. But in a
model with complete nancial markets this transfer has no e¤ect on economic
quantities. The government spending multiplier is zero in this case. National
income statistics frequently evaluate the output of the government sector at the
cost of the labour and other production inputs it uses. In this case, they would
actually report a government spending multiplier of 1, even though value added
in the economy has not really change.
The case of completely unproductive government spending is extreme. On
the other hand, the majority of increases in government expenditure in scal
stimulus packages during the 2009 recession were in the form of transfers (Oh
and Reis (2012) [152]). With more realistic incomplete nancial markets, trans-
fers to agents whose credit constraints are binding or more likely to bind (due to
lower asset levels) can signicantly raise output. But it remains the case that in
current DSGE models with credit constraints, the multiplier e¤ects of transfer
shocks are signicantly lower than those for government spending shocks (see
GIMF (2013) [7] for results from a state of the art New Keynesian DSGE model,
see Oh and Reis (2012)[152] for an analysis of the e¤ect of transfers with price
rigidities and uninsured household idiosyncratic risk).
The positive e¤ects of transfers on consumption and possibly on output are
likely to be more important in a nancial crisis when many agents are credit
constrained, if the transfers are well targetted to alleviate nancing frictions.
In this case, the government essentially acts as a replacement for the missing
private sector nancial intermediation during the crisis. Whether or not actual
government transfer programs during the 2008-2010 nancial crisis were well
targetted in this sense is still an open question. On the other hand, a pure
transfer nanced by lump sum taxes is a priori neutral in its e¤ect on private
spending, while government spending crowds out private spending if the mul-
tiplier is less than 1. Transfers can have a negative output multiplier if they
are nanced by distortionnary taxes. 59 Note that regardless of the low multi-
plier e¤ects on output, increases in transfers in a recession may increase welfare
by providing valuable insurance to poorer households against job loss or more
general income loss.
17.4 Government spending multipliers in models with xed
capital stock
We now return to the standard analysis, in which government spending uses
productive resources and is not a perfect substitute for private spending. We
start with a xed capital stock model, where labour is the only input and
yt = ct + gt:
59 In an open economy, some of the crowding out can take the form of lower availability of
domestic goods to foreigners - lower net exports.
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As in earlier analysis, we start with the exible price and wage economy.
In the benchmark RBC model government spending does not a¤ect labour de-
mand. Therefore, changes in output in response to changes in government
spending must come from shifts in labour supply. Suppose rst that there is no
income e¤ect on labour supply. In this case equilibrium in the labour market is
una¤ected by changes in government spending. Therefore, output is una¤ected
and the rst period multiplier must be 0. The increase in government spending
is completely o¤set with a fall in private spending.
Now return to the more common case in which leisure is a normal good
(whose demand increases with income). An increase in government spending
must lower private consumption, leading to a rst period multiplier less than
one. To see this note that if consumption does not change, then output must
increase. The output increase requires a rise in labour supply which by the
income e¤ect requires lower consumption. This contradicts the initial hypothesis
that consumption does not change. If consumption rises, labour supply falls
by the income e¤ect. This implies a fall in output, contradicting the rise in
output due to the increase in consumption and government spending. The only
remaining possibility is that consumption falls, labour supply rises and output
increases by less than the increase in government spending.
The result reects the common intuition that higher government spending
reduces private consumption and increases labour supply in an RBC economy
because of a reduction in household wealth. It explains the di¢ culty of such
models in reproducing the positive comovement between output, government
spending and consumption that appears in some of the reduced form empirical
studies.
In order to understand the di¤erence that sticky prices will make for the
strength of the multiplier it helps to examine the di¤erence between purely
transitory and persistent government spending shocks. We can gain signicant
intuition about this distinction using a 2 period economy with labour as the
only input. 60
If the government spending shock only occurs in the 1st period, 2nd period
output is una¤ected. To see this, note that any change in second period con-
sumption would imply that output must change in the same direction, from the
resource constraint. At the same time, by the income e¤ect on labour supply
consumption and output must move in the opposite direction. This contradic-
tion establishes the result.
We have already found that increased government spending in the 1st pe-
riod must lower 1st period consumption. Since 2nd period output does not
change, the consumption Euler equation implies a higher real interest rate as
60One interpretation of this model is that there are many periods, but the economy converges
back to the deterministic BGP two periods after a shock.
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households try to smooth consumption against what is essentially a negative
temporary income shock. In contrast, if productivity and the increase in gov-
ernment spending are the same across periods, for standard utility functions we
get that
ct = ct+1:
Therefore, there is no e¤ect on the real interest rate.More generally, a more
persistent positive government spending shock in this economy will generate a
smaller real interest rate increase.
Finally, consider a change in government spending only in the second period.
Previous arguments have shown that 2nd period consumption declines, 2nd pe-
riod output increases while 1st period variables remain unchanged. By the
consumption Euler equation real interests decline, as households try to smooth
consumption across periods by saving more in period 1. The analysis also shows
that the standard reasoning about higher government spending a¤ecting labour
supply through wealth e¤ects is not completely accurate. The timing of govern-
ment spending also matters. In general equilibrium the response of consumption
to future or past changes in government spending can be zero (in our special
case of xed capital) or quite small more generally. In a exible price model
without capital and without labour demand curve and government spending
interactions, consumption is in fact invariant to news shocks on government
spending. Finally the response of interest rates to a government spending shock
can have di¤erent signs depending on the path of the shock.
Nominal price rigidity has a major impact on the analysis of government
spending shocks.. In this case, the government spending multiplier critically
depends on the central banks interest rate policy. We continue with the same
2 period model. Start with a special case in which the 1st period price level
must equal the 2nd period price level, the central bank follows a xed nominal
interest rate target , and prices after the 1st period can adjust exibly. This is
close to the common undergraduate textbook analysis of government spending
shocks with xed prices in the short run and exible prices in the long run.
Our assumptions imply a xed real interest rate in the 1st period, so absent
any intertemporal demand shocks 1st period consumption must be equal to 2nd
period consumption.
Suppose government spending increases only in the 1st period. 2nd period
consumption and output are una¤ected due to price exibility. By the Euler
equation with a xed real interest rate, 1st period consumption is also un-
changed. Therefore, output increases. This is compatible with the rigid price
equilibrium because rms are willing to satisfy any demand from the private
sector or government at the xed price. Because consumption does not respond
the 1st period government spending multiplier is now 1. In contrast, the exible
price multiplier was below 1.
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Now consider a permanent increase in government spending, where 2nd pe-
riod government spending increases by the same amount as that in the 1st
period. Second period consumption falls. By the Euler equation with a xed
real interest rate, 1st period consumption will fall by the same amount, as house-
holds attempt to smooth consumption through higher saving at a xed interest
rate. Therefore, in this case the government spending multiplier is below 1.
In fact it is the same as in the exible price case, because in that case as well
consumption in both periods falls by the same amount.
Finally, if government spending increases only in period 2, consumption
in period 1 will also fall by the Euler equation. In contrast, in the exible
price economy rst period consumption is una¤ected by the future government
spending shocks. The future higher government spending shock is similar to a
negative news shock. This has a bigger e¤ect in the sticky price economy (see
the previous discussion of news shocks in the New Keynesian models for more
on this point).
All of these conclusions are conditional on a passive central bank interest
rate policy. In many setups it is in fact optimal for the central bank to target
the same real interest rate as in exible price models, that is the natural interest
rate. If the central successfully tracks this natural interest rate, our conclusions
about the importance of sticky prices for the government spending multiplier
are completely reversed: now the sticky price and exible price economies have
the exact same government spending multipliers. In intermediate cases, such
as an interest rate rule responding positively to ination and an output gap
measure with nite coe¢ cients, the 1st period multiplier for transitory 1st period
government spending shocks is below 1 but above the exible price multiplier.
Much of the analysis from the 2 period model survives in a more realistic
innite horizon economy. Woodford (2010) [180] starts with a benchmark sticky
price environment in which the central bank targets a xed real interest rate
and any government spending shocks are stationary so the economy eventually
converges back to the steady state. His analysis of this case reproduces our
conclusions in the 2 period model with a rigid 1st period price and xed central
bank nominal interest rate target. In particular, the xed real interest rate pins
down consumption as xed in response to the increase in government spending.
As a result the multiplier is equal to 1. 61
With full output gap stabilisation, the sticky price multiplier is identical to
that exible price multiplier. In the intermediate case of partial response to
ination, the output gap or the natural rate of interest (e.g through a Taylor
61Woodford himself notes that it may seem strange that this result is independent of the
level of price rigidity. He emphasizes that as prices become more exible, the government
spending shock generates bigger uctuations in ination for a xed real interest rate. As a
result the analysis is really only valid for high levels of price rigidity. Otherwise the central
bank would almost certainly adjust interest rates to control ination.
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rule) the multiplier is below 1 but above the exible price multiplier. The
negative e¤ect of higher government spending news shocks in the presence of
price rigidity and the lower multiplier for more persistent government spending
shocks also survive in innite horizon economies. In fact Woodford nds that the
sticky price multiplier can be signicantly negative in the presence of permanent
government spending shocks.
The innite horizon environment allows for a more realistic analysis of the
spending multiplier at the zero lower bound (ZLB) on the nominal interest rate.
Start with the standard analysis that assumes ination is below or above target
when the economy exits the ZLB episode (e.g Werning (2012) [177]. Here the
central bank is constrained in its ability to lower interest rates in order to track
the natural interest rate. With a xed price level, the multiplier would be 1. But
with partial price exibility, higher government spending over several periods
during which the zero lower bound constraint is binding can lead to higher
expected ination (through higher output gaps) which lowers real interest rates.
As a result, the government spending multiplier may exceed 1 signicantly.
Under some parameter values Christiano et al (2010) [54] nd a multiplier
above 2 at the ZLB, using a medium scale New Keynesian DSGE model. In
contrast, other studies (e.g Drautzenberg and Uhlig (2013) [68]) nd lower mul-
tipliers below 1 for government spending shocks at the ZLB. The key di¤erence
in the results is that studies nding a low multiplier assume that the government
spending increase lasts signicantly longer than the duration of the zero lower
bound problem. The expectation of future increases in government spending
and taxes when the economy is no longer at the ZLB reduces private sector
income expectations, lowering consumption and investment. 62 These results
match our earlier analysis of how higher government spending news shocks de-
press output with sticky prices, lowering the government spending multiplier.
The overall picture emerging from the initial analysis using New Keynesian
policy models is that a rise in government spending can be quite e¤ective in
reducing the e¤ects of a deep recession when nominal interest rates are close to
zero, as long the extra spending is mostly accomplished when the economy is
still in the ZLB regime (see Coenen et al (2011) [76] for a survey of multipliers
from several policy models). The positive e¤ect on output of an early stimulus
can be enhanced by promises of future reductions in government spending and
taxes, that act like a positive news shock. However, given the multiplicity of
equilibria and the importance of nonlinearity at the ZLB, these conclusions
need to be interpreted with some caution, especially since they are based on
(log)linear approximations of the main model equations and are not robust to
di¤erent assumptions on monetary policy rules.
Recent research (e.g Mertens and Ravn (2014) [146], Cochrane (2014) [60],
Kiley (2014) [124]) has questioned the e¤ectiveness of government spending in-
62Note that Christiano et al report static multipliers
dYt+j
dGt+j
:
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creases at the ZLB. It has shown that there are other ZLB equilibria in which
the government spending multiplier is less than 1. In particular the government
spending multiplier is likely to be less than 1 for relatively high price exibility,
high duration of the ZLB and if monetary policy allows ination to be above
target when exiting the ZLB . In Mertens and Ravn (2014) [146], these ZLB
equilibria are generated by self fullling expectations of deation and zero in-
terest rates. In Cochrane (2014) [60], government spending multipliers are less
than 1 if agents expect the central bank to allow ination to be above target
when exiting the ZLB regime.
These equilibria have the intuitive property that as prices become more
exible the dynamics of the economy converge to the exible price limit. They
have the counterintuitive property that higher government spending may reduce
the private sector output gap. For a more detailed analysis, see the earlier
section on the conditions for higher price to be stabilising for aggregate demand
shocks (noting that an increase in goverment spending is a positive aggregate
demand shock).
17.5 Di¤erences in the production function of the private
and government sectors, limited intersectoral mobil-
ity and the government spending multiplier
The standard DSGE models assume the same production function for the gov-
erment and private sectors. Essentially, our analysis so far (and most standard
analysis) assumes that it is irrelevant whether or not the government itself pro-
duces gt or it subcontracts it out to the private sector. Here, we examine the
consequences of the more realistic assumption of separate production functions
for government goods and private goods. To keep things simple, we ignore
income e¤ects on labour supply, for example by using the utility function
u(c; l) = c+ v(l); vl > 0; vll  0:
Suppose that there is a government production function
gt = zg;tf(ng;t); fng>0; fngng  0;
and a private production function
ct = zp;tf(np;t); fnp>0; fnpnp  0:
The private sector decides how much to produce based on standard prot
maximisation considerations. The government sector simply produces whatever
is demanded by the government.
We start by illustrating a case where this production structure is exactly
equivalent to the standard assumption of a common production function across
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sectors. Continue assuming that government and private sector labour supplies
are perfect substitutes with l = 1   np   ng: The private sector labour market
always satises
vl = w = zpfnp:
Suppose
f(nj) = n

j ; j = g; p;
; 0 <   1:
Suppose  = 1; so that
vl = w = zp:
This labour market equilibrium condition implies the same amount of labour
supply regardless of any change in government spending g: As a result
n
g
= 0; and
y
g
 0 () zg  zp:
In this case of constant returns to scale and perfect substitutability between
working in the private and government sectors, we get identical results as for
the case with a single production function if zp = zg:
Now, we will consider a case where despite exible prices the government
spending multiplier yg = 1 just like in the Keynesian xed price model. Suppose
the representative household has the utility function
u(c; ng; np) = c  vg(ng)  vp(np);
with both vp(:) and vg(:) increasing and convex functions.
The private labour market equilibrium condition
vgng = zpfng
establishes the same equilibrium private sector labour supply np regardless
of g: As a result
c
g
= 0; and
y
g
= 1:
Note that this equilibrium requires a di¤erent wage in the government and
private sector. For example if vg(:) = vp(:) higher government spending requires
an increase in wgwp :
How did we get this "Keynesian" result despite perfect price exibility? The
key assumption here was that labour supplies to the private sector and the gov-
ernment sector were completely independent of each other. We would get the
same result if we assumed two kinds of workers, each of which could only work in
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either the private or the government sector. If the two labour markets are seg-
mented, the government can increase GDP by hiring more workers and paying
them higher wages. Since the two markets are segmented, there are no pres-
sures for higher wages in the private sector that reduce private employment (see
Beaudry and Portier (2013)[24] for a more elaborate version of this argument
in a richer model of labour mobility costs between sectors). This extreme case
highlights a simple RBC theory of the negative e¤ects of scal consolidation on
output in the short run. Government spending cuts reduce economic activity in
the short run even with exible prices and no income e¤ects on labour supply if
it is hard to switch workers and other production factors from the government
sector to the private sector.
In the more realistic case in which there is some substitution between gov-
ernment and private sector labour supplies, an increase in government labour
demand bids up private sector wages and discourages private sector labour de-
mand. This reduces the government spending multiplier to below 1. To see this,
we go back to the model where government and private sectors labour supply
are perfect substitutes, with
u(c; l) = c+ v(1  np   ng);
with v(l) increasing and concave. Dene private leisure lp = 1  np: Private
labour markets equilibrium implies
vlp
zpfnp
= zp:
Suppose g > 0: This leads to ng > 0; which increases vlp for a xed np:
But since there is no change in zp; the only way for the private labour market
equilibrium condition to hold is for private sector labour supply to fall so that
np < 0: Thus, substitutability between working in government or the private
sector leads to crowding out of private labour supply in response to higher
government spending.
Our formal derivation of this result assumes perfect substitutability in labour
supply. But it may not be such a bad approximation for the marginal worker
who is contemplating whether to work in government or the private sector at
least for moderate increases in gt: Meanwhile, income e¤ects on labour supply
can make the wage elasticity of existing government workers to wage increases
quite small. In this case, the case of high substitutability of labour supply is
likely to be a better guide to the size of the government spending multiplier.
17.6 Adding distortionnary taxes
In general government spending must be nanced with distortionnary taxes.
Higher taxes act like higher wedges, discouraging labour supply, hiring and
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investment. As a result, with distortionnary taxes exible price government
spending multipliers are much lower and usually negative at least in the long run
(Baxter and King (1993) [22],Leeper et al (2011) [134]). With sticky prices, the
e¤ect of distortionnary taxes depend on interest rate policy (Woodford (2010)
[180])). If the central bank targets a xed real interest rate and the government
spending shocks are stationary, distortionnary tax nancing does not a¤ect the
earlier conclusion of a multiplier equal to 1. If the central bank follows a Taylor
rule (which in its extreme version involves complete output gap stabilisation),
sticky price multipliers with distortionnary taxes are lower than lump sum tax
multipliers, though they are usually higher than with exible prices. The intu-
ition for this result is that an active monetary policy typically tries to eliminate
output gaps caused by price or wage rigidity, so the response of output to gov-
ernment spending is closer to that under price and wage exibility than with a
constant interest rate policy.
If the zero lower bound constraint binds, then nancing government spend-
ing through contemporaneous increases in for example labour taxes can have
the perverse e¤ect of actually increasing the multiplier(see Christiano et al
(2010[56]). This occurs because the rise in labour taxes depresses exible price
output, increasing the output gap and ination expectations. As a result, real
interest rates fall by more than under lump sum taxes. Finally, if the increase in
distortionnary taxes extends beyond the period when the zero bound constraint
binds and the central bank follows a Taylor rule, then the government multiplier
is signicantly lower even in the short run because of the negative news e¤ect
of future distortionnary taxes depresses current aggregate demand.
Distortionnary taxation also makes the timing of taxes important, breaking
Ricardian equivalence. In the exible price economy, because a high distortion-
nary tax rate is more costly when output is low, a balanced budget policy can
worsen aggregate uctuations relative to a policy of lowering the tax to GDP
ratio in a recession and raising it in a boom (See Ljunqvist and Sargent (2004)
[137], chapter 15, for more on the optimality of tax rate smoothing). In general,
analysis of models with distortionnary taxes shifts some of the debate on coun-
tercyclical scal policy towards questions of the e¢ ciency of the overall tax mix
used to nance government spending instead of just looking at the pure e¤ect
of changes in gt:
17.7 Flexible capital adjustment, credit constrained house-
holds and other extensions
Flexible capital has the same e¤ect as for other shocks with exible prices of
allowing for an aggregate consumption smoothing channel and reducing real in-
terest rate volatility. Households can now partly compensate for lower wealth
in response to temporarily higher government spending through lower invest-
ment. For transitory shocks, investment usually declines. With exible prices,
a key di¤erence in comparison to the xed capital economy is that now more
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persistent government spending shocks have larger multipliers ( Aiyagari et al
(1992) [3], Baxter and King (1993)[22] and Leeper et al (2011) [134], because
investment declines by less or even increases.
A more persistent increase in government spending has a bigger negative im-
pact on permanent income. This reduces the scope for consumption smoothing,
leading to a bigger drop in consumption and higher aggregate saving through
capital.The larger drop in permanent income also implies a stronger negative
income e¤ect, leading to a bigger increase in labour supply over several periods.
This leads to a persistent and potentially large increase in the marginal prod-
uct of capital, further boosting investment. If the shock is persistent enought,
investment must increase.
To see this, consider a permanent shock nanced by lump sum tax increases
(or transfer cuts). The long run interest rate is determined by the household
discount factor which is independent of lump sum tax changes. So higher gov-
ernment spending has no impact on the real interest rate in the long run. Mean-
while the permanent increase in labour supply due to higher taxes increases the
return on capital, and raises the optimal capital stock. In the short run, rms
gradually build up the capital stock to its new long run level through higher in-
vestment. In fact permanent higher government spending shocks nanced with
lump sum taxes can generate government spending multipliers for output above
1 in the RBC model, if labour supply elasticity is high enough (Baxter and King
(1993)[22]).For highly persistent but transitory shocks, investment is still likely
to increase, and multipliers above 1 are still possible if labour supply is elastic
enough.
This analysis highlights an important di¤erence between exible price and
sticky price economies for government spending shocks. Sticky price models pre-
dict a higher government spending multiplier in the short run for less persistent
shocks. In contrast the baseline RBC model predicts that more persistent gov-
ernment spending shocks lead to bigger short run multipliers if the government
uses lump sum taxes.
For realistic distortionnary taxes and shock persistence, the RBC model
still generates impact multipliers signicantly below 1 and negative long run
multipliers. For New Keynesian economies the model with exible capital still
predicts that we can have impact multipliers above 1 (though typically below
1 with active monetary policy and distortionnary taxes), and that long run
multipliers are below the short run multipliers with either negative or positive
signs (but above the RBC long run multipliers) (Leeper et al 2011) [134]. Once
again, the multiplier can be much larger than 1 in sticky price economies when
the ZLB is binding.
Finally there are several other important elements that can a¤ect government
spending multipliers. A higher proportion of nancially constrained households
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tends to increase multipliers in sticky price or wage economies, with a higher
probability of a multiplier above 1 at least on impact. This is due to the tra-
ditional aggregate demand multiplier e¤ect: higher government spending raises
aggregate demand, which raises the current income of credit constrained house-
holds, which then increase their consumption. Complementarity between con-
sumption and labour e¤ort also increases the multiplier above 1 in New Keyne-
sian models, since the higher output in response to higher government spending
again stimulates consumption. In the other direction, in an open economy where
the current account is endogenous government spending multiplier will tend to
decrease (see Leeper et al (2011) [134])
18 Unconventional Monetary Policy
This section studies central bank intervention in credit markets through mea-
sures such as asset purchases or discount window lending in an attempt to reduce
credit market frictions. We focus on central bank lending to nancial institu-
tions or direct central bank lending to the private sector through purchases in
private debt markets. These operations are frequently known as credit easing.
Suppose there is a signicant worsening in borrowing conditions, represented
in our economy as some combination of higher efph;t+1; vf;t; k;t; nd;t and  c;t:
In economies with credit frictions, transfers of resources from nancially un-
constrained to nancially constrained agents can reduce credit frictions. So a
government program that subsidizes credit constrained agents at the expense
of taxing other agents can increase output, though the welfare consequences of
this transfer need to be carefully assessed, since it is not necessarily a Pareto
improvement.
Can central bank intervention in private debt markets reduce these frictions
and stimulate economic activity without hurting some agents (by forcing them
to accept losses in order to implement a transfer to other more credit constrained
agents) ? The baseline answer in an RBC model without heterogeneity across
nancial institutions is no: the distribution of assets and liabilities across nan-
cial intermediaries is irrelevant, except possibly through the specication of the
stochastic process of the wedges.
When engaging in unconventional monetary policy the central bank essen-
tially behaves like a nancial intermediary, borrowing from some agents in the
private sector (either through selling government debt or by expanding the sup-
ply of reserves) and lending to other private sector agents. Without specifying
any advantage for the central bank in solving the moral hazard or asymmet-
ric information problems that a¤ect private nancial intermediaries, the central
bank cannot do any better than them. In that case credit easing is irrelevant.
Central bank lending to nal borrowers simply crowds out private lending to
nal borrowers.
186
If the central bank lends to private nancial intermediaries, these intermedi-
aries cut back their own lending to other private intermediaries, or they redeposit
the central bank loans back at the central bank as reserves. This fundamental
point holds in general for models of unconventional monetary policy in which
the nancing frictions are explicitly modelled (for example Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010) [93] ).
For central bank credit easing to reduce credit frictions while maintaining
Pareto optimality, the central bank must have an advantage in terms of solving
the fundamental causes of the worsening borrowing conditions. More formally,
it must have a better borrowing or lending technology. For example, central
bank liabilities are often implicitly backed by the governments ability to tax
or by seignorage revenues, which reduces moral hazard or asymmetric informa-
tion problems concerning the quality of loans made by the central bank (note
from this perspective, the scal authorities could also engage in credit easing
operations - see for example Kocherlakota (2009), Del Negro et al (2011) [149]
, Gertler and Karadi (2011) [92]). To the degree that private sector agents are
concerned that the government may have hit a scal limit on its ability to tax,
so that the government debt itself is subject to default risk or ination risk (in
order to devalue nominal debt), this reduces the ability of the central bank or
the nance department to reduce credit frictions. 63
In the presence of asymmetric information or ambiguity aversion problems in
debt markets, there may be a role for a large nancial intermediary to coordinate
a pooling of other nancial institutionsassets. The pooled portfolio diversies
risk and reduces asymmetric information or ambiguity about nancial returns 64 .
For example, the nancial intermediary could swap other nancial institutions
assets that are subject to asymmetric information in return for shares in a well
diversied portfolio of these assets. This is the essence of several proposals to
solve sovereign default risk related asymmetric information in European debt
markets in the autumn of 2011 (see for example Brunnermeier et al (2011), Uhlig
et al (2011)). A central bank or a scal authority may have some advantages in
coordinating such an asset swap.
Central bank or in general government lending to nancial institutions in
distress can also be more e¤ective than private sector lending if it is easier for the
63 In a monetary union, the scal backing of the central bank is more uncertain, in which
case credit easing is signicantly less likely to be successful (this may explain the much greater
reluctance of the ECB in 2011 to engage in credit easing relative to the Federal Reserve in
2008). In general, the backing of government debt through taxes in an environment with credit
constraints breaks Ricardian equivalence. Under certain circumstances, higher government
debt levels can alleviate liquidity constraints by allowing agents to save more easily (see Perez
(2010) for an insightful analysis using the Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) [127] model of liquidity
constraints).
64See Caballero and Krishnamurty (2008) about ambiguity aversion and nancial crises.
See Diamond (1984) [65] for a similar argument in a costly state verication environment
about how a nancial institution o¤ering claims to a well diversied asset portfolio can reduce
assymetric information problems.
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central bank or government to enforce measure such as audits or stress testing
that directly reduce asymmetric information and moral hazard concerns. There
is an exception to these results if the credit crunch was caused by the bursting
of an asset price bubble. In that case, it may be possible for the government
to counter the collapse of the bubble by introducing another asset in its place
as a new bubble (e.g Kocherlakota (2009)). A successful introduction of a new
bubble asset would restore the old equilibrium with a higher economic activity.
But without scal backing , this intervention is subject to multiple equilibria,
including negative ones where the new asset is (close to) worthless. In other
circumstances, the government cannot nance credit market interventions by
introducing a pure bubble at all (Miao and Wang (2011)).
Finally, nancial frictions can under certain circumstances generate multiple
equilibria (often called sunspot equilibria in the literature). In that case, it is
possible that if (almost) everyone in the economy believes that central bank in-
tervention can avoid or stabilise a crisis, then an intervention which is otherwise
neutral could indeed avoid a crisis by coordinating agentsbeliefs on the more
positive, optimistic equilibrium. Here unconventional monetary policy simply
serves as a coordination device for eliminating a bad equilibrium.
One way to formalise this is in a Diamond Dybvig style framework (Freixas
and Rochet (1997), ch. 7 [86]), in which there are two types of banks. Due to
illiquidity or default risk, and imperfect liquidation procedures,Type A banks
are subject to a self fullling belief by depositors that the bank will become
insolvent. As a result, absent further intervention depositors all want to with-
draw their funds, and type A banks would in fact become insolvent. Type B
banks are for some unspecied reason not subject to this belief: depositors in
those banks have somehow coordinated on the alternative equilibrium in which
no one wants to withdraw their deposits and the bank does not default. In this
case, if depositors in A banks share these beliefs about B banks, they may agree
to redeposit their withdrawn funds in type B banks. Type B banks could then
lend out these new deposits to type A banks, making them solvent again. If we
call the type B bank a central bank, we get a theory of how monetary policy
can prevent sunspot based bank runs.
Of course, there are no guarantees in this story that the central bank is
itself not subject to a sunspot based bank run. Something combination of scal
backing of the central bank through taxation, the use of seignorage revenues
or surprise ination (to reduce the real value of government debt) are required
to eliminate the possibility of a run on the central bank. 65 The situation is
more complicated if there are other reasons for potential bank defaults, such as
asymmetric information, moral hazard or ambiguity aversion. Furthermore, it is
possible that the central bank intervenes but fails to coordinate expectations on
the positive equilibrium initially. Then the perception of disappointing results
65Note the parallel to our earlier discussion in which a legal requirement to use money was
required to eliminate the self fullling belief that money has no value.
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of the intervention can make agents more pessimistic and worsen a crisis. In
that sense, policy interventions that rely purely on multiple equilibria and self
fullling prophecies are fundamentally more fragile than other interventions that
also work in environments with unique equilibria. This makes the latter class
of policies preferable whenever they are available.
19 Appendix A, a benchmark DSGEmodel equa-
tions
19.1 Households:
19.1.1 The representative saver
Representative saver optimisation problem:
max
fcsa;t;nst ;Dt+1;bt+1g1t=0
E0
1
t=0sa;tu(csa;t; Dsa;t+1; lsa;t)
subject to a sequence of constraints
csa;t(1 +  c;t) + pD;t(1 + D;t) [Dsa;t+1   (1  D)Dsa;t] + bsa;t+1 
bsa;tRtefpsa;h;t + wt(1  nst)nsa;t + dht + Tt, (sa;t);
nsa;t = 1  lsa;t;
uc > 0; ucc < 0; uD > 0; uDD < 0; ul > 0; ull < 0; uc;l  0:
Representative saver optimisation conditions
csa;t : sa;t(1 +  c;t) = uc;t
nsa;t : ul;sa;t = sa;twt(1  ns;t)
bsa;t+1 : sa;t = Et
sa;t+1
sa;t
efph;t+1Rt+1sa;t+1:
pD;t(1 + D;t) =
uDsa;t+1
sa;t
+ Et
sa;t+1
sa;t
sa;t+1
sa;t
pD;t+1(1 + D;t+1)(1  D):
19.1.2 The representative borrower
Representative borrower problem:
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max
fcbo;t;nbo;t;dbo;t+1;bbo;t+1g
E0
1
t=0bo;tu(cbo;t; Dbo;t+1; lbo;t)
subject to a sequence of constraints
cbo;t(1 +  c;t) + pD;t(1 + D;t) [Dbo;t+1   (1  D)Dbo;t] + bbo;t+1  bbo;tRtefpbo:h;t
+wt(1  nst)nbo;t + Tt, (bo;t);
 bbo;t+1  bt+1 +mbo;tpD;tDbo;t+1;
(t+1);
bt+1j  0; 0  mbo;t  1:
nbo;t = 1  lbo;t;
uc > 0; ucc < 0; ul > 0; ull < 0; uc;l  0:
Representative borrower optimality conditions:
cbo;t : bo;t(1 +  c;t) = uc;bo;t
nbo;t : ul;bo;t = bo;twt(1  ns;t)
bbo;t+1 : bo;t = Et
bo;t+1
bo;t
efpbo;h;t+1Rt+1bo;t+1 + Et
bo;t+1
bo;t
t+1
 Et
bo;t+1
bo;t
ef pbo;h;t+1Rt+1bo;t+1
pD;t(1 + D;t) =
uDbo;t+1
bo;t
+ Et
bo;t+1
bo;t
bo;t+1
bo;t
pD;t+1(1 + D;t+1)(1  D) + Et
bo;t+1
bo;t
mbo;tpD;tt+1:
19.2 Representative rm
Optimisation problem:
max
fkt+1;mt;ntg
E0
1
t=0f;tdt;
dt = g(Atmt; em;t)ztf(kt; Atnt)  wt(1 + nd;t)(nt +mt)  pkt (1 + k;t)[kt+1   (1  t)kt]
 bf;t+1 + bf;tRtefpe;t;
gm > 0; gmm < 0; gem > 0; fn > 0; fnn < 0; fk > 0; fkk < 0
; g(am; :)f(ak; an)  ag(m; :)f(k; n) for all a  0: At = GyAt 1; Gy  1:
Optimisation conditions:
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nt : gtztfn;t = wt(1 + nd;t);
mt : gm;tztft = wt(1 + nd;t);
bf;t+1 : f;t = Rt+1Etefpe;t+1f;t+1;
kt+1 : pk;t(1 + k;t) = Et
f;t+1
f;t
[gt+1zt+1fk;t+1 + (1  t+1)(1 + k;t+1)pk;t+1]:
Link between discount factors and external nance premia of rms
and households:
vf;t =
f;t
sa;tsa;t
;
Et
vf;t+1
vf;t
' Etefpsa;h;t+1
Etefpe;t+1
:
19.3 Capital production sector
19.3.1 Business capital
The representative capital producer solves
max
kt+1
k;t = pk;tx
k
t   It
xkt = kt+1   (1  t)kt = atG(
It
kt
)kt
; G0(:) > 0; G00(:)  0:
Capital supply:
atpk;tG
0(
It
kt
) = 1:
19.3.2 Durable goods
Representative durable goods producer problem
max
Dt
D;t = max
Dt
pD;tx
D
t   IDt :
xDt = Dt+1   (1  D)Dt = aDt G(
IDt
Dt
)Dt
; G0(:) > 0; G00(:)  0:
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Durables supply:
aDt pD;tG
0(
IDt
Dt
) = 1:
19.4 Market clearing conditions
iicit = ct;
iiDit = Dt;
ct + It + I
D
t + gt = yt
iini;t = nst = nt +mt;
iibi;t = 0; i 2 fsa; bo; fg;
sad
h
t = dt + k;t + D;t
i = sa; bo:
20 Appendix B, a benchmark DSGEmodel with
search and matching frictions
This is an extension of the baseline model with pervasive matching frictions
in all goods and labour markets. We leave the di¤erent matching rates (job
nding rate, vacancy lling rate, product nding rate, etc...) as exogeneous
wedges that measure the ine¢ ciency of markets relative to the perfect matching
Walrasian equilibrium benchmark. These matching rates can be partially endo-
genised by assuming for example Cobb-Douglas matching functions and various
combinations of Nash bargaining, directed search or price and wage rigidity.
20.1 Households:
20.1.1 The representative saver
Representative saver optimisation problem:
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max
fcsa;t;Scsa;t;;Sdsa;t;ensa;t;nst ;Dt+1;bt+1g1t=0
E0
1
t=0sa;t[u(csa;t; Dsa;t+1; lsa;t)  vc(Scsa;t)  vd(SDsa;t)  ansa;tensa;t]
subject to a sequence of constraints
csa;t(1 +  c;t) + pD;t(1 + D;t) [Dsa;t+1   (1  D)Dsa;t] + bsa;t+1 
bsa;tRtefpsa;h;t + wt(1  nst)nsa;t + dht + Tsa;t, (sa;t);
csa;t  ctScsa;t; (SCsa;t):
Dsa;t+1   (1  D)Dsa;t  Dt SDsa;t; (SDsa;t):
nsa;t   (1  n;t)nsa;t 1  'nsa;tensa;t; (nsat ):
nsa;t = 1  lsa;t;
uc > 0; ucc < 0; uD > 0; uDD < 0; ul > 0; ull < 0; uc;l  0:
vS > 0; vScSc  0
Representative saver optimisation conditions
csa;t : sa;t(1 +  c;t) = uc;t   csa;t
Scsa;t : vScsa;t = 
c
t
SC
sa;t;
Sdsa;t : vSDsa;t = 
SD
sa;t
D
t ;
ensa;t : an;t = 
ns
sa;t'ns;t;
nsa;t : ulsa;t = sa;twt(1  ns;t)  nssa;t + Et
sa;t+1
sa;t
nssa;t+1(1  n;t+1);)
ulsa;t +
an;t
'ns;t
= sa;twt(1  ns;t) + Et
sa;t+1
sa;t
an;t+1
'ns;t+1
(1  n;t+1)
bsa;t+1 : sa;t = Et
sa;t+1
sa;t
efph;t+1Rt+1sa;t+1:
Dsa;t+1 : pD;t(1 + D;t) +
SDsa;t
sa;t
=
uDt+1
sa;t
+Et
sa;t+1
sa;t
sa;t+1
sa;t
"
pD;t+1(1 + D;t+1) +
SDsa;t+1
sa;t+1
#
(1  D)
)
Dsa;t+1 : DpD;t(1 + D;t) +
vSDsa;t
sa;t
D
t
=
uDt+1
sa;t
+Et
sa;t+1
sa;t
sa;t+1
sa;t
"
pD;t+1(1 + D;t+1) +
vSDsa;t+1
sa;t+1
D
t+1
#
(1  D)
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20.1.2 The representative borrower
Representative borrower problem:
max
fcbo;t;Scbo;t;;Sdbo;tenbo;t;;nbo;t;dbo;t+1;bbo;t+1g
E0
1
t=0bo;t[u(cbo;t; Dbo;t+1; lbo;t)  vc(Scbo;t)  vd(SDbo;t)  anbo;tenbo;t]
subject to a sequence of constraints
cbo;t(1 +  c;t) + pD;t(1 + D;t) [Dbo;t+1   (1  D)Dbo;t] + bbo;t+1  bbo;tRtefpbo:h;t
+wt(1  nst)nbo;t + Tbo;t, (bo;t);
 bbo;t+1  bt+1 +mbo;tpD;tDbo;t+1;
(bt+1);
bt+1j  0; 0  mbo;t  1:
cbo;t  ctScbo;t; (SCbo;t):
Dbo;t+1   (1  D)Dbo;t  Dt SDbo;t; (SDbo;t):
nbo;t   (1  n;t)nbo;t 1  'nbo;tenbo;t; (nbot ):
nbo;t = 1  lbo;t;
uc > 0; ucc < 0; ul > 0; ull < 0; uc;l  0;
vS > 0; vScSc  0:
Representative borrower optimality conditions:
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cbo;t : bo;t(1 +  c;t) = uc;bo;t   SCbo;t
Scbo;t : vScbo;t = 
c
t
SC
bo;t;
Sdbo;t : vSDbo;t = 
SD
bo;t
D
t ;
enbo;t : an;t = 
ns
bo;t'ns;t;
nbo;t : ul;bo;t = bo;twt(1  ns;t)  nsbo;t + Et
bo;t+1
bo;t
nsbo;t+1(1  n;t+1);)
ul;bo;t +
an;t
'ns;t
= bo;twt(1  ns;t) + Et
bo;t+1
bo;t
an;t+1
'ns;t+1
(1  n;t+1)
bbo;t+1 : bo;t = Et
bo;t+1
bo;t
efpbo;h;t+1Rt+1bo;t+1 + Et
bo;t+1
bo;t
bt+1
 Et
bo;t+1
bo;t
ef pbo;h;t+1Rt+1bo;t+1
Dbo;t+1 : pD;t(1 + Dt) +
SDbo;t
bo;t
=
uDbo;t+1
bo;t
+Et
bo;t+1
bo;t
bo;t+1
bo;t
pD;t+1
"
(1  D)(1 + D;t+1) +
SDbo;t+1
bo;t+1
#
+Et
bo;t+1
bo;t
mbo;tpD;t
b
t+1:
)
Dbo;t+1 : pD;t(1 + Dt) +
vSDbo;t
bo;t
D
t
=
uDbo;t+1
bo;t
+Et
bo;t+1
bo;t
bo;t+1
bo;t
pD;t+1
"
(1  D)(1 + D;t+1) +
vSDbo;t+1
bo;t+1
D
t+1
#
+Et
bo;t+1
bo;t
mbo;tpD;t
b
t+1:
20.2 Representative rm
Optimisation problem:
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max
fkt+1;V kt ;V nt ;mt;ntg
E0
1
t=0f;tdt;
dt = g(Atmt; em;t)ztf(kt; Atnt)  wt(1 + nd;t)(nt +mt)  pkt (1 + k;t)[kt+1   (1  t)kt]
 bf;t+1 + bf;tRtefpe;t
 FN (V nt )   (V kt );
subject to
kt+1   (1  t)kt  'kt V kt , (kt ),
ndt   ndt 1(1  n;t)  'nd;tV nt ; (ndt ).
gm > 0; gmm < 0; gem > 0; fn > 0; fnn < 0; fk > 0; fkk < 0;
 V k > 0; V kV k  0; FNV n > 0; FNV nV n  0:
; g(am; :)f(ak; an)  ag(m; :)f(k; n) for all a  0: At = GyAt 1; Gy  1:
Optimisation conditions:
V kt :  V kt = 
k
t'
k
t ;
V nt : F
N
V Nt
= ndt 'nd;t:
ndt : gtztfn;t + Et
ft+1
ft
ndt+1(1  n;t+1) = wt(1 + nd;t) + ndt ;)
gtztfn;t + Et
ft+1
ft
FN
V Nt+1
'nd;t+1
(1  n;t+1) = wt(1 + nd;t) +
FN
V Nt
'nd;t
mt : gm;tztft = wt(1 + nd;t);
bf;t+1 : f;t = Rt+1Etefpe;t+1f;t+1;
kt+1 : pk;t(1 + k;t) + 
k
t =
Et
f;t+1
f;t
(gt+1zt+1fk;t+1 + (1  t+1)[(1 + k;t+1)pk;t+1 + kt+1]);
)
pk;t(1 + k;t) +
 V kt
'kt
=
Et
f;t+1
f;t
(gt+1zt+1fk;t+1 + (1  t+1)[(1 + k;t+1)pk;t+1 +
 V kt+1
'kt+1
])
Link between discount factors and external nance premia of rms
and households:
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vf;t =
f;t
sa;tsa;t
;
Et
vf;t+1
vf;t
' Etefpsa;h;t+1
Etefpe;t+1
:
20.3 Capital production sector
20.3.1 Business capital
The representative capital producer solves
max
kt+1
k;t = pk;tx
k
t   It
xkt = kt+1   (1  t)kt = atG(
It
kt
)kt
; G0(:) > 0; G00(:)  0:
Capital supply:
atpk;tG
0(
It
kt
) = 1:
20.3.2 Durable goods
Representative durable goods producer problem
max
Dt
D;t = max
Dt
pD;tx
D
t   IDt :
xDt = Dt+1   (1  D)Dt = aDt G(
IDt
Dt
)Dt
; G0(:) > 0; G00(:)  0:
Durables supply:
aDt pD;tG
0(
IDt
Dt
) = 1:
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20.4 Market clearing conditions
iicit = ct;
iiDit = Dt;
ct + It + I
D
t + gt = yt   FN (V nt )   (V kt ):
iini;t = nst = nt +mt;
iibi;t = 0; ; i 2 fsa; bo; fg;
sad
h
t = dt + k;t + D;t
i = sa; bo:
0  i  1 for i = c; d
0  'j  1 for j = ns; nd; k:
21 State space representation and extension to
hybrid models
Here kt is a vector or endogenous, predetermined, state variables (note that these
may include a subset of yt 1; for example lagged consumption or investment). yt
is a vector of endogenous non state variables.  t is a vector of stochastic wedges.
Ft is a vector of exogenous factors driving the wedges. Note that a subset of
the variables  t could itself be part of Ft: Higher order lags are included by
expanding the state vactor with new auxiliary variables, e.g kt 1 = k 1;t.
kt+1 = g(kt;  t; e
k
t+1);
yt = h(kt;  t; vy;t);
 t = (kt; Ft; e

t );
Ft+1 = (Ft; e
F
t+1);
et ; e
F
t ; vy;t v IID shocks.
Let st = (kt;Ft): A general hybrid model represents yt as
yt = H(st; yt 1; vt);
where H(:) encompasses h(:) as a special case. We can use the DSGE function
h(:) to form priors on h: In the special case of a linear approximation to the
DSGE model, this reduces to a DSGE-VARX model:
yt = Ayt 1 +Bst + vt;
st = Cst 1 + et;
replacing the unobserved st with stjT : As before we can use priors from the
DSGE model, setting A0 to 0 and B0; C0 to the corresponding matrix from the
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DSGE equations
yt = gst;
st = fst 1 + et:
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